Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the IPP

The choice of development path states has always been personalized in the Central Asian, and remains so, although we should not ignore individual, historical, cultural, and geographical features, as well as particular traits of the ethnicities and countries of the region, which certainly affected this choice. Therefore, the primary approaches to and concepts of development vary across all five countries of the region, and display fundamental differences across a range of major elements.

Economic frameworks and their implementation are still not freed from imitation (meaning attempts at technical application of some foreign experience) or from the influence of the inertia of the Soviet Social and Economical development model. Still, it is necessary to recognize that certain individual outlines have been highlighted with the conceptual property. The low performance of the countries’ economies, along with the fragmented nature of integration into global economic relations, remains a serious issue. The strategic economic interests of the East and the West are focused on the energy resources of Central Asia, which no one is keeping secret. The only issue is who is going to be first in “mastering the Central Asian oil and gas reservoir.”

For the short history of independent development, the foreign policy benchmarks of the Central Asian states went through numerous changes, with various amplitudes and different content.  Such oscillation is, in principle, justified by the lack of previous experience, the inability to design realistic foreign policy projects and develop corresponding technologies, and by specific discourses in the foreign policy of the main partner-state in the region. The principal question for the region is whether it is going to remain an object of foreign or other policy by developed countries and intergovernmental associations, or whether the states in the region will manage to unite efforts and significantly expand their real standing, not merely their formal legal status.

The Central Asian states attempted to create some economic and even politico-military unions, not without external influence. However, today that idea is left outside of serious conversations among the countries of the region.

Along with that attempt, by no means can one exclude the issue of compiling a list of common priorities and values, and promoting their gradual implementation through an agenda of corporate cooperation among these states.

All these issues should become subjects of close attention and regular consultation among the Central-Asian leaders.

None of the Central-Asian countries has yet created a national system of values that would underlie the stable and secure development of the state, as well as internal and external policies that are effective, balanced, and clear to their partners and their own people.

The region of Central-Asia is unique, because it has some characteristics that are unusual for other regions of the world. People living in the region, due to certain documented historical events, adopted different value systems and cultural civilizations – different “masks.” The majority of the population of Central Asia are, or at least would like to think that they are, followers of Islam (as a religion, culture, life style, etc). A second group (also significant in size) associates itself with the USSR; some individuals have appeared who, although not consolidated yet, are also quite influential and partially supported in their countries – the apologists of liberal (western) values. An endless number of followers of other ideas, futurologists, etc. also exist in the same “tree of independent states.” Political history and peoples’ aspirations have inserted nationalism into everyday life, which is not always a positive.

All the above-described factors collide, although they remain relatively harmless for politics or private life.  Mimicry, social and political – the ability to quickly change masks – has become an entire school of life that has been cultivated by a group of “hobos,” “perestroika (reorganization) people,” etc, who philosophize and dabble in politics. Such people have one mask for district committees, another one for a summer cafe with friends, and a third for the family circle. The paradox is that none of them has synthesized these multiple influences, but rather packed them into layers, and work with a particular mask depending on the situation. During the decades, such a life style grew into a particular behavioral culture. 

However, after acquiring independence, each of the mentioned “masks” became rapidly politicized. Currently, champions of each mask are in active search of government support, building capital, establishing contacts with foreign partners, and setting their own agendas and messages.

The absence of a national system of values (not even mentioning a common regional system), or a general national framework of development in the Central-Asian countries might soon result in serious internal conflicts, including armed ones. One possible scenario of conflict development is yet another forceful intrusion by various outside ideas, political and otherwise.

Such types of conflicts might cause even intergovernmental confrontation. There are plenty of examples of such an event.

Existing hot spots in the security of Central Asia decompose into several aspects, each of which should be the subject of extremely close attention from experts, as well as the  dynamic cooperation of all Central-Asian states.

The first aspect, local or geographical, includes the Caspian Sea Region and the Ferghana Valley. The Caspian Sea Region is intensively militarized: military fleets, shore guards, etc. A contractual legislative framework regarding the Caspian Sea that would satisfy all parties is far from completion. Since the Caspian Sea really means oil, it is subject to the interests of not only those countries that border it.

A challenging situation is developing in the Ferghana Valley: interethnic overlap, a high population density with an obvious lack of fertile lands, poverty, constant discussions in the politics of the leadership of the three Central-Asian states, and still other problems, have formed a favorable environment for the dissemination of extremist ideas to the public, as well as the creation of criminal movements that directly confront the governments. The tangle of problems in the Ferghana Valley is not just a Gordian knot that can be easily cut by one thrust of the sword.

The second aspect, economic, involves the weak, unstable, and unpredictable development of the state economies in the region. Despite attempts to create certain economic development programs, any positive economic progress has been achieved through the sale of raw materials rather than through the structural growth of these economies.

Integrity in world economic relations can be described as nowise but fragmented. It is worth noting that the so-called world economy is not eager to host Central-Asians. The tough world of business does not play the game of charity.

The third aspect, military, includes the daily growing threat of international terrorism and extremism. For the sake of fairness, it is necessary to highlight that since the beginning of antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan, tension has decreased. However, the problem in general is still part of the foreign policy and security agenda in Central-Asia. The danger of the emergence of new hot spots and localized conflicts still exists, not only within the Central-Asian region. Therefore, a priority issue for these states is to strengthen the military forces and law-enforcement agencies, and to closely and seriously cooperate with each other in this sphere.

The fourth aspect, intergovernmental, includes an especially serious factor: the Uzbek-Tajik relationship that might play the role of a beginning of stabilization, or of a detonator of conflicts. It is quite obvious that the internal interplay between the states in the region is formed according to an interethnic, social communication interlace (traditionally trade and cultural contacts). The porosity of borders, despite the efforts of states to secure them, is the main potential factor or distribution channel that might facilitate the resonance of events occurring in one country throughout other states of the region. In this context, even the location of Turkmenistan does not make it special.

The fifth aspect, boundaries and trans-water arrangements, is the hottest in the range of issues that confront the states of Central-Asia – the most sensitive and delicate. This block of questions requires high professionalism and mutual understanding. Thorough and regulated work is needed, free from populism and strain.

The sixth aspect, drugs, includes drug production and drug trafficking, which states have failed to fight effectively, and will probably continue struggling with for a long time. Clearly, it is impossible to localize the problem within one of the regions – a fruitless idea. Unless the international community does not switch from bare declarations and sham projects to decisive, productive joint, actions, the situation with drugs, far from improving, will continue to get worse and worse.

The seventh aspect, cultural and informational, includes the loss of informational guiding points for the population of Central Asian countries, the radical degeneration of the informational and cultural environment, and the increase of informational and cultural holes, currently filled by various ideological constructions and outlooks, not only strange but frequently even hostile.

Resolution of all these problems described above surely requires the active, permanent, and comprehensive work of the governments of each of the Central-Asian countries. On the other hand, the key here is the coordination of the efforts of states in the region; otherwise nothing can be achieved.

I think that we can by no means ignore the opportunities and capacities of civil society that can be used indirectly through various Non-Government and Public organizations.

In this context, the first issue (and in my opinion, one quite urgent) is assistance in building a political, intellectual and economic elite for the Central-Asian states. It is more than evident that unless the above-mentioned elites maturely and patriotically take action, these countries are condemned to a wretched existence.  It is a challenge to find sponsors abroad for such long-term programs, but civil society, if it considers itself as such, ought to take this challenge, rather than only gathering information for its donors. Elite formation is not only educational work or patronage, it is (not in the last word) the creation of the social class structure of the society, which is a vital condition for the development of the nation.

Another important target for non-government organizations should become the issue of the intellectual and biological development of the people living in the region. Only a people who are educated and healthy in all aspects, together with developed elites, will be capable of resolving the problem of forming a common national and regional system of values which could become a basis for joint fruitful development.