I think that few people in Russia ponder over the titular question of this article. By the highest standards, there are few Russians, especially those under 30, who could immediately name the capital city of Kyrgyzstan. I am convinced that when mention is made of a tiny state in Central Asia (and this generation is used to referring to this region as Sredniaia Azia, Middle Asia) older Russians will recall Chingiz Aitmatov, perhaps Issyk-kul…and that is it. Maybe those who have been watching the news program Vremya regularly for the past fifteen years can name Askar Akaev, whose image is imprinted in their memory thanks to his white headdress, which made him look taller…

These last among the more or less politically aware Russians, perhaps, will talk about Kyrgyzstan as a country where enemies of Russia tried to carry out another "orange revolution" and install their puppet. It is not unlikely that they will mention in this regard America, who deployed their military base and tried to force the Russians out of Kyrgyzstan.

Finally, and here I mean residents of Moscow who are far from politics, there are those who will point to Kyrgyzstan as a state which is being abandoned by many people who come to Russia’s capital for work, and who most often differ from other guest workers by their orange working vests and coats (as reported in late May by Apas Jumagulov, Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan in Moscow, some 16,000 Kyrgyz labor migrants arrived in Russia in 2005, which is 6-7% of the total number of migrants, though not all of them register with local authorities). They work mainly in the housing and communal service, and compared to local workers they work with more responsibility and neatness.

Therefore, I believe that the question, "what use does Kyrgyzstan have for Russia", today largely concerns the Kyrgyz themselves or those who live here, to a much greater extent than in any other post-Soviet state of Central Asia. The reason behind this situation is obvious, as Kyrgyzstan has traditionally been more oriented towards Russia in the region. There is no need to explain this circumstance in details. Absolutely right were those politicians and representatives of NGOs who, in the months preceding the events of 24 March 2005, tried to explain to the Russian elite and media that Askar Akaev’s threats were absolutely groundless regarding an opposition inspired by the orange revolution and backed by the West, which would bring anti-Russian leaders to power. It is impossible to succeed in Kyrgyzstan by staking a campaign on anti-Russian nationalism.

However, it is necessary to answer this question, or at to look for an answer. My answer may turn out to be cynical in form and sad in content. Kyrgyzstan is hardly a big item in the contemporary foreign policy of Russia. Rather it is a toolbox at hand, used to resolve serious geopolitical objectives and promote economic expansion into world markets.

Today, after a difficult and lengthy period of internal political frustration and economic stagnation, the Kremlin again feels itself capable of behaving on the level of a great power, which makes it possible to enjoy foreign policy. With reference to the topic under discussion, it is not so important that the end of stagnation is due primarily to an unprecedented long period of increased prices for energy supplies, and not due to innovation or structural reforms in the Russian economy.  However, with time this policy looks like the policy of a large multinational company which tries to conquer new markets.

People of my generation remember very well how Soviet propaganda loved to mention the famous formula of an American President which, according to the Soviet leadership, aptly described the nature of Uncle Sam’s aggressive imperialism: “What is good for General Motors is good for the country.” So today it would not be an exaggeration to say: “What is good for Gazprom is good for the Kremlin.”

Here I would consider it appropriate to mention a phrase told recently by Stanislav Belkovsky, a famous Russian political scientist and director of the Institute of National Strategy, during an interview by the French La Figaro. “Putin is primarily protecting those energy companies where he has a personal interest – Gazprom, Rossneft, Surgutneftegaz,” says Belkovsky. “In Europe, it is difficult to understand the motivation and psychology of Putin. He is a man of business, not politics.”

If one carefully observes how the Kremlin acts today in domestic and foreign policy, then one will be convinced that the main motivation of its actions are defined by securing the interests of big Russian state companies, exporting raw materials or companies which are absolutely loyal to the Kremlin. Do these companies have any serious interests in Kyrgyzstan? If yes, then it is only those which are ready to invest in the development of the waterpower resources of Kyrgyzstan. However, investment into this sector should be large-scale, reflecting the inevitability of a lengthy term of payback. Besides power generation, investors will be interested in the redistribution and sale of energy. If an investor will not receive guaranteed access to these sectors of business, specifically, if an investor will not become a shareholder and trustee, then he will not come.

Among the current authorities of Kyrgyzstan, a lack of understanding about the structure of this type of business led to a situation in which a Russian oligarch, Oleg Deripaska, and a group of companies under his control refused to cooperate with Bishkek in developing a hydroelectric power complex, despite the fact that the Kremlin directly advised Mr. Deripaska to deal with this issue. Furthermore, even Russians, who are used to shadow business, were struck by the level of the lack of transparency, which is peculiar to the Kyrgyz way of business.

The immediate future will show whether such giants of Russian business as the Russian Joint Stock Company Unified Energy System of Russia (Chubais) or Renova (Vekselberg) will be able to overcome this hurdle. Kurmanbek Bakiev, President of Kyrgyzstan, admits that this issue now mostly depends on the part of Kyrgyzstan. In an interview which he gave to the author of this article on May 20, Mr. Bakiev emphasized this circumstance, noting that Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) will consider a program of privatizing units of the Kyrgyz economy, after which Russians could come. On June 1, a draft of such a program was submitted to relevant committees of parliament.

Basically the same situation exists regarding the widely publicized plans of Moscow to invest several hundred millions US dollars into the resort infrastructure of Issyk-kul. Mayor Lujkov and his team will not invest without guarantees of acquiring land to construct these projects as private property (or at least a control packet of shares). If the Kyrgyz legislation resolves the issue with the sale of land to foreigners, then this business will become feasible.

In fact, such Russian business needs Kyrgyzstan no more than those in Kyrgyzstan are ready to accommodate it. There is no altruism or “humanitarian thought,” less so any economic preference. Somewhat more likely perhaps is talk about the “long historic experience” of mutual enrichment through the “living together of the peoples.” In short, “money in the morning, chairs in the evening.”

In addition, hopes of receiving economic assistance from Russia on the state level should be abandoned. Such “donor” channels remain existent from western sources only if Bishkek fulfills certain conditions, the acceptability of which, as can be seen, is not obvious. Is it worth remembering that there is no such a thing as free lunch?

Thus, it is naive to hope that any of the current “big brothers” needs Kyrgyzstan, or that any one will come as Santa Claus with a sack of gifts on his back and consider it a pleasure to see joyful smiles and extended hands waiting for a freebee. Severe years lay ahead, during the course of which the authorities will have to gain courage in order to make unpopular decisions and reject, and I apologize for repeating myself, cheap populism. Apparently, this task primarily concerns the current parliament, which has to remember its primary function, i.e. lawmaking.

Of course, there will be a question about the military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Russian and American. Which good one should we keep and which bad one must we expel. What should be done regarding China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? For whom and against whom should Kyrgyzstan stand?

It should be honestly admitted that the model of conduct chosen by Askar Akaev regarding power players was fairly balanced, if not optimal. Kyrgyzstan is a tiny state without the right to have foes or an explicit enemy. It is a different matter that after years in rule the ex-President of Kyrgyzstan came to believe in the infallibility of his tactics and overestimated the effectiveness of his schemes once they were chosen. Even if he tried to catch a new “rose of winds” in the geopolitics taking shape around Kyrgyzstan, as well as the alignment of forces within the country, then he only did so as a result of possible threats to his personal power and the business of his inner circle. On a side note, this trend became obvious to the leadership of neighboring states, allies of Bishkek, and was also on the periphery of the ex-President’s attention.

The role and significance of Kyrgyzstan could be once and for all reduced to the position of an outsider if it completely accepts the rules of the game imposed by one of the great world or regional powers, be it that of Russia, the USA, China, Kazakhstan, or Uzbekistan. Bishkek can make itself respected as a sovereign state only by rejecting the sickly-sweet style of conduct practiced in past relations with each of the partners, involving assurances of “eternal friendship,” “brotherhood,” “strategic partnership,” and by demonstrating a clear understanding of the limits of concessions and level of loyalty required from Kyrgyzstan by this partners.

The Kyrgyz are a proud people, and it is unlikely that they will submit themselves to a scenario whereby they will be acting as a minor character who utters a remark to the main character only when needed. It could be suggested that such scenarios are constantly being offered to Bishkek, authored either by Tashkent, proposing to fight the makers of “Islamic Khaliphates,” by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, proposing to resist the domination of “extra-regional forces” in Central Asia, or even by America, with the eternal central theme of the struggle between “coalitions of good” and constantly emerging “axes of evil”…

There is a lot to be done in Kyrgyzstan which can be handled only by its citizens, even if their “leaders” will be thanked by an “uncle-director” for allowing a substitution from a minor character to a supporting character.

Arkadii Dubnov is an international reporter of Vremya Novostei newspaper, expert on Central Asia and CIS countries.