There are several aspects of Central Asian historical development.

First, Central Asia is the place where several cultural and civilization threads converge: Russian, Chinese, Persian, Arab-Muslim and early Turkic-Mongolian.

Second, the region lies at the crossroads of all four world religions: Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, with the two latter dominating in terms of expansion.

Third, Central Asia is a region of three ethno-linguistic zones: Turkic, Persian and Slavic.

Fourth, Central Asia is the point of confluence between settled agricultural and nomadic horse economies which influences the worldview and behavioral stereotypes of people.

Fifth, Central Asia is the region where communist ideas of the Bolshevik doctrine and, traditionalist and pagan concepts were spread, with odd juxtapositions with Islam and other religions. Recently, liberal conceptions including democratic ones have been gaining prominence in the region.

Sixth, Central Asia is a territory where social systems are strongly influenced by regional, tribal, and clan conventions.

All those factors have historically and persist in affecting all aspects of life in Central Asian countries, including the system (not the form) of and formation of mechanisms of state management, the judiciary and also intellectual, political and business elites and social relations. It has a direct relationship on the formation and implementation of foreign policy of the region's states.

The historical-geographical, cultural-humanitarian legacy of Central Asian nations is most likely not an object of interest for other states, but rather a factual and semantic instrument in pursuit of its own goals and objectives.

At the current time, Central Asia is attractive for external players in two capacities: as a military and strategic location and as a source for huge hydrocarbon and water-power resources. One could recall the famous thesis of S. Halford MacKinder: "Who rules Central Asia commands Asia, and who rules Asia commands the world."

Further, the transitional condition of Central Asia as, in my opinion, a concrete definition - post-communism which possesses the following features:

• 1) Excessive personification in choosing a development pathway and the establishment of personal authoritarian regimes;
• 2) Economic development modeling, which is a set of schemes and instruments representing its socialist past, a fragmentally "pre-historic" natural economy and a new market economy. Domination of one or another in this set depends on a ruling group.
• 3) Strong influence of traditional social relations on the first two factors which are, strangely enough, in the process of degradation;
• 4) Unpredictable and often irresponsible foreign policy.

There are also other parameters and characteristics. 

The history of Central Asia's modern international structural formation can be conditionally divided into four stages:

First stage:  (1991-1994) is characterized by an inert tendency of the region's countries to maintain close economic relations of all types with Russia despite the USSR's collapse and new possibilities. However, Russia, which adhered to the concept of "Russia is a part of the West" in that period, quite openly pushed Central Asian countries away. The efforts of the West found support mainly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Second stage: (1994-1999) Central Asian countries, under political, moral and partly financial support from the West, attempted to construct regional structures, including a Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU), the Aral Fund, and a Central Asian Peacekeeping battalion. There were also attempts to establish a military-political union of Central Asian countries.

Third stage: (1999-2001) is the stage of full disappointment for Central Asian countries by common CIS, regional structures and the tendency to build relations on a bilateral basis, including its neighbors. The CAEU and Aral Fund gradually collapsed, and the idea of regional integration ceased to be a priority in Central Asian countries' foreign policy.

Fourth stage:  (2001-2005) started after September 11 events and the main feature of this stage is the demolition of Central Asian geopolitical boundaries (post soviet) instead moving toward the widening and formation of two-vectored foreign and diplomatic practices in Central Asia. The direct presence of the West, mostly the U.S., in the region is the main actor on the stage.       

Fifth stage: (2005 - to present) dominated by mercantilism in foreign policy, inter-related with the tendency of Central Asian leaders to prolong their rule and the beginning of "oil and gas" diplomacy.  

During all stages of international network development in Central Asia, at various time sequences, different countries tried to build certain schemes and models of interaction with the region in general and individual countries in particular. This happened along with attempts to form influence zones on internal political life of Central Asian countries, considering above listed factors and features. There are some examples.

Turkey. The most attractive aspects of Turkey's foreign policy in Central Asian direction were: 1) Turkey as a model of development; 2) ethno linguistic solidarity; and 3) common religion. Turkey tried to arrange "Turkic speaking train with Turkish steam" at the first stage, actively promoting all three listed aspects. Turkey tried to back its efforts by financial and investment projects, and some of them were just not successful, some of them were even scandalous. Turkey's goal was to form a lasting "Turkish influence group" in Central Asian countries. In particular, through admitting thousands of students from the region.

However, because of other players lack of acceptance of Turkey's plans and inaccurate estimations made by Turkish politicians, those plans did not properly evolve, including the concerted effort to form "Turkish influence groups" from representatives of art workers, businessmen and others.. Central Asian countries negatively perceived the aspiration of Turkey to play the role of new "big brother". The fact that Turkish projects were financially insufficient also played a key role in the lack strong development.         

Cultural aspects and the Islamic religion were at the foundation of Iran's policy for Central Asia although Pakistan's policy relied less on these two factors. However, it was very clear that Iranian Islam and Iranian business were not attractive for Central Asian countries, except in Tajikistan where it flourished, which is why the dispersion of Iranian influence was limited to separate programs.     

One should also take into account that Iranian, Pakistani, Indian experiences of development were outside of Central Asian countries' spheres of research and application and did not spread in so called "interest groups". Quite honestly the experience and opportunities of those countries were not demanded, and more than that, were seen as useless for Central Asian countries. Because of it, the influence of Iran, Pakistan and India on the internal political life of Central Asia is almost nonexistent, except in one-time events.  Compared to Turkey these three countries were not considered priority actors at any stage of the development of the international relationship network.              

The countries of Western Europe, especially Germany, Great Britain, France, Switzerland and other countries through the EU, OSCE and other bilateral relationships during the first two historical development stages tried to actively influence the democratization of Central Asian's internal political life. Sometimes - connecting financial and economic aid with the democratization issue. In my opinion, the Europeans main objective was to influence leaders directly and form a new structure of relationships through humanitarian and human rights defense activities amongst civil society. However, the personification factor was one of the most difficult obstacles along the way.     

During the third and fourth stages, the threat of Islamic extremists becoming stronger, Al-Kaeda's energetic activity and other organizations involved with international terrorism forced both the Europeans and the Americans to focus their attention on cooperation with Central Asian states in the security fields to fight against these evil forces. Often not paying much attention and sometimes even eliminating the critical elements in human rights and other freedoms and hampering democratic processes. It appeared especially at the "oil and gas diplomacy" stage. Germany's new European strategy in Central Asia will be worked out based on access to the hydrocarbon resources of the region's countries, and the focus will most likely be on bilateral relationships.       

Japan never had the goal of forming "influence groups" in the countries of the region, democracy strengthening or other goals and tried to reinforce its positions through financial and technical aspects by providing expertise and other aid, as well as spreading Japanese language and culture in several countries of the region. A new "Japan-Central Asia" project correlates with the American "Bigger Central Asia" idea, and could work together with this idea for certain reasons. However, it is only at the stage of diplomatic negotiations now.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that Central Asia is being offered such projects as "Bigger Central Asia", the new European strategy on Central Asia, "Japan-Central Asia", and current EvrAzEC, CSTO (CIS projects) and finally, the SCO as a Chinese project. Plus, let us not forget about Islamic options, including caliphate.    

Next, let's examine the main group of players - China, the USA and Russia.

China's leadership in the civilization of Central Asia for two thousand years before the British and Russians arrived was never questioned, and in fact, was considered natural and even as sent from heaven by some. For the last 15 years, China has had to prove its potential leadership in competition with other powers. According to traditional concepts, China usually works with political systems, but not separate individuals. However, the same hyper personification of Central Asian countries' foreign priorities forces Beijing to take it into consideration and work with individual leaders. It seems that China is not trying to influence domestic situations in Central Asian countries, but rather prefers that countries be loyal to China on the most sensitive and complicated issues, including Taiwan, Tibet, Uigur separatists, and confirmation of border documents. Also, China is vitally interested in Central Asian countries not turning their territories into a threat against China.        

Along with these issues, the economic, and possibly the cultural presence in Central Asia are important aspects for China in order to solve the political problems of cooperation with Central Asia as a part of a larger scale counter action against the military presence of the U.S in the region.

China has several serious obstacles in its way. These self-reinforcing positions in Central Asia such as problems of ethno-psychological and ethno-cultural compliance and the unresponsiveness of an anti-Chinese mood, which was formulated during the Soviet period, as well as ethnic antagonism.   

The U.S actively uses direct influence on the countries' leaders, the opportunities of existing "interest groups", financial and economic schemes, including the world trade situation, to achieve its objectives. In Washington's global strategy, there is a clear tendency for the U.S. to try to establish certain control over the Muslim region starting from Magreb to the Great Wall of China. In this context "Big Central Asia" is a part of the geopolitical region. If they achieve their objective, then it will allow them to solve issues of the fight against international terrorism and gain access to vast main hydrocarbon reserves. However, serious errors by the American administration in the last few years have given rise to doubts that the project can be implemented.  

In comparison, Russia compared to these other two powers not only has justified interests in the region, but also carries a certain historical responsibility over Central Asia's fate. The cultural and humanitarian impact of Russia's position remains a serious enough influence mechanism in the Central Asian countries. From an economic point of view, Russia controls almost all transport and communication networks which connect Central Asia with other parts of the world. 

Russia also has a serious advantage in that there is a presence of "pro Russian interest groups" especially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Plus, there are a number of politicians, scientists, artists and other influential people in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan who cherish positive feelings for Russia for various historical reasons.    

It is worth noting that after the September 11th events, an active presence was established for the U.S. and Russian Federation in the region, which is evident not only by the presence of military bases, but also the foreign policy stances of countries in region narrowed only to relations with those two powers. Cooperation with other countries, when the antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan started, moved to the background or lost relevance.    

There is no clear conflict of interest between the U.S. and Russia in Central Asia. They have a common objective of fighting against international terrorism, and also weakly but still identified "anti-Chinese" sentiments.

However, if a conflict escalates, then almost all Central Asian leaders have to make a choice, which is difficult for them.  

"New Great Game" - a definition which is often used by political experts recently regarding the presence of leading powers in Central Asian region.

How is the use of the term justified?  

Indeed, is there any reason to think that the convergence of Russian, American and Chinese interests in Central Asia is the "New Great Game"?

Indeed all three powers have objective interests in the region: the U.S as super power has interests in every region of the world (in any case, Americans announce it themselves), and Russia and China are direct neighbors of Central Asia.

The first and main set of questions:       How are the interests of the main players formulated? What is behind these interests? Is there only an issue not to admit or force someone out of the region thus designing a zone and regime of confrontation? All Central Asian states should find answers to these questions. It is also important to solve the following puzzle: How closely do stated principles and undeclared interests of the leading countries of the world coincide?

On the other hand, what Central Asia are we talking about? There are two definitions of the region. The first one - as a part of historical-cultural area, which includes not all post Soviet countries but also Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia and others. The second one - the region in the boundaries of the former Soviet Central Asia. The latter definition is preferable for CIS countries. States, which are located to the south, south-west, east and west, are no more than possible partners on various issues of cooperation. It is an issue of geopolitics, but depending on which interpretations are transformed into reality, can fundamentally change the future of these countries.     

A broad interpretation of Central Asian boundaries can result in an immediate connection with the Middle East. Following the formation of a new geopolitical network and a conglomeration of political, economic and other problems. One cannot say if this directly corresponds to the interests of Western countries and a number of Islamic countries, but it seems that such a construction is preferable for them.

A narrow (post-Soviet or Eurasian) interpretation is probably supported by Russia.

Until the current period neither post-Soviet countries (except Kazakhstan, which started to exclude itself from Central Asian countries) nor their partners and neighbors formulated a geopolitical self identification in the region and seemingly it will not happen anytime soon.   The

Central Asian region possesses a more complicated, possibly unique, feature.

For example, for Baltic countries there is no alternative to European integration: in general it is an enormous advantage for the region which is why there is more or less a clear and logical foreign policy. This foreign policy is generally supported by domestic forces, except fragmentary protests by Russian speaking communities in Latvia and Estonia. Here we talk not about some resistance against "Europeanization" but rather about impact of worldview and interests of ethno-linguistic groups.

Central Asian region is, on the contrary, as if it is being "stretched" into different sides by geopolitical factors: to the West, Russia and Islam. Also let us not forget the growing strength of the Chinese vector.   

Internal political allocations in the Central Asia countries are represented by (in fact, in different conditions and with different forces) bearers and apologists of all three "factions" in emerging political and business elites. Then there is the exclusion of big neighbor China - there are almost no pro-Chinese people in the region. Although China actively demonstrates that it is peaceful, predictable and ready to render any aid.  

If talking about the strength of Russian, Western and Islamic positions in the region's countries, it appears that Russia and Islam receive wide social support (in most cases, the population supports both sides, and there is nothing paradoxical in that). There are also certain "interest groups".

Certainly each of the three powerful countries, the U.S., Russia and China, have already proposed or will propose an adaptation of its value system. (Under the condition that no country in Central Asia yet formulated its own system of values, not to mention a common regional one. But, it is obvious that when formulating these systems they will incorporate full fragments or elements of values proposed by the leading powers).    

Those values are connected with a particular worldview, philosophy of existence, educational, cultural, moral, linguistic corporate systems, building of state and society, social, and economic concepts. There are two important questions in this context. The first one: is it realistic that each of theses leading countries proposed or will propose to the Central Asian countries to apply its own system of values, declaring their values as dominant and even the only priority of foreign policy and as a base for mutually beneficial cooperation? Or are some of the values only instruments to reach certain mercantile goals? Is it interest or principle that is the basis of the leading countries' policies regarding the region? It is obvious that it contains both interest and principle. The issue remains, which one is the priority?. The question should be thoroughly answered by Central Asian countries independently.     

It needs to be considered that there are contradictions in the approaches of the leading countries to the issues of globalization and the new world order. It is objective and preconditioned by historical-cultural, political, socio-economic and even ethnic-psychological factors. In particular, we can describe again the problem of uni- or multi-polarity of the world order. However, along with that, all three powers (including India, Israel, and the European Union) face a common enemy - international terrorism or so called international Islamoterrorism.  

In this context, there is a question for Central Asian political elites - the position of leading powers toward current Islam, politicized Islam, "majestic" and militant. Formally Islam is not an opponent or the obstacle for the leading powers to strengthen mutual understanding and further cooperation. The enemy is Islamic religious extremism, which gives rise to radicalism. The issue becomes whether there is any division between Islam and religious radicalism? There are voices of influential politicians in America, Europe and Russia and other countries and regions that think it is all the same.  

Secondly, in the context of aforementioned conceptual approaches to the issues of globalization, do the contradictions between value systems of Islam, the West, Russia and China pose a potential basis for permanent hostility and conflict? Those issues are not easy for Central Asian countries; they have very complicated and contradictory form and substance since Central Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan, are considered Islamic.

An objective assessment of  the terrorism problem and Kyrgyzstan's own experience makes Bishkek support the fight against international terrorism. Yet subjective feelings of religious solidarity amongst part of the population give rise to other ideas. These complex issues about Islam have direct bearing on the presence of Russia, the U.S., and China in Kyrgyzstan.   

In publications devoted to the issue of the two military bases existence in Kyrgyzstan, there is a high degree of speculation about possible conflicts of interests between these two leading powers.   

Currently, one can only talk about competition or concurrence mainly between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Official representatives of both countries declare positive positions, which are directed to assuage conflict. A wide variety of goals and objectives on fights against international terrorism compose the basis for tight cooperation between the leading countries with the participation of Kyrgyzstan. However, it is obvious that on other foreign policy stages of these countries they think and act according to other schemes and examples? The issue for Central Asian leaders is not to allow themselves to turn into a field for the New Great Game, where the fight against terrorism turns into a power struggle for influence.  

And finally, regarding concrete international construction that emerged for Kyrgyzstan.  First, Kyrgyzstan's real foreign policy is narrowed down to the relations with the U.S. and Russia. Second, Kyrgyzstan, with its two military bases, is considered as the territory which poses a threat for countries located to the south and southwest of Kyrgyzstan. Third, there is even an observable disintegration among Central Asian countries which diminishes the possibility of regional integration, which might be the basis for joint development and the common fight against international threats.