Erlan Abdyldaev, specially for IPP
The internal political situation in Kyrgyzstan, characterized by struggle between various political forces, actualizes the task of searching for external support and elaborating foreign policy priorities and foreign policy strategy for the new administration of President Kurmanbek Bakiev.
After the events of March 24 2005, President Kurmanbek Bakiev, maneuvering on the foreign policy field, tried to gain the support of major powers and neighboring states, with the aim of strengthening his position as the second President of Kyrgyzstan, as well as resolving the internal political and economic problems of Kyrgyzstan.
However, not all achievements in the sphere of foreign policy during the first year of Bakiev’s presidency can be attributed to the new administration. Among the list of problematic issues in the relations of the new Kyrgyz leadership with foreign policy partners, it is possible to mention delayed democratic transformations (primarily constitutional reform), uncertainty and frequent changes regarding their position on the American airbase, the problem with Uzbek refugees, recurring criticism by certain politicians on the border agreements with China, reform of the UN, and water-power problems with neighbors.
One may track the evolution of President Bakiev’s views on the abovementioned issues for the past year. Having started as a successor of the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine and a supporter of an increase in the American vector in the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiev gradually departed from these views, and by the end of his first year of presidency, most likely he has taken a pro-Russian position.
A certain evolution of the foreign policy views of Bakiev could be tracked through Kyrgyz-Chinese relations during this period as well. Over the course of a year, Bakiev gradually moved from severe criticism of the foreign policy of the first President Akaev regarding China, to “expressing satisfaction with the successes achieved over the past 14 years” in Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, acknowledging all agreements and treaties that had been achieved, and committing to the continuation of past policy in the future.
The events of March 24, 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, which led to the change of leadership, coming to power of the opposition, and subsequent developments within the internal political situation in the country, initially caused a certain tension in Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, and a cautious attitude in the official stance of Beijing. Notwithstanding the obvious exacerbation of the political crisis in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2005, the leadership of China did not expect such a sharp turn of events. Cautiousness on the part of Beijing regarding the new leadership of Kyrgyzstan was most likely caused by a number of circumstances, among which the following should be noted:
- the instability of the internal political situation in Kyrgyzstan; a lack of unity not only between various branches of power, but also within the government team on key issues of strategy regarding the country’s development;
- the coming to power of opposition leaders who had previously held anti-Chinese positions;
- inconsistency in the foreign policy priorities of the new administration; a lack of clearly defined continuity, common approaches, or coordination of a political course regarding China, primarily on issues that are sensitive for Beijing;
- criticism by certain Kyrgyz politicians of the achievements and signed treaties and agreements in the preceding period of Kyrgyz-Chinese relations (1992-2005);
- an increase in the possible risks of destabilization in the adjacent Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region under the influence of the situation in Kyrgyzstan;
- the intensification of external, primarily American, influence in Kyrgyzstan.
Taking into account the abovementioned factors, Beijing did not speed up events, instead taking a wait-and-see attitude, giving the initiative to the Kyrgyz side to a certain degree. The numerous political interactions which have taken place recently (a meeting between Bakiev and Hu Jintao during the Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Astana; a meeting between Kulov and Wen Jiabao in Moscow; two visits by Foreign Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic, Otunbaeva and Jekshenkulov, to the People’s Republic of China), generally did not lead to full scale restoration of relations, because the position of the leadership of Kyrgyzstan on a number of key issues for China was vague and ambiguous. Furthermore, certain politicians, including government officials, continued as before to call for revisiting the Kyrgyz-Chinese border agreement.
In the given situation, both sides focused on preparing for the visit of President Bakiev to Beijing, which took place on the 9th and 10th of June, 2006, supposing that existing disagreements and problems should be resolved during this visit. Both sides had their own goals, objectives, and expectations for the visit. The expectations of Beijing for the visit were most likely primarily related to the political component of cooperation. The Chinese leadership tried to clarify not only the position of the current President of Kyrgyzstan on key issues of bilateral relations, involving both regional and international politics, but also the firmness and invariability of Kyrgyzstan’s partnership in the long term. In general, Beijing wanted a restoration of the atmosphere of political trust between the leadership of the two countries.
In Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, the level of political trust between the leaders of the states and the degree of cooperation in the sphere of security have and will determine the dynamics of relations in other spheres, primarily in trade and economics, including the realization of big economic projects. The readiness of Beijing to restore cooperation in full depended on the position of the Kyrgyz leadership regarding the following issues:
- the stance on Taiwan and Tibet;
- the joint struggle with Xinjiang separatism, extremism, and terrorism;
- continuity and adherence of the Kyrgyz leadership to bilateral treaties and agreements signed in the past, primarily of a political character, and on the resolution of the border issue;
- the American military presence in Kyrgyzstan;
- reform of the UN Security Council.
To a certain degree, all of the abovementioned issues were included on the agenda of the negotiations between President Bakiev and the political leadership of China, and all were reflected in the joint declaration on the results of the visit signed by the heads of the two states.
Confirmation of continuity on the part of the new Kyrgyz leadership, as well as firm adherence to the prior treaties and agreements, primarily those of a political character and those regarding the resolution of the border issue, were the key elements in the substantive part of Bakiev’s visit to the PRC.
There were certain apprehensions that the lack of a clearly defined position of the new Kyrgyz leader over this issue could be viewed by Beijing as a weakness of the present political leadership of Kyrgyzstan, and perceived as playing a double game, which could freeze relations between the two states to a level that is minimally sufficient for Beijing. The official statement of the new President of the Kyrgyz Republic on firm adherence to prior agreements and treaties, notwithstanding objection on the part of internal political opponents, is viewed by experts as a significant step towards restoration of an atmosphere of mutual political trust.
In a joint Declaration, the parties confirmed their adherence to the principles stipulated in the political documents signed and publicized over the past 14 years. They further expressed satisfaction with the successes reached in political, trade and economic, humanitarian, and security matters for the period after diplomatic relations were established, and agreed that Chinese-Kyrgyz friendship responds to the vital interests of the peoples of both countries, and benefits peace and development in the region.
Of principal importance is the statement of both parties on strict observation of the “Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Kyrgyz Republic and the People’s Republic of China” and the “Program of Cooperation between the Kyrgyz Republic and the People’s Republic of China for the years 2004-2014.” In addition, there was recognition of the historic significance of the “Protocol between the Kyrgyz Republic and the People’s Republic of China on Demarcating the Line of the Kyrgyz-Chinese State Border” and of a map of the state border between Kyrgyz Republic and People’s Republic of China as a supplement, which marked the final resolution of the border issue between the two states. The parties pledged to strictly follow all agreements and documents on the border issue signed between the two states, and to make active efforts to transform the state border between the two states into a zone of eternal peace and friendship, passing from one generation to the next.
Bishkek officials confirmed their adherence to promoting a policy for a unified China – that they are against any forms of “independence of Taiwan,” including “legalization of the independence of Taiwan,” against attempts to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” and against the participation of Taiwan in any international organizations in which participation is reserved only for sovereign states. The Kyrgyz side stated that it will not establish any official relations with Taiwan, and will not maintain any official contact with it.
In turn, Beijing officials confirmed their support of attempts being undertaken by the Kyrgyz Republic to ensuring its independence, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity, to strengthen its internal stability, and to develop its national economy. They also highly appreciated the contribution of Kyrgyzstan to strengthening of security, stability and cooperation in Central Asia.
Regarding the issue of fighting terrorism, extremism and separatism, the heads of the two states acknowledged that they will increase coordination and cooperation between the law enforcement agencies and security services of the two states, and will also continue taking effective measures within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the joint fight against all kinds of terrorism, including the terrorist forces of “Eastern Turkestan,” for the sake of ensuring peace and order in both countries, as well as in the region. The heads of the two states emphasized that the fight against the terrorist forces of “Eastern Turkestan” is an important component of the international antiterrorist fight. Kyrgyzstan and China will support and develop contacts and cooperation between the military departments of the two states.
The issue of the American military presence in Kyrgyzstan and the issue of UN reform were also important items on the political agenda of Bakiev’s negotiations in China.
In regards to the issue of the American military presence in Kyrgyzstan, China has repeatedly stated that it understands and shares the position of Kyrgyzstan, which granted an airbase to the troops of the Antiterrorist Coalition with the aim of fighting terrorist forces in Afghanistan. This decision was coordinated by the former leadership of the Kyrgyz Republic with partners at the Organization of the Treaty on Collective Security and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the same time, the People’s Republic of China is firmly and resolutely calling for a determination of term limits for the presence of the military airbase at Manas airport, and is against extending its mandates beyond the framework of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. It is likely that the Chinese leadership was able to convince President Bakiev during negotiations of the validity of its position on these issues, and gained his support. In a joint declaration, Kyrgyzstan and China stated that they “will not allow the use of their territory by tertiary states to the prejudice of state sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of another party, and will also not allow the creation and activity of organizations and associations on their territory which pose a threat to the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of another party.”
Regarding the issue of UN reform, the joint Declaration contained a position very close in argumentation to the position of China, which suggests that the parties came to an agreement over this issue as well.
The economic component of President Bakiev’s visit to PRC did not become the main item on the agenda of negotiations. As a result, in spite of the statements of certain Kyrgyz politicians, no breakthrough decisions were made in this regard. During the visit, China, which does not consider Kyrgyzstan as a prospective economic partner in the region, confined itself to extending a traditional grant of 70 million yuans to support the Kyrgyz economy. Upon the insistence of the top Kyrgyz leadership, it provided a government loan for the construction of a cement works in the town of Kyzyl-Kiya in southern Kyrgyzstan. Specific details of the contract signed on the construction of the cement works have not been publicized yet. However, according to experts, there are well-founded concerns that, given the lack of proper management and appropriate financial and economic calculations, the plant might repeat the fate of a Kyrgyz-Chinese paper-mill.
As for the economic projects which are a priority for Kyrgyzstan – the construction of a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad and the export of Kyrgyz electric power to China – which have been examined and discussed over the past years, the Chinese leadership, as was expected, proposed additional examination, which translates from diplomatic language as a lack of interest in implementing those projects. This stance is explainable by the fact that, from the point of economic effectiveness, both of the projects are sufficiently expensive (in total over two billion USD is required) to be debatable. However, it is more important that, if implemented, both of the projects could have a direct impact on the social-economic situation in Xinjiang. The Chinese leadership, which is not sure of the stability of the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, is not interested in pegging its explosive Xingjian region to the situation in Kyrgyzstan and the changes in political passions of the Kyrgyz political elite.
In general, the visit of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Kurmanbek Bakiev, to the People’s Republic of China had a predominantly political character, and was aimed at bringing to an end a protracted pause in Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, which appeared after March 24, 2005. Notwithstanding the lack of breakthrough decisions in the economic sphere (given the current situation, it would be unrealistic to expect such decisions), it is important to acknowledge that the goals of establishing working contact with the top political leadership of China and restoring a certain political trust between the leadership of the two states was basically achieved, which could be considered as the most important and main result of Bakiev’s visit to China. Thus, the Chinese vector in the foreign policy of Bakiev has become indistinguishable from that of Akaev.
Erlan Abdyldaev is a former Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic to the People`s Republic of China.
