Erlan Abdyldaev, exclusively for IPP

A report presented at the conference “Kyrgyzstan and Central Asian Today", organized by the Institute for Public Policy on 9 June 2007.


At present there are a number of problems that attract the attention and concern of Central Asian countries within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Among those problems, traditionally, are the issues of providing security and stability in each country in particular, and in the region in general, particularly in terms of providing security on borders, the joint fight against terrorism, separatism, drug trafficking, illegal arms trafficking (primarily in the context of antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan), as well as economic cooperation in the framework of the organization. All those issues are certainly important and among the priority objectives of the organization. Regarding the aforementioned points, the SCO’s participating states more or less (and with various level of success) managed to work out a common approach and sign the relevant agreements and treaties. The issue is their implementation, which has not always been successful however.

There are several other problems that need to be highlighted that are on the agenda of the SCO and lately an increasing number of experts devote more and more attention toward those problems. We have to stress that the organization’s future parameters and success of the organization will depend on the level of solutions to those problems and at least a working out of a common balanced approach to their solution by participating states.

Firstly, there is the geo-political factor related to the de-facto military-political presence of the U.S. in Central Asia and as a consequence the necessity to work out principles of relations by SCO states, and to some extent cooperation with influential out-of-region states and organizations. Secondly, there is the need to search for a suitable balance of interests, taking into account medium and long term perspectives in the strategic approach to the Central Asian region of main players in the SCO - Russia and China, where the main motive should be cooperation and not the present covert competition. Thirdly, there is the problem of non equal participation of countries in the SCO and a wide range of complicated problems in bilateral relations.

All the aforementioned problems become issues of special topicality due to the initiation of the political elites’ changes, sometimes very painful and often unpredictable in Central Asian states (which are still far from constructing stable democratic systems). Right now, after Kyrgyzstan, there are other SCO states standing in line, which are in a heavier weight category, and taking this factor into consideration, instability and sharp domestic political changes within those countries might bring more significant and negative influences to the region as a whole, as well as impact upon the development of the SCO.

One of the main problems of the SCO is a certain non-compliance with the declared principles of cooperation both within the organization and the states and organizations outside of it.

In particular, the issue of one of the main principles of the SCO is that of transparency. At present the SCO established cooperation with the EC, ASEAN, CSTO, EurAzEC and other international organizations. However, experts highlight the fact that there are not still serious contacts with the U.S. and NATO, which took the responsibility for development of the situation in and the fate of Afghanistan, which is the most topical security issue in Central Asia. Right now many, probably reluctantly, admit that without the relevant participation of the U.S. issues of security and stability in the Central Asian region are hard to resolve.

Moreover, the U.S. with the consent of Russia and China and the Central Asian states themselves secured its direct presence not only in Afghanistan but also in Central Asia as a part of the antiterrorist coalition. All the SCO’s participating states have independent schemes of relations with Washington, admitting its influential role in global and regional politics. However, there are not joint contacts of the SCO with the U.S. and NATO even as a part of consultations. We have to acknowledge that such an approach to partnership with the U.S. and NATO creates obstacles to other declared principles of the SCO- the principle of corporateness or consolidation, especially for Central Asian states, for example.

Bilateral Russian-American, Chinese-American negotiations and consultations on issues of strategic security including Central Asian issues that are permanently conducted, have in recent years raised doubts, even bewilderment, among Central Asian states. It is in the interests of Central Asian states to form and maintain a balance of interests and develop the cooperation with world powers in the region, but not to confront or attempt to squeeze others out. In this context a very important issue is that the situation in Afghanistan right now is not improving at least, and as experts believe, it is in the interests of the SCO to start consultations with the U.S. in this regard. Most likely the time is coming where Washington is also showing interest in establishing contacts with the SCO.

The second problem is the need to find a suitable balance of interests taking into account medium and long term perspectives in strategic approach to Central Asian region primarily of main players in the SCO – Russia and China. In the beginning of the 90s Russia, being busy constructing contacts with the West (and later confrontation with it in the international arena), itself set the geopolitical space of Central Asia free. China exploited the timing to the full to enter the region. Thanks to the Shanghai five, and then the SCO, China received an institutionalized legitimate channel (which did not give birth to critics of Russia or Central Asian states) and the opportunity to directly act in the post-soviet territory. We also have to add here the growing interest of Beijing in the rich resources of power and minerals in the region, conditioned by rapid rates of economic growth in China in the last decade.

By the end of 90s Russia tried to return lost positions in Central Asia, creating competition with China. However, at the beginning of the new century, the military presence of the U.S. and NATO, which incorporated Central Asia into their zone of strategic interests, became an alternative to Chinese-Russian competition replacing it with a partnership of a primarily anti U.S. direction.

However, the partnership is limited by certain frameworks and burdened by a range of problems that related to the objective complexities in Russian-Chinese relations, with the uncertainty of relations from both Russia and China with the West in general, and the U.S. in particular. Chinese ambitions in Central Asia, and the Russian historical responsibility for the fate of the region, have potential for conflict. Until there is one common objective – to decrease level of U.S. influence in Central Asia and if possible to squeeze it out of the region, such partnerships exist, as well as its main institution (SCO) remaining functional. Nevertheless, it is hard to forecast what would happen with this partnership, if the common objective disappears and China becomes stronger.

The third problem- the unequal partnership in the SCO has in fact an objective character. The organization includes states, which are formally and legally equal in the organization (a consensus principle when taking decision proves the notion) but they cannot be compared according to their economical potential, not even when talking about military and other opportunities. That is why the problem of asymmetric partnership will emerge sooner or later.

A number of experts proposed a way out of the situation “to discuss the issue of internal structure and functional specialization of the SCO members on the 2+4, 3+3 or 2+2+2 schemes.” There is a certain logic to it from the point of view of increasing first of all the effectiveness of economic cooperation in the framework of the SCO. However, in this model one of the founding principles of the organization would be lost, which makes it attractive for other countries- the principle of a vote’s equality and consensus in decision making. Secondly, there is the problem with the level of self-evaluation and the ambitions of separate participating states and their leaders. Thirdly, it is necessary to take into consideration the possibility of over evaluating the “weight category” in case of possible membership of other countries in the organization.

There is one more aspect related to regional stability and security and it could negatively influence the organization’s perspectives. The issue is of the problems of Central Asian countries with Russia, China and among each other in bilateral relations. The existing range of problems often get very sharp and the SCO most likely should decide whether it would discuss those problems in its format or whether it prefers to consider them on a bilateral basis. The issue is not easy because sooner or later states will have to solve several problems such as water-power problems, trans-border rivers, labor migration and others with purely bilateral relations.

In conclusion, we have to say that the SCO right now is at important stage of its development. There are numerous problems in the organization. Not everything that is designed and declared comes to fruition, especially when it comes to economic cooperation. In some cases the SCO is late on taking the necessary decisions; often the ambitions of certain countries and their leaders do not correspond to the interests of the organization in general. Along with that, it is evident that if the SCO’s potential is used to the full, the organization will gain the necessary authority not only in the region but also in the broader context. We have to acknowledge that right now the Shanghai Cooperation Organization among existing interstate unions in the region, despite its problems and contradictions, is primarily still very necessary for Central Asian states.