Today, no one will argue with the fact that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a political reality on not a regional level, but a global level. Some supported the creation of this organization, others not. In any case, it leaves nobody indifferent.

Moreover, some countries have started making efforts to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in their interests.

Meanwhile, several unresolved issues remain in the current situation of the organization. The core issue is the nature of the organization: military or economic?

There are other questions as well, maybe not that alternative but also significant. At least they are fairly relevant for some members of the organization. Especially significant are questions such as: is the SCO a zone of mutual interests for cooperative development, or will each member fight for itself?

Each time activities take place within the SCO, everyone is looking to clarify at least some of these questions, if not all. The upcoming meeting of Prime Ministers of the SCO states on September 15^th in Dushanbe will not be an exception either. Although the competence of the Council of Heads of Governments primarily addresses economic cooperation, it is obvious that the heads of Cabinets of Ministers cannot ignore political and security issues.

However, even if we are to consider the SCO from the point of view of the Council of Prime Ministers, out of the coherent organizational sequence of “intentions-implementation-prospects,” today we clearly see and understand only two points: “intentions” and “prospects.”

Those intentions which have been publicized are indeed transparent and optimistic. From this point of view, they undoubtedly seem significant for the Central Asian states. Economies in close cooperation with such economic giants as Russia and China, which, moreover, have decent political weight, can develop much faster than they could alone or even in a “pure Central-Asian team.” Active, productive economic cooperation only within the SCO will allow the Central-Asian states to take a serious step in the development of their economies.

Unfortunately, the implementation of intentions in the economic sphere is complicated by a high level of bureaucracy and excessive regulation of activity, complemented by yet-to-be-agreed-upon bilateral relations (in some cases multilateral) on SCO territory.

Excellent and fairly prospective projects, including the Business Council, Economic Forum, Interbank Association, Forum for the Scientific Community, and other structures of the “secondary echelon” may become shallow and useless accessories to summits if they are not brought to life.

In Bishkek in 2004, SCO members agreed about joining their efforts on 6 priorities: 1) transport, 2) energy, 3) electricity, 4) agriculture, 5) production of household appliances, and 6) light and heavy manufacturing industry. A program for trade and economic cooperation until 2020 was approved. It is quite obvious that at least five of these priorities are important for the Central Asian states. However, we have to recognize that further promotion of these projects is being impeded by contradictions and the uncoordinated stances of SCO countries.

In order to begin implementing projects and programs, the leadership started creating various types of special groups. By the way, the latest but not the least groups, addressing the fuel and energy industry and information and communication technologies, were formed during the Tashkent meeting. However, none of these projects have been implemented.

On August 24^th a meeting of Ministers responsible for the foreign policy of the SCO states was held in Tashkent. The main purpose of the meeting was to prepare for the Summit of Prime-Ministers. However, aside from declaratory statements touching upon the realization of projects and programs, nothing significant was signed. The same is true about the activities of the SCO in the area of cultural and humanitarian partnership.

Cooperation is currently developing more fruitfully in the scope of bilateral relations. For the sake of fairness though, we should recognize that such relations are happening only under the influence of SCO agreements. Overall, the dynamics of the development of cooperation shows a visible shift from the dominance of general objectives on the level of “intentions” to the prioritization of country interests on the level of “implementation.”

Considering this “power alignment,” it appears that the Central Asian republics should not stand aside awaiting their role in the SCO. They could well play solo parts, utilizing the capacity of their powerful counterparts to maximize their own benefits. At the upcoming meeting in Dushanbe, we will probably hear old and new statements about intentions, declarations about forms and ways of implementation, and assurances of the bright prospects of economic cooperation within the SCO. I  hope these predictions for the meeting are wrong, and that a realistic scenario will be presented rather than empty statements.

Muratbek Imanaliev is the President of the Institute for Public Policy, Member of the RIA News Expert Council.

The article was prepared for RIA-Novosti news agency.