Valentin Bogatyrev, specially for the IPP

Even for those who still cannot think outside of Soviet stereotypes about Central Asia as a region where all resident ethnicities live in friendship, the phenomenon of post-soviet intraregional isolation of Uzbekistan has become an unquestionable fact, though perhaps less obvious than in case of Turkmenistan. A vital state for Central Asia has managed to spoil relations with all its surrounding former Soviet neighbors.

Past claims on regional leadership quickly transformed into a system of conflicts with neighbors. Uzbekistan fenced itself off from its neighbors not only with border posts, but with minefields as well.

Uzbek officials thought that this step was perfectly justified. There was a war going on in Tajikistan, democracy raging in the Kyrgyz Republic, a flow of Kazakh petrodollars and Afghan drugs threatening to destroy the Uzbek economy, and an aggressive anti-Uzbek policy led by their neighbor from the West. Islam Karimov was saving his country.

Today, fifteen years since independence, the situation has not changed much. Uzbekistan is the only state in the region that still has disputes over borders with its neighbors.

Certainly, the period when neighbor enmity continually threatened to grow into a conflict has been left behind. However, it is too early to talk about cooperation or even interest in cooperation. It is mainly the choice of Uzbekistan, not of its neighbors. Whether or not the change of script is the reason, Uzbekistan speaks a different language.

All these years, Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations resembled a conversation between people speaking different languages. None of key issues between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic have been resolved.

In principle, there are not many such issues, only three or four. The most important one is the issue of water and energy resources; the most complicated is border demarcation; the most vexing is the regime of border crossing; and the most painful is the problem of Anti-Uzbek extremism. Both states have a different attitude to these issues.

Water and energy issues are of serious concern not only to the Kyrgyz, but also to Uzbek officials. The failure of the recent informal meeting in Astana, where yet another attempt was taken to resolve these issues, reveals the presence of not only issues with negotiation, but also principal disagreements between the states.

The momentum by which issues of water and energy resources could be resolved through Soviet inertia is long gone. Today, one can only speak of market-based and utilitarian approaches. However, states speculate about free market relationship only when it is profitable for them, and immediately forget about them if they lead to their own expense. It is obvious that such double standards are not acceptable.

Statements made by the Uzbek leader about the divine origin of water and its common ownership are widely known. However, it is easy to imagine his reaction if Kurmanbek Bakiev or Emomali Rahmonov were to state that oil and gas also have divine origins and belonged to all states of the region. After all, when the gas was formed, no Uzbeks were around. Even Kazakhs were not around when oil was formed. Water flows on the other hand are formed today and formed right on the land that belongs to Kyrgyz and Tajik peoples. Payment for water is an entirely legal form of resource revenue for the country, on the territory of which water flows are formed, not even mentioning the expenses that the Kyrgyz Republic bears to regulate the flow. After all, there are many other ways for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to utilize their water for their own means instead of sharing it with neighbors.

Tashkent understands this fact as well. Latent recognition of the commodity essence of water resources is reflected in the relatively low prices for gas. This approach is mutually acceptable, but only until Uzbekistan decides to revert to world prices on gas. In this case, prices for Kyrgyz water should be reformed, if not based on world trade standards, at least based on the cost of supplying it to Uzbek customers.

Recently, the Toktogul regional council (a local legislative assembly) raised a question regarding compensation to local residents for lost profits due to lands drowned under the Toktogul water reservoir. Since the water reservoir mainly regulates water flow, the issue of who should compensate how much to Toktogul residents really is a question of who receives how much water from the reservoir. This significant part of their appeal to Kurmanbek Bakiev should be readdressed.

The best decision would be to create an International Consortium on water and energy resources. However, this step would require states to reach an agreement on how individual state’s contributions would be determined and how they would be managed, especially when related to critical points.

This agreement is yet to be reached, perhaps because no one on the expert level has seriously worked on developing models of the future Consortium. Therefore, state leadership has nothing to discuss, and there is nothing on the negotiation table except for former annual agreements, which do not suit anyone and which are always signed late and with great difficulty. One could suggest that President Bakiev approach Islam Karimov with the idea of creating such a mutual expert group and assigning it to design models of Consortium within three to six months. It would be even better if both parties agreed on the work of such a group under the patronage of international organizations, the UNDP for example.

Bakiev’s critics have reminded him of the story with the Soh enclave trying to accuse the Prime Minister in those days of the secession of Kyrgyz lands. However, the situation was not that primitive at that time, as Bakiev’s opponents are attempting to show. As a matter of fact, Bakiev has attempted to find an interesting solution to the problem with borders between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – a solution that would eliminate the problem of enclaves. The main point of it was in exchanging lands. Similar experiences of resolving border issues exist in many other countries. This solution is very suitable for the Ferghana Valley, especially because its borders were marked quite freely not longer than a century ago.

Certainly, land exchange in the interest of optimizing borders requires a high level of political support, especially in Kyrgyzstan, and good will from the leadership of both states. Currently, neither element exists. However, if leaders agreed at least in general terms about the possibility of such an approach, then one could speak about the advantages of this approach, which are obvious. Besides the fact that the issue of border conflicts would be easily resolved, it would eliminate the hidden icebergs and potential problems of the enclave system.

The return of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Collective Security Treaty Organization and EvrAzES makes improvement of border crossing conditions for the civilians of our country quite realistic. We have a right to expect cancellation of the visa regime in Uzbekistan for neighbors, and possibly the right to cross the border with internal passports for all citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, regardless of their residence in border regions or not. Such a change would facilitate not only free visits by businessmen to neighboring states and the opening of Trans Central-Asian tour routes, but also the possibility of utilizing Manas and Tashkent airports by passengers of both countries for more convenient flights abroad.

But the most important aspect here is the simplification of the customs regime and the creation of free trade, as well as the establishment of free currency exchange, at least in the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan. There is a good opportunity for development and the withdrawal of the black market from bilateral trade in general, especially in border areas.

The construction of a Trans-Asian railway and auto highways going through the Kyrgyz and Uzbek territories going from North to South and from East to West is particularly promising.

Currently, resolution of the Issue of the Kashgar-Karasuu railway construction rests upon the Uzbek side. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic should enter negotiations with a legitimate set of arguments in favor of construction. Such arguments do exist. For Uzbekistan, this would open up a path to China, and further to Pakistan and the Indian Ocean, omitting Afghanistan. On the other hand, it would significantly ease the transit flow of Chinese commodities being sent to the Middle East and Europe. Furthermore, for Uzbekistan it forms a prerequisite and a new motivation for entering the WTO.

It is not worth fearing for the domestic Uzbek market, which is competitive only due to relatively cheap labor and raw materials. This advantage cannot be maintained for too long without taking additional measures, especially when labor is paid significantly higher wages in neighboring countries. As a rule, the price of labor grows fast. That fact also regards Chinese goods that won’t remain cheap for very much longer. The availability of raw materials is an unquestionable advantage, especially if they are not sold out on the London Stock Exchange, but manufactured domestically into commodities of a higher level.

Uzbekistan has a unique location in the middle of Central Asia. It can become a powerful communication hub on a regional and global scale.

One of stumbling stones in improving Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations is the issue of fighting extremism. This issue is extremely delicate and difficult, as much for Uzbekistan as for the Kyrgyz Republic. 

The liberal regime of the Kyrgyz side has long and actively been using forces that do not like Islam Karimov or the situation in Uzbekistan. Using part of the Uzbek environment in the boundary regions of Kyrgyzstan as cover, Karimov’s opponents are moving freely, organizing covered headquarters and recruiting supporters, as detection of one group of extremists recently showed. Naturally, Tashkent does not like this situation, and their reproaches are not groundless.

However, there is a different side to this matter. The exact distinction between terrorists and extremists versus dissenters and idealistic opponents of Uzbek officials has to be made.  The firm actions of Uzbek officials and the resounding criticism regarding the usage of torture and the criminal prosecution of political opponents force us to be more attentive and to follow democratic principles and our international commitments strictly.

The solution to the question lies in the law-enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic taking a more active position in investigating the work of citizens of Uzbekistan and other states suspected of extremist intentions, rather than passively observing how the special services of neighboring countries work on Kyrgyz territory. We should ensure order and not provoke our neighbors to take action on our territory. This type of cooperation is starting to shape between the various special services. Considering the importance of this issue, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic could have considered the idea of creating a joint police special division under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to fight extremism in the Ferghana Valley.

These are only some of the major issues. There are a few others, especially in the humanitarian area, which certainly will become subject to negotiations between the Presidents of the two states during a long-awaited visit.

The leadership of both states have a good chance to radically change the key of Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations. Useless conversations about friendship are unnecessary; there is a need for real measures of cooperation and joint projects. Steps towards each other have already been taken. They should be made irreversible.

Neither the Kyrgyz nor the Uzbek peoples are going to disappear from this land. They are destined to live side by side. In this situation, the continuation of relations in the paradigm of confrontation is historical nonsense. It is unlikely that today’s leaders want their people to recall the time of their leadership with such an appraisal.