Muratbek Imanaliev

President of the Institute for Public Policy, Associate Professor of the American University - Central Asia

22.04.2006

 

The second half of the 20^th century witnessed the appearance of new actors in the international arena. Classic players in this field – governments of states – were joined by global and regional international organizations of different types (UN, OSCE, OIC, EU, OAU CIS, SCO and so on), transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations (Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch). It must be emphasized that not always are these enterprises dependent on governments, and in some cases it is the governments that are dependent on them. Nowadays, one sees such inverse relationships more and more often.

In recent years, the above-mentioned international actors have been sidelined by various international criminal groups that seek to take on world leadership roles. 

All the actors are interdependent and interconnected, often within the boundaries of positive political, economic and humanitarian spheres. However, no less often this interaction is charged with negative dynamics and meaning, as is the case with trans-border criminal organizations.

Each of the international actors has its own niche. Governments present their interests through the discourse of “international standards,” which some of the current nation-states are able to manipulate in clever ways, while others, which have not yet been able to construct their national interests and sort out their internal role, remain the objects of various Great Games and other political schemes.

Advancement and defense of national interests is ensured by many mechanisms, including brute power and economic resources, a consolidated society, and an internal political agenda positively perceived by global community. However, no less important an element of the political resource base necessary for strengthening any country’s position on the international arena (and defending national interests) is the reputation of the country and its government, which serves either to develop or to ruin the trust of the international community. (In this case, we are now greatly downgrading the importance of geographic location, territory, population size, etc.).

Kyrgyzstan’s reputation indicator swiftly went down after 2000. The exceptionally important image of our country as an “island of democracy,” which was an enormous resource for Kyrgyzstan in its relationship with the developed world and neighboring states, was destroyed by the Kyrgyz authorities of that period. Kyrgyzstan’s credo as a democratic country in the early stage of development was not only actively supported by western governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, but also served in a way as a defense mechanism in fighting organized crime at the international level. 

After the events of March 24 2005, the credit advance of trust towards Kyrgyzstan from the international community was significant. The resource potential of such attitudes could have brought our country vast dividends of a different kind. However, in a paradoxical way, the current government has ruined this trust following its amateurish and inept steps.

As it was mentioned, demonstrating keystone elements of internal politics represents the most important resource base for the foreign policy of the country, as well as a signal to international community. In this context, realizing constitutional, administrative, and economic reforms, decreasing the level of corruption, fighting organized crime and its attempts to enter the authority structures, and committing to neutralization of other sources of crisis might have given significant “capital” for foreign policy maneuvers.

Yet, to the greatest regret, the new authorities have done the opposite, resulting in Kyrgyzstan gaining an image as a semi-criminal, degenerating state. It was very unpleasant to hear from a close strategic ally – Russia – an official message that Kyrgyzstan should seriously engage the issues of promoting political stability and struggling against criminal elements penetrating governmental structures. Not to mention other state positions. Only one thing must be added here: the inactivity of the authorities on these matters breeds distrust and disbelief, resulting in a vacuum (in the context of international interaction) not around the country, but around the country’s leadership. Permanent expansion of this vacuum may lead to international isolation.  

What does it mean in our case?

At this moment, the level of political interaction along the lines of bilateral relations with chief partners is at its lowest. Except for short, minor meetings with the leadership of Russia, China and Uzbekistan during meetings of the CIS, Eurasian Economic Community, and SCO, there have not been serious visits or meetings with state leaders. 

With America, except for issues related to the Gansi airbase, there is a lack of a permanent channel of interaction. The situation is worse with the European Union. with Japan it is at the same level.

During the past year, there was not a single foreign policy statement made, even on the most important issues of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, by either the president or prime minister, or by the minister foreign relations. Only unclear “whispers in the ear” were offered. Given the growing distrust of and discontent with Kyrgyz internal policies, Moscow, Beijing, Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, Astana, and Tashkent, as well as other capitals, finally want to learn Bishkek’s clear and precise positions.   

A bit about the Gansi airbase: For Kyrgyzstan, it is more than an issue of bilateral Kyrgyz-American relations. The opening of the airbase is not directly based on an appropriate UN resolution, but clearly correlates with it. It is a base of the antiterrorist coalition (that is the formal reason of course, but in inferring the official positions, one should work with formal statements, as everything else is corridor-talk diplomacy), the creation of which was openly or tacitly supported by Russia, China and other countries. Of course, the “base” is a multilayer, ambiguous phenomenon. If the opening of the Gansi airbase is related to Afghanistan (e.g. the Taliban), and if the exact perspective on relative stability or instability in Afghanistan should be determined by the UN Security Council – then the permanent and non-permanent members of the UN Security Council should decide on this issue. Kyrgyzstan will act in accordance with that decision. Such an approach allows our great partners to understand that the Gansi airbase issue cannot be a Kyrgyz problem only, or only a part of Kyrgyz-American relations.       

Any military airbase is seen by neighbors as a potential threat to them. The existence of military airbases on Kyrgyz territory provokes some level of nervousness among our neighbors and some terrorist organizations.

In a situation when international isolation becomes a real possibility, the Gansi airbase plays the role of a magnet that attracts chief players to Kyrgyzstan, creating conditions that are unappealing, yet necessary for maintaining relations with them. If Kyrgyzstan presses harder and the Americans remove the airbase, the US administration will leave Kyrgyzstan (which does not mean the American organizations will leave the country), and inter-governmental reactions will slow down. With the departure of the US, Russia will leave too. Most likely, China will breath a sigh of relief, but the expectation of positive steps towards China on behalf of Kyrgyzstan will remain. The European Union never had serious interests in Kyrgyzstan, and is not likely to have any in the future.  

At the same time, the country will attract the attention of international nongovernmental organizations, (especially human rights organizations) and criminal syndicates. Devoid of Americans, Europeans, and Russians (in a political and humanitarian sense), Kyrgyzstan may turn into a breeding ground for international criminals and thugs of all kinds.

Finalizing on the Gansi issue, it must be noted that the Kyrgyz President’s statement on the airbase, dated April 19, 2005 represented nothing other than a desire to gain Moscow’s favor on the eve of his visit to Russia. Moscow will be solicited not only for political support, but also for economic assistance. A discouraging statement on the issue came from the Russian Armed Forces chief of staff, general Baleuvski: “The American airbase in Kyrgyzstan does not disturb us [Russia]”. It should be inferred correctly that this answer was directed not to the Americans (as such an answer was given to them long before), but was intended for the Kyrgyz president. 

Objections might be expected that the Kyrgyz president’s statement was not related to the visit in any way, and that the issue has been addressed long ago, but the time for such straightforward perceptions has long passed. This is not the first time such a situation arose and appropriate conclusions were made.

Despite its modest political resources, the new authorities of Kyrgyzstan are still capable of restoring the country’s image in the international arena.

First, serious reforms must be launched immediately, including social and economic, constitutional and cadre policy reforms. Kyrgyz society must be consolidated in order to halt its dehumanization and degeneration.

Second, organized crime and its advancement into structures of authority should be stopped.

Third, the country’s national interests should be formulated in the international arena.  

To conclude, the geographic factor was never in our favor, and now the factor of time is against us as well.