At the moment, the Central Asian region is again in the center of the world community’s attention. The recent anniversary summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was held from June 14 to 15 in China, viewed by experts as an engine of the organization, makes it very topical to analyze Beijing’s policy towards the Central Asian states. It becomes obvious that the new-old actor in this field – the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is gradually trying to state its interests openly, has begun aiming for the role of a regional leader. An adequate assessment of the current situation in Central Asia and prospects of its development is already impossible without analysis of the Chinese factor – the role of the PRC in the fight against international terrorism, competition for the energy and mineral resources of the region, perception by the Chinese of their security threats, the genuine interests of China, and its policy in the region. The Central Asian region, which China has been accustomed to considering as its own more or less quiet backyard since olden days, is now becoming one of the forefronts of Chinese foreign policy.

Post-Soviet Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, with a population of already over 60 million people, is included by Beijing in the so-called sphere of “external strategic frontiers” of the PRC, which has a direct impact on its nation-state interests. The common border (over 3,700 kilometers) of the PRC with the new states of Central Asia is an issue of increased attention for the Chinese leadership. According to Beijing, besides “separatist” Taiwan, presently the main threats to stability and territorial integrity of the PRC could emanate from the western direction. This perception is the key to the hyperactivity of Chinese diplomacy in this direction.

In the first half of the 1990s, after the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of the newly independent states in Central Asia, China did not demonstrate any visible activity in the region. Having officially established diplomatic relations with the states of the region, Beijing was primarily interested in maintaining political stability in its Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and expanding trade and economic ties with the states of the region. In this regard, it is worth remembering Chinese Premier Li Peng’s programmatic speech made in April of 1994 in Tashkent during his first tour of the states of Central Asia. The Chinese leader defined four main directions for the development of Beijing’s ties with the states of Central Asia: 1) neighborliness, friendship and peaceful coexistence; 2) mutual cooperation in the effort to promote general well-being; 3) mutual respect for the choice of the peoples of all countries and non-interference into each other’s domestic affairs; 4) mutual respect of independence and sovereignty and promotion of regional stability. In general, the position of China had quite a restrained nature, which in principle was due to the instability of the situation in Central Asia, and reflected the real interests and concerns of Beijing during that period.

However, the severe political realities of Central Asia (the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the post-Soviet “vacuum” of external influence, the increasing struggle over oil, gas, and other mineral resources of the region, the persistent search for external partners by the new states, etc.) prompted Beijing to switch to a more active policy. It is worth emphasizing the circumstance whereby China, which experiences a significant lack of energy resources, and the Central Asian states, which command huge reserves of these resources, had to make all efforts to reach agreements on expanding cooperation in the energy sphere, primarily, in terms of investments in the extraction of hydrocarbon materials and pipe laying for the transportation of Central Asian resources through the territory of the XUAR to the internal regions of China. On the other hand, in order to implement successfully the plans of development of Central Asian resources and their transportation to China, it is necessary to ensure stability and security in the XUAR; otherwise, railroads and pipelines could be quite vulnerable. In this regard, it is important for Beijing not to allow the emergence of serious problems in the Central Asian region, mainly radical Islam and ethnic separatism. These threats, along with the necessity of counteracting the expanding influence of extra-regional forces, primarily the U.S., to a great extent became the reasons for deepening cooperation between China, Russia and the states of Central Asia, which together set up the initial “The Shanghai Five,” and later the SCO.

The contemporary geopolitical positions of China in Central Asia after the infamous events of 11 September 2001 could be characterized by the following factors. Within the context of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, China, on the one hand, acquired certain opportunities, at the same time, on the other hand, faced a number of new challenges to its own security. The international operation, overthrow of the Taliban regime and relative stabilization in Afghanistan were to the advantage of China, given the fight against terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region of PRC and certain ties between extremist groupings in XUAR with the Taliban regime.

At the same time, it became obvious that the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan had a reverse side-effect for Chinese interests: the problem of the emergence of U.S. military bases and its allies on the territory of two Central Asian states – Kyrgyzstan, which borders China, and Uzbekistan, which, although it does not border China, is an SCO member. Thus, the U.S. became a de-facto “neighbor” of the Central Asian states. This circumstance today has a direct impact on both political processes in the states of the region, and on policymaking regarding domestic and foreign policy. The factor of the American presence in Central Asia also influences the adjustment of approaches towards the region by other countries that have traditionally held strong positions in the region.

China has maintained a cautious approach to these changes, viewing the military bases as a long-term threat to its security. Certain Chinese experts have openly stated that in the remote future those bases were directed against China and the operation in Afghanistan was merely a pretext for concentrating the military infrastructure of the U.S. along the western borders of the PRC.

In this regard, the policy of China, which has been lately creating a zone of stability and security along the perimeter of its borders in order to facilitate domestic reforms, ran into a number of problems. One of the key principles of the Eurasian direction of China’s foreign policy is the principle of a “secure neighborhood.” However, today this principle is undergoing a test of durability. All these factors, together with the incipient change of political elites in Central Asia, forced Beijing to specify its main objectives in foreign policy towards this region.

Quite symbolic is the programmatic speech of the leader of the “fourth generation” of the PRC, Hu Jintao, delivered in Tashkent in 2004, in which he again arranged the priorities of China’s policy toward the states of Central Asia. The speech of the Chinese leader demonstrated the continuity and lack of sudden shifts in Beijing’s policy. At the same time, experts note the emergence of new developments in China’s policy as a result of the altered situation in the region after September 11, 2001. As before, the insurance of security and the development of trade and economic relations, with an emphasis on energy and mineral resources, are priorities for China in this direction. China views not only the expansion and deepening of bilateral relations with key countries of the region as tools of achieving these objectives, but also, primarily, the capabilities of SCO.

The Chinese strategy for Central Asia also involved resolution of border and territorial problems with the states of the region. One after another, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, working as a team together with Russia from 1994 to 2002, signed border agreements with China, thereby removing from agenda of bilateral relations this sensitive and burdening issue.

The U.S. commands universal power as the only superpower in the world, whereas Russia has enjoyed traditionally closer relations with Central Asia. China is trying to close this gap in the hierarchy of strategic interests through active exploitation of the capabilities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  

Historically, the fundamental principle for the creation of SCO was the aspiration of China, neighboring Russia, and the states of Central Asia to resolve border issues primarily, as well as to strengthen military confidence-building measures in border areas. Another important factor which forced the states to unite was a common interest in ensuring security and stability in Central Asia. Increasing infiltration of terrorist forces from neighboring Afghanistan, as well as the growth and provocation of domestic religious extremism and ethnic separatism, became a serious threat to the region. For these reasons, the states initially united into the “Shanghai Five” in 1996, which turned into an important tool for ensuring regional security.

The attainment of accords over confidence-building measures and the reduction of troops in the border areas of China with Russia and the states of Central Asia created a favorable atmosphere, and positively stimulated the process of resolving border issues on the one hand, and the expansion of the framework of cooperation on the other. In 2001, the “Five” was transformed into the SCO with the joining of Uzbekistan. As stipulated in its founding documents, mutual trust, reciprocity, equality, respect of each other’s interests, mutual consultations, achievement of agreements through consensus, and voluntary agreement to implement signed treaties became the main principles of the SCO’s functioning. 

A special role in the creation of the SCO undoubtedly belongs to the PRC, which in this way stated its interests in Central Asia. By actively initiating the creation of the SCO, Beijing apparently proceeded from the assumption that strengthening its position in Central Asia would mean strengthening the stability and security of the entire neighboring region. Resolution of the border issue with the neighboring states made common borders not only secure, but also transformed them into effective channels for close contacts with Central Asia. Another important circumstance which facilitates such contact is the commonness of the peoples of Central Asia with the ethnic minorities of Xinjiang in terms of religion, culture, history and customs.

Beijing also seriously expects that Central Asia will play a positive role in realizing its strategy for the development of the western regions of China, becoming a stable source of supply of not only energy resources, but also other raw materials which are required for the dynamically progressing economy of the country.

Beijing characterizes the creation of the SCO as a strategic advancement and diplomatic breakthrough for China into Central Asia. In this way, China acquired a mechanism for ensuring security, an institutional channel for participation in regional affairs, and an opportunity to develop comprehensive cooperation with the states of Central Asia. On the other hand, as Chinese experts note, the creation of the SCO represents the attainment of a strategic compromise and strategic balance between China and Russia in Central Asia. This compromise involves mutual recognition of each other’s interests and implementation of strategic cooperation between them in the region, which has been reflected virtually in all documents signed within the framework of SCO, including those singed during the anniversary summit of the organization in Shanghai.

The sphere of international contacts of the SCO should be pointed out, as the process of admitting new member states in the organization and granting the status of observer on others has been gradually gaining topicality. For the first five years of the organization’s existence, no new members were admitted, though Mongolia, Iran, India and Pakistan were granted the status of observers in SCO, with some of these states expressing desire to immediately become full members of the organization. Together with Afghanistan, the organization created an “SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group,” and for the past several years has been inviting the leadership of this state as a guest to various events held within the framework of the organization. The SCO established partnership relations with a number of international organizations, including ASEAN, CIS, Eurasian Economic Union, and has acquired the status of an observer at UN.

Of fundamental importance in the international contacts of the SCO is the fact that, for the entire period of its existence, leaders of the member-states of the organization have been stressing the open character of SCO, and that it is not directed against the interests of tertiary countries or organizations. During the Shanghai Summit of the SCO, Hu Jintao, Chairman of the PRC, again emphasized that, “the SCO is not a closed military political bloc; on the contrary, it decries geopolitical confrontation, and is not directed against any state or organization. Through wide international cooperation and active external exchange, we should ensure security and stability in the region, and in the world in general.” Russian President Putin has also noted that, “the SCO is an open organization. It is not sealing itself off from anyone and not going to transform into a closed association, let alone into a certain bloc…. At the heart of the SCO philosophy is the conviction that Central Asia should not turn into a field for internal or external confrontation. The focus should be on searching for those developments which will unite, while fully respecting the right for one’s own model of development, as well as attempting to introduce democratic processes into the context of national history and national traditions. The SCO is not going to compete with anyone…». 

According to specialists, arranging such emphases in the statements of Chinese and Russian leaders (unlike the last year’s summit in Astana, when they made a statement on the need to define a timeline for the presence of the U.S. military bases in the region) is in a sense a signal or suggestion to search for a mutually acceptable point of contact, primarily with the U.S., which became a factor in regional politics after September 11, 2001 with the deployment of military bases in Central Asia. The issue of creating a Contact Group – SCO-U.S. or SCO-NATO – as a mechanism for maintaining working contacts may emerge on the agenda of the organization in the foreseeable future, in a certain sense developing joint projects and events with the aim of ensuring security and stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan, as well as facilitating the joint fight against terrorism, illegal drug and arms traffic, and other transborder crimes. This could become an initial stage for initiating wider cooperation, which could take into account the interests of all major powers in the region, as well as those of the states of Central Asia.

The sphere of SCO interests has lately been extending to the development of trade/economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties between the SCO member-states. Indicators of trade and economic cooperation within the SCO framework are so far characterized by a modest level, which in principle corresponds to the quite low economic development of the states of Central Asia in the first place, and to certain varied directions of economic interest on the part of China and Russia. However, the organization has set the task of considerably improving the economies of member states, as well as trade and economic ties. Boasting the most powerful economy, and commanding increasing influence over the situation in the region, China aspires to become the SCO’s economic leader by participating in energy and transportation projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

The large-scale and generally successful anniversary summit in Shanghai has again confirmed China’s interest in Central Asian, not only from the perspective of ensuring the security and stability of its western borders, but again demonstrating the aspiration of China to develop the energy and raw materials of the states of the region, as well as to develop transportation and communication projects. Of course, the political interests related to the objective of containing or limiting the increasing influence of extra-regional forces, primarily the “American factor” in the region, remain extremely important for Beijing.

Apparently, one of the central tasks of the organization at the moment is the search for a certain balance of the interest of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with extraregional forces, primarily with the U.S., which has become, as was mentioned above, a de-facto “neighbor of the states of Central Asia.” The idea of balancing the strategic interests of major powers in Central Asia, transforming the region through joint efforts into a zone of stability, prosperity and cooperation, not into a “field of resistance and confrontation” between major powers, was one of the main ideas discussed at the anniversary summit of the SCO. The member-states of the SCO sent a signal and expressed in a certain sense their readiness for dialogue and the start of such cooperation, which is reflected in the documents signed following the results of the Summit.   

Erlan Abdyldaev, IPP expert, former Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic to PRC