Regrettably, the year 2006 has not become a year of stabilization of the internal political situation in Kyrgyzstan. “Stable instability,” heightened political tension was noted as before, the struggle for power continued with the help of various techniques and methods, including “street democracy” and “matryoshka gate”, which became internationally known. At the end of the year, in November-December, political tension reached its zenith, having led to unjustifiably swift change of the Constitution, which in the end due to multiple legal conflicts in the new wording of the country’s Basic Law and lack of mutual good will among both conflicting sides, led to the resignation of the Cabinet and questioned further existence of the current membership of parliament. These developments on the eve of the New Year again put the country before another political crisis, and the forecasted exacerbation of the situation, which will possibly be accompanied by new parliamentary elections and forming of a new Cabinet, now will obviously leap over into the year 2007.

The political year again vividly demonstrated that lacking real, not formal, political compromise between the authorities, opposition and civil society, lacking a common aspiration for moving forward in the highest interests of the state, not personal, group or clan, the unfolding volatile situation in the country clearly becomes of “chronic” nature, moving from year to year and in the end further postponing the exit of Kyrgyzstan from political and economic crisis.

After the well-known events of March 24, 2005 advanced credit of trust by the international community in the new leadership with Kurmanbek Bakiev at the head was very high. Still available and not fully spent at present the resource potential of such kind of relations in 2006 could bring Kyrgyzstan quite good political and other dividends on the assumption of competent use as well as strict and constructive demonstration of the most important elements of domestic politics.

Thus, conducting constitutional, administrative, economic reforms by the leadership of Kyrgyzstan during the past year, real reduction of the level of corruption, fight against organized crime, including harsh counteraction to attempts of criminals to integrate into government as well as firm determination to solve other crisis problems could add a significant “capital” not only to the domestic but also to flexible foreign policy maneuvering. However, unfortunately, in 2006 the leadership of Kyrgyzstan, fully preoccupied with the struggle for power, could neither resolve the abovementioned problems nor indicate fundamental approaches to their solution, giving Kyrgyzstan increasingly an image of an unstable state in the eyes of foreign partners. Lack of predictability and consistency in making decisions on domestic and foreign policy issues by the top leadership of the country is becoming more and more problematic for foreign policy partners.

All year long continuous fierce domestic struggle for power in Kyrgyzstan in certain sense objectively put off solution of foreign policy problems. Activity, determination and effectiveness of the leadership in foreign policy languished, and stability in maintaining and pursuing foreign policy priorities lacked. This circumstance often led to foreign policy discourses which undoubtedly could have a long-term negative impact on relations of Kyrgyzstan with the outside world.

In the unfolding difficult domestic political situation in 2006, under increasing pressure by western states, which expressed certain dissatisfaction with the course of democratic reforms, political leadership of Kyrgyzstan apparently made a forced and perhaps expectable focus on strengthening relations with its traditional and more “familiar” partners, mainly neighbors and CIS member states. At the same time, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Organization of Collective Security Treaty, Eurasian Economic Community, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were named as priority international and regional organizations in statements of the top leadership of Kyrgyzstan. In his address to the people of Kyrgyzstan on September 28, 2006, President Bakiev said about completion of the work on development of a new foreign policy strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic, which according to him contained the necessary corrections, and suggested to Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) to adopt it as a law. However, the draft of that document was not discussed in the parliament or released for the public till the end of the year.

Slowdown or, to be frank, rollback of democratic transformations, especially issues around constitutional reform and general democratic values, uncertainty and frequent changes of position regarding the American airbase, expulsion of American diplomats and a general deterioration of relations with the U.S., problems with the Uzbek refugees, periodic criticism on the part of certain politicians of the border agreement with China, the issue of joining the HIPC Initiative, which aggravated by the end of the year, water resources and border problems with neighbors – this is an incomplete list of problems of the Kyrgyz leadership with foreign policy partners in 2006. Moreover, there was a clear lack of unity of opinions of the top political leadership regarding a number of abovementioned problems. However, still more alarming is the fact that often domestic and generally natural disagreement in the top Kyrgyz leadership became known to mass media and public long before principled decisions were made, hurting the foreign policy image of Kyrgyzstan

The infirmity of Kurmanbek Bakiev in his office, to the point of potential threat of pre-term resignation from presidency during the course of 2006 under pressure of the opposition, coupled with his pronouncements on foreign policy led to a situation whereby the majority of foreign policy partners of Kyrgyzstan preferred to take a largely wait-and-see attitude by carefully stating their interests or freezing their relations with Bishkek at a marginally sufficient level. It is indicative that in 2006 no delegation headed by a president or prime minister has visited Kyrgyzstan. Heads of states and governments who toured Central Asian states preferred not to visit Bishkek last year.

On the other hand, a number of experts note that a foreign policy direction of “returning Kyrgyzstan home to Central Asia”, made by Kurmanbek Bakiev in the beginning of his presidency, started getting realized but, unfortunately, in a negative manner for Bishkek. The realm of foreign policy for President Bakiev within this framework really starts narrowing down to relations with the Russian Federation, Central Asian neighbors, certain CIS member states, and as an exception, with Iran and Turkey.

Activity of Kyrgyzstan at present in other important directions – American, European, and Asian – could hardly be called positive and effective. Further mechanical and one-sided adherence to realization of the abovementioned, in principle, explainable direction on the part of Bishkek could lead to destruction of the balance of interests of outside forces in Kyrgyzstan, falling into dependence from one pole, which could eventually lead to the loss of independence in foreign affairs.

A tendency of Bishkek’s departure from the policy of multiple vectors and transition to domination of primarily one – northern – vector in foreign policy orientations and personal passions of the top leadership could be observed today.

Notwithstanding persistent efforts of the Kyrgyz leadership and personally President Bakiev on rapprochement with the foreign policy partner number one – Russia, Kyrgyz-Russian relations regrettably did not develop further. The parties, primarily the top leaders, most likely still could not overcome the syndrome of non-fulfillment by the Kyrgyz side of its promises, in particular, “the Astana statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (July 2005) on the American airbase. On the eve of his first official visit to Russia in April 2006, President Bakiev made an attempt to remedy the situation and win back sympathies of the Russian leadership by once again laying down the U.S. a rigid ultimatum on significant raise of the rent for the airbase or its withdrawal. However, Moscow treated this gesture of Bakiev in a rather lukewarm manner, and immediately reacted through Yuri Baluevsky, Chief of the Joint Staff of the Russian Defense Ministry, who said that Russia does not view deployment of the American airbase in Kyrgyzstan as a problem.

According to official information of both sides, the main goal of the visit of President Bakiev to the Russian Federation, which took place in April 24-25, 2006, was to elevate “bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level – concrete definition of mutually beneficial cooperation, primarily in the trade and economic sphere.” It was also reported that during the visit there was a discussion of realization of specific business projects in oil and gas sphere, power engineering, transport with participation of major Russian companies, as well as the topic of cooperation in the sphere of migration and interaction in the sphere of culture and humanities. However, no breakthrough agreements or contracts were signed in the abovementioned spheres; the parties did not go beyond protocols of intentions. By the end of 2006, realization of the abovementioned protocols important for Kyrgyzstan’s economy was not observed. Interests of Russia, not Kyrgyzstan, were reflected in the joint document signed as a result of Bakiev’s visit to Russia, especially in the section dealing with the military presence of Moscow in Kyrgyzstan, which is apparently the main interest and a structural element of the entire Russian policy in Kyrgyzstan.

During the past year there were visits of Russian Defense Minister Ivanov, Head of the Russian Agency for Atomic Power and Co-Chair of the Russian-Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Commission Kirienko to Kyrgyzstan as well as the visit of Prime Minister Kulov to Moscow. However, they also did not bring about any progress in trade, economic or other directions of cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

A new irritant in Kyrgyz-Russian relations has suddenly emerged in the middle of the last year. There were reports in Kyrgyz mass media about supposedly transient visit of Boris Berezovsky in Bishkek and his meetings with some Kyrgyz officials. Notwithstanding denial by official Bishkek and personally Bakiev of the fact of the visit of President Putin’s major opponent to Kyrgyzstan, Russian Office of Prosecutor General confirmed this fact, which obviously did not promote establishment or restoration of mutual trust between leaders of two states.

Developments around the American airbase and Kyrgyz-American relations in general in 2006 were noted by experts as the most significant, and which had a substantial influence on relations of Kyrgyzstan with other foreign policy partners during the last year. Given the lack of economic interests in Kyrgyzstan, virtually zero commodity turnover and American investments, U.S. interests in the country mainly lie in the military-political sphere and promotion of democratic reforms. For Washington, the American airbase at “Manas” airport is a key element of not so much American-Kyrgyz relations but rather US military-political interests in the entire Central Asian region. This is what most likely explains the significant restraint showed by the U.S. during repeated changes of positions of the Kyrgyz leadership on this issue, including an ultimatum made in April 2006 on revision of the agreement regarding the terms of the deployment of the airbase. Negotiations initiated by Bishkek with the US on further use of the airbase in “Manas” airport by the forces of the Anti-Terrorist Coalition in Afghanistan were completed in July 2006. Upon the completion of negotiations Miroslav Niyazov, Secretary of the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan and James McDougall, Deputy Assistant for the U.S. Defense Minister signed a protocol, according to which the U.S. is going to provide over 150 million USD as a general assistance and compensation during the next year after ratification by the U.S. Congress. However, this issue is not completely resolved and still will remain the main issue on the agenda of Kyrgyz-American relations in 2007.

The “cold spell” of bilateral Kyrgyz-American relations was also affected by a sudden declaration of two American diplomats persona non grata in the second half of the last year. The murder of a Kyrgyz citizen in “Gansi” airbase in early December, which caused a justified indignation of the Kyrgyz public, served a final blow to the Kyrgyz-American relations in the last year.

At this state, Kyrgyz-American relations will have to withstand serious tests in 2007, and their adjustment apparently will require quite serious efforts on both sides, and desire and capability of the leadership of two states to take into account each other’s interests.

The state visit of President Bakiev to the People’s Republic of China, which reflected all problems and nuances of the countries’ relations during the last year, became the main event in Kyrgyz-Chinese relations in 2006. Expectations of Beijing regarding the visit were connected primarily to the political component of the cooperation. The top Chinese leadership tried to clarify as much as possible not only the position of President Bakiev regarding key issues of bilateral relations, regional and international politics but also its firmness and invariability in the long term. In general Beijing was interested in the possibility of restoring the atmosphere of political trust between the leadership of two states, which staggered to a certain degree after events of March 24, 2005. In Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, the level of political trust between the top leaders and the extent of cooperation in the sphere of security have always defined and will define the dynamics of relations in other spheres, primarily in trade and economic sphere, realization of major economic projects.

Acknowledgement of continuity and firm adherence of the new Kyrgyz leadership to earlier accords and agreements, primarily of political essence, including the settlement of border issues were the main elements of Bakiev’s visit to PRC. Official statement of Kyrgyzstan’s new President during the visit about firm adherence to all the hitherto concluded accords and agreements, including the border agreement, despite domestic opponents, was viewed by Beijing as a significant step towards restoration of the atmosphere of political mutual trust.

The issue of American military presence in Kyrgyzstan in immediate proximity to Chinese border was also an important aspect on the political agenda of negotiations of Bakiev in Beijing. During the visit the Chinese leadership unambiguously advocated determination of time limits for the deployment of the American airbase in “Manas” and against expansion of its mandate beyond the framework of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Apparently, Beijing managed to persuade the Kyrgyz side in validity of its position and enlisted its support. Regarding this issue in the joint final declaration, the parties stated that they “will not allow third countries the use of their territory to the detriment of the state sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side, and will not allow creation and activity on its territory of organizations and associations which pose threats to sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side.”

The economic component of President Bakiev’s visit to PRC by any measure was not the main one on the agenda of negotiations, and as a result, despite statements of certain Kyrgyz politicians, no breakthrough decisions were made in this regard. China, which does not view Kyrgyzstan as a priority economic partner in the region, restricted itself to giving a traditional grant worth 70 million yuans to support the Kyrgyz economy and a government loan for the construction of a cement works in Kyzyl-Kia, a town in the south of Kyrgyzstan. As for the priority economic projects for Kyrgyzstan – construction of a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad and export of Kyrgyz electric power to PRC, which have been at the stage of studies and discussion for the past years, the Chinese leadership as it was assumed suggested to additionally study them, which could mean that at present there is lack of interest in their implementation on their part.

In general President Bakiev’s visit to PRC was largely political and was aimed at completing the protracted pause in Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, which appeared after March 24, 2005. Notwithstanding absence of breakthrough decisions in the economic sphere, which would be highly unrealistic at present, it should be acknowledged that the goal – restoration in a certain sense of the political trust between the leaderships of two states – in principle was achieved, and could be considered as the most important and main result of Bakiev’s visit to China.

Official visits of President Bakiev during the last year to the states of the Central Asian region – to Kazakhstan (July) and Uzbekistan (October ) – were of significance to him from the point of view of acknowledgement of his status as a new legitimate leader of a neighboring state by the political elites of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The stated goals of the visits – stimulation and solution of problems in bilateral political, trade, economic and humanitarian relations – in general were not achieved. Water, fuel-energy, border, migration, property and a number of other bilateral problems with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could have been hardly resolved during one visit. According to estimates of experts and participants of negotiations, both visits were mainly about “overture” of positions and search for possible compromises. At the same time, following an established tradition upon completion of a “successful” visit to Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz side received a notification from Tashkent on raising gas prices in 2007 approximately by 50%.

Relations of Kyrgyzstan with other foreign policy partners – EU member states, Japan, Asian and Arab states – in 2006 were not active and remained at the previous level. During the last year the parties exchanged seldom visits, the highest level being ministerial.

Positions of Kyrgyzstan during the past year within the framework of multilateral diplomacy in general remained without changes. The attitude towards the HIPC Initiative, UN reform, and chairmanship in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could be noted as the most important issues for the leadership of Kyrgyzstan in international and regional organizations in 2006, and which could influence both positively and negatively domestic and foreign policy position of Kyrgyzstan. The final decision on the first issue, which caused heightened tension in the country, has been postponed to March 2007; however, judging by the statements of the prime minister and key ministers, the issue has been basically resolved in favor of joining the Initiative. Regarding the second issue, during the last year mainly China and Japan, whose interests clashed over UN reform, tried to put pressure on Bishkek with the aim of getting hold of its vote when it comes to voting. Voting on the UN reform has been postponed to a later date, which however does not eliminate the issue of making a difficult decision by the Kyrgyz leadership in favor of one or another option for UN reform, which reflect interests of key world powers. Chairmanship in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and accordingly hosting the next summit of the heads of states in 2007 has passed on to Kyrgyzstan according to the organization’s Charter by way of rotation in alphabetical order. Kyrgyzstan is given a good chance this year to promote its interests within the organization, improve bilateral relations with members and observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and try to show Kyrgyzstan favorably to the entire world during the days of the work of the Summit.

In conclusion it should be noted that the entire sequence of events which took place in Kyrgyzstan in 2006 again confirms that under an impaired and unstable leadership, stagnating economy and general unsteady internal political situation in the country, there cannot be a strong and purposeful foreign policy. All of the above negative factors were present in Kyrgyzstan during the last year. At this conjuncture, President Bakiev made efforts of maneuvering on foreign policy field, which was getting narrower as a result of his politics, trying to enlist support of above all Russia and China as well as the next-door neighbors with the aim of strengthening his positions as a legitimate President of Kyrgyzstan and solving internal economic problems of Kyrgyzstan. However, it should be admitted that from the point of view of the immediate and medium-term future, President Bakiev’s last year stake on preferred development of relations with one pole – Russian Federation could hardly compensate sharply defined cold spell in relations with western countries, primarily with the U.S. in 2006. Taking this into account, not many achievements in the sphere of foreign policy in 2006 could be claimed by President Bakiev.

Erlan Adbyldaev, IPP expert