Valentin Bogatyrev, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, adviser to the President of the Kyrgyz Republic

Traditionalism in foreign policy orientation is becoming one of those old suits which we do not want to change, but must throw away if we want to correspond to modern standards of foreign policy, above all to tomorrow’s trends of world foreign policy fashion.

The existence of old geopolitical paradigms, and our attempts to continue moving along them, is one of the main sources of Kyrgyzstan’s problems. Our fifteen-year history of statehood demonstrates on a number of occasions a firm correlation between the level of multi-vector foreign policy and the level of engagement in domestic policy. The ease with which the country was receiving resources for social reorganization during the transition period produced severe political conflict. The disparity between the ideal of good-democracy and its real features has become more noticeable.

Of critical danger to our country is the strategic mistake committed while negotiating U.S. policy in the region: an orientation of assistance not on investments for the development of the economy, but on political (not administrative) modernization.

At minimum, such a policy has produced three negative consequences for Kyrgyzstan: (1) the lack of any serious economic projects despite fifteen years of funding, (2) corruption, and (3) the formation of an entire social cluster in the country which subsists solely on foreign support.

Richard Boucher could be acknowledging the mistakenness of this strategy through his invitation to participate in the formation of a single energy zone in Central Asia.  Recall however that it results from the logic of the “Partnership for Development of Bigger Central Asia” Project (PBCA), which is based on the same paradigm of confrontation with Russia and China. Nevertheless, the good thing is that this project focuses on developing the economy, not democracy.

Russia’s policy in the country has mainly been dictated by the motive of fighting the “American presence” in the Kyrgyz Republic. It is not just a coincidence that the main visitors to our country are officials from law enforcement agencies and coordinators of military-political organizations.

Ever-cautious China is also not going beyond the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in its presence in Kyrgyzstan. Although Chinese goods speak on behalf of the Chinese government, having totally occupied our markets, here it is the laws of economics in force rather than the political plans of Beijing.

The transformation of Kyrgyzstan into a deployment site for the troops of two different, and from a certain perspective opposing military-political alliances is the result of tri-part military-political maneuvering. A Chinese military base did not appear in the country only because the Chinese did not want that. Although military bases are good political business, and hosting military bases of opposing world powers is a good way of ensuring security, dependency is great within such an “economy” of political whims. Moreover, the sovereignty of the state becomes merely a conditional notion.

Looking over our shoulder at the “three power centers” has become commonplace not only for politicians and experts, but for the general public as well. It is enough to start a talk in the most remote area of Kyrgyzstan to be certain of this.

Is this situation evidence of “Kyrgyzstan’s destiny”?

If regarding our past, then yes. The importance of neighborly relations with China involves a thousand year-long history. With Russia, relations involve the last two centuries of history. With the U.S., they involve the modern history of the sovereign Kyrgyz Republic.

However, the same history testifies that such a strong attachment to a trilateral orientation is the source of multiple problems for Kyrgyzstan. Among them are losses of language and culture, environmental problems, high sensitivity of the internal political field to external influences, and decreased possibilities for implementing an independent economic policy.

Still, the most unpleasant outcome is that we are constantly being tortured by the question: “who are you with?” We are forced to make existential choices on even the most petty issues. If you join a rally – you are for America; if you send your child to a school with Russian as a medium of instruction – you are a Russian agent; if you construct a railroad – you facilitate Chinese demographic expansion, and so forth, whereas you really just want to be Kyrgyz and act in a certain way because you like to live that way. Obviously, the orientation on traditional power centers – Russia, China, and the U.S.A. – is a paradigm which generates confrontation in foreign policy, domestic policy, and socio-cultural policy. 

This problem should be resolved by exiting the triangle.

It is possible only through formation of a new field of vectors unrelated to the old one.

Such new field of vectors for Kyrgyzstan could be formed through developing relations with another troika: Europe (primarily Germany) – India – Japan.

Today these states make claims as new world centers, or at least have grounds to join the leading world powers which define policies in the world.

For Kyrgyzstan, such orientation within a new triad could create resistance to competition between the traditional power centers, and could ensure freedom to a greater extent. In fact, owing to such reconfiguration, the Central Asian region could acquire a new geopolitical and geo-economic framework and acquire a new status.

It is exceptionally important that this troika, unlike the existing one, presents regimes that are not ideological or overwhelmed with missionary zeal.  Issues of ideology in all of these states are contained within their domestic affairs.

Through cooperation with these states, there could be access to means of effective administration and social organization which are more applicable to the mentality of Central Asian states than American, Chinese, or even Russian standards of social organization. Their character of functioning machines correspond to those already existing in Central Asia.

Finally, we are talking about states which are carriers of the highest technology, including not only material, but also informational and cultural. Increasing the interest of these states towards Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia would involve our suggesting that the benefits of cooperation, consideration and attraction are mutual.

If within the forthcoming five years we will be able to advance relations with this troika to the same level as with China, Russia and the U.S.A. then Kyrgyzstan will receive unique opportunities for development. There will be new horizons, new views from our window, in place of a landscape which has currently become quite boring. Is it necessary to prove that this step would facilitate the development of relations with our traditional “strategic partners?” It would indeed facilitate them, but together with new, different relations.