Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public Policy

The world is undergoing serious changes. Humanity has undoubtedly crossed the threshold of global crises through the escalating interaction of global ideas, religions, socio-economic factors, world outlooks, and philosophical visions. The influence of demographic pressure is being felt more and more as a result of the absence of serious analysis, forecasting, or real programs or projects addressing this concern. Serious environmental issues have emerged, including global warming and those “multicolored clouds” hanging above us. One manifestation of these crises in the secure existence of people is the excessive production, accumulation and proliferation of weapons of all sorts.

It is striking that humanity, while actively fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (with limited success, unfortunately), virtually missed the stockpiling of a horrific arsenal of conventional weapons, with which, it turns out, it is possible to annihilate many people. Various types of humanitarian crises often occur in human activity. On the rise are threats from different tribal transborder criminals, often united into powerful international criminal syndicates with the help of governments and non-governmental foundations. Sometimes these syndicates lay claim to leadership roles in certain nations, religious currents, or various semi-mythical supranational communities. Economic disparity has been continually growing between the developed and developing nations and regions. A billion stand in “patched clothes” against a “golden billion.”

Humanity, in general, agrees that so-called globalization awaits us in the foreseeable future. Variation in the predicted vectors of development among world civilization was and remains wide.  Each state or a group of states, offering its own concept or vision of the development of globalization, strives to see itself in a more privileged position than others. That is to say, they are already now trying to defend their future interests. However, all futurologists and other political foretellers are unanimous in their conviction that cardinal changes will affect, without exception, all spheres of the activities of people and states. Thus far, it is more or less clear that globalization has both positive and negative potential.

The abovementioned points have a direct relation to the Central Asian states. The issue of the day in this context of globalization is to what extent these states are capable of internally starting necessary coordinated moves which are of use to the region in general, and to each state in particular. I suppose that future regional constructions could have both internal and external conceptual content. The first (internal) is, in fact, a consolidation of efforts in forming three real faces of Central Asia, which should be accepted by the international community:

The second (external) face is the formation of a new historical process, which could be designated as the restoration of the Great Silk Road.  This historical process should not become a restoration of primitive methods of transportation, communication, and exchange of cultural achievements. Covering the area from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the project should become truly long-term. It is the Central Asian states that should become the movers of this process.

Very important is the assessment of two historical moments from the recent past of Central Asia which, as I view them, are fundamental details for understanding what is happening in the region now, and what may happen in the future.

First of all, an enormous state, second in the world in terms of cumulative power, of which the Central Asian states were a part, suddenly dissolved into fifteen underdeveloped states. Many of these states have been placed at the bottom of a list of hundreds of countries in terms of living standards, i.e. second and third-rate zones of human existence.

Second, for the past fifteen years, the states of Central Asia have walked a path from the “periphery of an empire,” to one of the centers of attraction of various interests of different countries. Until 1991, this region was known in both West and East as the territories of Turkestani and Middle Asian military command, with a Muslim population. Independence has opened up new prospects on the one hand, but on the other hand harbors certain threats.

It is worth pointing to one more peculiarity of the Central Asian region: it “stretches” to different sides, which makes it different from other regions of the former USSR, the Baltic States for instance. The Islamic “corner” pulls the region towards itself; the “Russian factor” is very strong; and one cannot deny the strengthening of partnership with the West, although this partnership is not necessarily based on liberal values.

These circumstances once more highlight the mosaic structure of the geopolitical picture in Central Asia.

The choice of development path by the Central Asian states has been highly personified. By no means however we can ignore certain individual historical and cultural characteristics of the peoples, as well as geographic and ethno-psychological features of the states, which have undoubtedly influenced this choice of leadership. Therefore, basic approaches and concepts of development for all five states of the region differ from each other, and differ fundamentally in terms of the most important elements. However, they are not conflicting.

Economic concepts and their implementation up to now are not yet free from imitation (I mean mechanical transfer of certain foreign experience) and inertia of the Soviet model of socio-economic development. However, it should be acknowledged that the outlines of a number of elements of a conceptual nature have already appeared. The low level and fragmented state of integration of the Central Asian economies into world economic relations remain serious problems. A strategic economic interest of both the East and West is the focus on the energy resources of Central Asia. No one conceals this interest. The issue is about who will be first in “opening up the Central Asian reservoir.”

During a brief period of independent development, the foreign policy tactics of Central Asian states have changed several times, displaying different amplitude and different content. This oscillation is justified by the lack of experience in the past and an inability to construct realistic foreign policy projects or develop appropriate technologies, as well as by certain discourses in the foreign policy of partner states. A fundamental issue for the region is whether it will remain an object of foreign policy – of the initiatives of major powers and intergovernmental associations – or whether the states of the region will together manage to significantly expand the real personality of the Central Asian states, not just a formal, legal facade.

So far, none of the Central Asian states have managed to create a national system of values, which, as I view it, underlies a stable, steady development of the state, as well as balanced and effective domestic and foreign policy that is understandable to partners and to its own citizens.

Not without external influence, the Central Asian states have tried to set up a certain economic and even military-political alliance. However, the idea presently remains virtually outside of the context of a serious dialogue by the countries of the region.

However, notwithstanding this failure in the common cause, by no means should we exclude from the agenda of corporate interaction of the Central Asian states the issue of drafting a list of regional priorities, value measures, and the gradual implementation of each. Whether the states of the region will be able to do it, the answer could be only regional, though alternative answers will be offered from outside.

Lately, the idea of creating a so-called Bigger Central Asia is being actively discussed. It is virtually at the stage of implementation, and eliminates a barrier between the five countries of Central Asia and their southern neighbors. Often, all Central Asian states unite not only under one name, but also under common programs. In the foreseeable future, such an “association” could make serious amendments to the policies of all five Central Asian states, with ensuing consequences for their cultures, economies, and especially for the foundations of their world-outlooks.