Due to a wide spectrum of reasons, a discourse on the guidelines of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy and geopolitical strategy has been actively developing over the past fifteen years of independence. During this time, stable guidelines and strategic goals should have been consolidated. However, discussions continue, first and foremost regarding the question “to whom should we look?” The existing multi-vector foreign policy has not validated itself according to various viewpoints, primarily due to the narrow outline of interests and few resources. Under such conditions, a logical change to pragmatism forces us to make a choice. Besides the classical triangle, Russia-China-USA, experts are referring to other possible prospects for partnership with the European Union, Turkey, the Arabic world through the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Iran. In this context, it is indicative that such an influential organization as NATO, which has successfully transformed itself from a regional force into an alliance of global scale and which is expanding not only geographically but also thematically, has not been taken into consideration. The true reason for such neglect is not completely clear: whether it is due to Soviet stereotypes, an excessively pro-Russia foreign policy and adherence to other regional initiatives (Collective Security Treaty Organization and Shanghai Cooperation Organization), or an underestimation of NATO’s potential. Obviously, all of these factors contribute to this situation.

YESTERDAY

At the end of the Cold War, NATO lost its main strategic opponent in the form of the socialist bloc headed by the USSR. With the collapse of the bipolar world order, the very existence of NATO was called into question. The concept of “partnership” was the result of this complex and painful process of transformation and adjustment to new international conditions: NATO offered the former states of the socialist bloc a mutually attractive format of cooperation within the “Partnership for Peace” Program (PfP), whereby each partner-state independently identifies the limits and content of their individual partnership with NATO. Thus, post-socialist states turned into NATO partners with the prospects of joining it, and the Alliance acquired a “second wind,” somewhat reducing its military component and redirecting itself towards geographic expansion and reforming the military/defense sectors of partner-states. Precisely this concept of “partnership” allowed NATO to carry out a so-called “humanitarian intervention” operation in the 1998 Kosovo conflict through an unpopular bombardment of Belgrade.

Kyrgyzstan officially joined the Partnership for Peace program in 1994, although it has been participating in the work of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership (CEAP), the main advising body of “partnership,” since 1992. The main priorities for Kyrgyzstan within the framework of PfP have not significantly changed since signing the PfP Framework Document. They mainly address fighting international terrorism, emergency civil planning, and issues of developing science and protecting the environment. Other important potential spheres of partnership with NATO remain unrealized: peacekeeping, military reform, military education, institutional renewal of the defense sector, and control over arms.

The policy of Kyrgyzstan towards NATO faces the prospect of turning into a hostage of the general transition of the country’s foreign policy, away from the notorious multi-vector policy towards pragmatism. A false association of NATO with the US policy of “dictation” gives an incorrect basis for excluding this military-political organization from the list of foreign policy priorities. The alleged existing confrontation between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and/or Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which has been stirred up by the press (both western and Russian-language) obviously serves as an additional argument not in favor of NATO. The first myth is difficult to dispel; it is impossible to change the perceptions of millions of people in a blink. However, speaking of our country, even false perceptions of NATO as a “puppet” of the US is in the interests of Kyrgyzstan at present. Under conditions of somewhat tainted relations with the main pole of influence, a dynamic development in dual directions – “NATO-US” – could “put a good face on things.” 

Regarding the second myth – it is impossible to compare incomparable things. NATO is an organization uniting twenty-six states through political leadership and military command, which has stepped beyond its regional jurisdiction and become global after the start of operations in Afghanistan and Darfur. The CSTO and SCO are different regional initiatives with no common military structures, and therefore do not possess any strategic potential for confrontation with NATO. They are directed mostly at the realization of the “great-power ambitions” of Russia and China in the post-Soviet area. Participation in the CSTO and SCO does not mean curtailing partnership with NATO. On the contrary, Kyrgyzstan could become a connecting link of new interinstitutional relations. Frequent comparisons and contrasts of NATO with the SCO, and to a lesser extent with the CSTO, do not have any real basis, due to insufficient potential of the latter two organizations for conducting peacekeeping operations or effective response to hot stages of international and internal conflicts.

TODAY

The result of the passive policy of Kyrgyzstan towards NATO is obvious: among NATO’s twenty partners, Kyrgyzstan has remained in the “rear echelon” due to its satisfaction with the working level of cooperation, whereas proactive and constructive partners in NATO policy such as Finland and Austria are able to influence the process of decision making within the framework of NATO. Russia and Ukraine have particular relations with NATO in an appropriate format; Kazakhstan is approaching a similar model of partnership, while also serving as an active participant of the CSTO and SCO, just like Russia.

As a result of the Istanbul Summit in 2004, NATO declared the regions of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia as its geographic priority. As a result, today we are witnessing the advancement of partnership between NATO and Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Analysis of statements made by the NATO leadership indicate that NATO considers our state as one of the key states in the region, both in the spheres of fighting terrorism (due to the presence of the Gansi airbase) and the current fashionable discourse within NATO on general democratic values, which looks particularly contrastive in the light of Uzbekistan’s self-isolation after the notorious Andijan events.

These emerging favorable conditions notwithstanding, Kyrgyzstan is again very slow in using this potential effectively. There is an impression that Kyrgyzstan is satisfied with “passive partnership” and a conciliatory position regarding the initiatives of other partners, primarily Russia, which objects to active post-Soviet partnership. An additional reason for the lagging approach lies in the flexibility of the format of partnership offered by NATO, entailing that Kyrgyzstan determines the extent and bounds of its interaction with the Alliance, which is, to put it mildly, modest at present. In this case, the “concept of national interests,” taken as a principle of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy, should play a counterbalancing role. For the time being however, the national interests of Kyrgyzstan are interpreted somewhat differently.

TOMORROW?

The recent decision of NATO to expand its command of the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to the eastern territories of this country, previously controlled by the US, is indicative of the consolidating role of NATO. NATO will now begin to carry out the UN mandate in supporting the government of Afghanistan and creating conditions for reconstruction and development. The introduction of NATO’s new tool – the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), designed to maintain constant readiness for use in all directions – strengthens the leading role of NATO in the provision of security, not only in its traditional Euro-Atlantic geographic area, but also on a global level.

It is certainly impossible to exclude the chance that the threat of using the RRF could theoretically become a means of political pressure in the conflict regions of the world, including on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In this case, active partnership with NATO and participation in the CSTO and SCO could become a “trump-card” for a number of states, including Kyrgyzstan, which could play a leading role in ensuring the success of the negotiation processes on the basis of interorganizational interaction. The alternative “either this or that” is unacceptable for Kyrgyzstan from the point of view of national interests.

As was mentioned, NATO is expanding not only geographically. A striking example of the role-based expansion of NATO was its operation on providing humanitarian assistance to Pakistan after the disastrous earthquake in October 2005. The fact that this regional (Euro-Atlantic) military-political alliance was the first to establish an air bridge for delivering humanitarian cargo to Pakistan, located on the periphery of NATO’s mandate, is another obvious piece of evidence of the global effectiveness of the organization.

Undoubtedly, Kyrgyzstan could more deliberately approach the organization of its work with NATO, determine real priorities which meet national interests, and strictly follow their practical realization. To transform the lagging policy of Kyrgyzstan towards NATO into “outpacing,” it is necessary to define the use of traditional and innovative methods:

- NATO actively cooperates on a variety of different issues with a number of regional organizations (e.g. the OSCE, EU, and African Union), and is of obvious interest to other regional initiative, particularly the SCO, in which the leading position of Russia is balanced by China, a terra incognita for NATO. Here also Kyrgyzstan could play a key role in facilitating China’s cooperation with NATO, as well as in promoting western interests in drawing NATO closer to the SCO. At the same time, NATO’s “global partners” could exert a critical influence on China (Japan and South Korea in particular, but also Pakistan, China’s long-time ally, which received unprecedented support from NATO after last year’s earthquake). Cooperation with the CSTO in fighting terrorism and drug trafficking seems logical, and has the potential of becoming a long-term effort. The failed attempt of Russia to “impose” cooperation with the positions of the CSTO and Russia on NATO complicates matters, but does not make impossible a repeated initiative at such practical cooperation. Kyrgyzstan will receive an opportunity to increase partnership with NATO within the format of NATO-SCO cooperation, and to a lesser extent NATO-CSTO (not mentioning the practical use of joint projects directed at achieving stability and security in the region) without having to worry about others’ opinions on such activity in the friendly clubs of the CSTO and SCO.

- Granting the airbase in Manas Airport in 2001 to the International Antiterrorist Coalition could be viewed today as the “passive” participation of Kyrgyzstan in the process of Afghanistan’s reconstruction, to which our country was previously devoted. Partnership with NATO gives Kyrgyzstan a unique opportunity to shift such a contribution to the post-conflict development of Afghanistan into an “active” track by participating in peacekeeping operations under NATO’s leadership. Development of peacekeeping potential will give Kyrgyzstan additional points on the regional and wider Euro-Atlantic level in the future.

- The deepening and expansion of political and military partnership in accordance with our priorities and national interests could allow Kyrgyzstan to complete its painful reform of the military/defense sector, start traditions of peacekeeping, lay the foundation of new types of military/political institutions, and move forward in such vital directions as the security of Kyrgyzstan’s borders, emergency civil planning, and the development of science and innovative technologies.

At the same time, it is necessary to note that Kyrgyzstan’s most important task in conducting its policy in the Euro-Atlantic direction may lie in forming an independent line, without any hesitation, with a single guideline centered on national interests through breaking old stereotypes and false calls of duty to others.

The forthcoming NATO Summit in Riga in late November may serve as a milestone in the history of the concept of “partnership,” in which a new type of global partnership will be started, with the subsequent introduction of a non-conventional jurisdiction for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. Without modern and fundamental changes in our policy towards NATO, the weak voice of Kyrgyzstan will be easily lost in the thick of “global partnership.”

Joomart Ormonbekov, Graduate Student, Moscow State Institute of International Relations