A report presented at the conference “Kyrgyzstan and Central Asian Today", organized by the Institute for Public Policy on 9 June 2007.

Everyone probably remembers the feelings of 2001-2002; that expectation of the situation in Afghanistan, residing in peoples’ thoughts and a state of a public opinion related to the defeat of the Taliban regime, the hopes for peace and stability to finally reach this country. It was especially relevant to our region because for a long time the situation in Afghanistan, whether we want it or not, has been affecting our countries and having an impact on our development. If Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are geographically located in the second echelon, then let’s say for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the issue has always been of a high concern.

Those expectations I mentioned were formalized in some plan of an international regulation compiled under the aegis of the United Nations. I will briefly recall that at the end of November - beginning of December 2001 Bonn hosted a conference, where a military administration of Afghanistan was formed; in July 2002 Loya Jirga met in Kabul, which is a traditional representative body that approved the temporary government of Afghanistan. In January, 2004 a new Constitution of Afghanistan written by Barnett Rubin, a professor of New York University, was adopted, and Hamid Karzai, the current President was elected. In September 2005 the first Parliamentary elections took place, wherein a current two-chamber Parliament was elected. Parliamentary elections became the final stage of the peaceful regulation plan passed under the aegis of the United Nations at the end of 2001. Formally, since September-October 2005, upon the organization of Parliamentary Elections, Afghanistan started a path of a peaceful democratic construction.

However, during this time starting from the summer 2002 until now, the process of a real peaceful regulation unfortunately does not exist, and the situation with security – military, political, with several adjacent areas - is deteriorating and problems building up. There was a statement that the situation in Afghanistan is not changing; I understand that diplomats have to be more reserved in their speeches. In reality, the scenario run in Afghanistan now is of a very alarming nature. That is proved by the example of drug production. The laast harvest produced before the Taliban regime defeat made up 189 tons of raw opium. In 2002 already, production growth was up 1400 percent and reached the volume of the 1990s when 70 percent of the world production was concentrated in Afghanistan. In 2003, 3600 tons were produced, in 2004, 4100 tons. In 2006, a record breaking harvest of 6100 tons of opium was gathered in Afghanistan; the average crop from 1 hectare of land made up 37 kilograms. Collected in 2006, the harvest of the opium poppy was almost three times higher than the annual world consumption and heroine produced made up 90% of the world use. Based on United Nations experts’ evaluation, at least 8400 tons of opium is expected to be produced this year in 2007.

The situation is not better in the military and political spheres. Military-political instability in Afghanistan reached an extremely high level and remains one of the main factors determining the state of security in the whole region of Southern and Central Asia. Moreover, in comparison with a lingering confrontation between the Northern alliance and the Taliban (peculiar to the second half of 1990s and till October 2001) the newest situation in terms of intra-afghan stability and regional security is significantly less predictable. Today the Taliban fully control almost the whole range of the South-Eastern and Southern provinces, permitting official administrations to exist only in cities. Thus, this situation is true about Khost, Ghazni, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Farah, Helmand, Konar, Oruzgan and Zabol. Besides, there is a whole range of provinces not related to the regions where Taliban influence was traditionally strong, while Taliban and other forces fighting against Karzay’s Government and foreign forces are mobilizing. This is, for example, Baghlan, Badghis, Faryab, situation is building up in Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan… And that is directly by the borders with the Central Asian states. The Kabul government is not capable of controlling the situation in the provinces; almost all local government is in the hands of mafia with close ties to the Taliban. In fact, today Afghanistan faces in average of up to five acts of a military nature a day. In the course of military actions in 2006, about four thousand people died on both sides including 170 military officers of the USA and NATO. Since 2007, destabilization tends to touch upon the North of Afghanistan or the so-called Afghani Turkistan and Badakhshan, i.e. those provinces or territories adjacent to the borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

This raises the question of what the international contingent, legally represented by NATO forces, is doing there. Basically, NATO forces today in Afghanistan play a deterrent role. A certain balance of power is reached where international forces complemented by Afghan troops are incapable of defeating existing confrontation, but yet serve controlling functions of the majority of administrative centers including Kabul, and support a relative equilibrium in the country. On the other hand, Taliban and other confrontation forces leading military actions and committing terrorist attacks enjoy the support of the majority of the population and cannot be neutralized by the opponent. This fluctuating balance depends on a variety of local factors in a given time period, since the country is very complicated and a whole range of differentiating characteristics including regional, ethnic, tribal, professional and others exist. One of the factors justifying the current situation is, for example, local agreements and ties. For instance, when Taliban troops belonging to the group of tribes close to Karzai can openly fight with international forces and at the same time remain neutral to afghan governmental troops. Some other groups of tribes related to politicians can act oppositely. When a range of Afghan officials – politicians, Members of Parliament, Ministers - unofficially have levers of managing this or that antigovernment military group.

Today the politics of the international coalition led by the USA is in deadlock. The military presence of the USA, NATO and international ISAF forces in Afghanistan, alongside a low activity by Hamid Karzai in securing stability, is by itself a factor causing a growth of public support for antigovernment forces, and for building up military confrontation. Based on the testimonies of NATO generals, support shown for confrontational movements including the Taliban, Islam Party of Hekmatiar and others may make up almost 80 percent of the adult population…

Essentially, the current situation is absolutely convenient to the USA, which has shifted most of its responsibility for Afghanistan on NATO while continuing to use Afghani “manageable conflict” to solve its geopolitical objectives. Actually, usage of the Afghan situation was not an invention of 2000 since very clear bonds of the Taliban with U.S. state structures in the 1990s are not a secret. By 2001 stagnation began when the Afghan situation decreased the instrumentality of conflict; deploying troops increased the opportunity of using the Afghan situation, for example, to justify military presence in a range of states in the region.

During the whole post-soviet period all threats coming from the territory of Afghanistan are divided into three categories. That is: drug production, refugees (not as a humanitarian problem but an issue of security that Tajikistan experienced the most in one time period) and the third is the usage of Afghan territory for the allocation of groups of a terrorist and extremist nature related to radical Islamic ideas. Currently relevant threats to Central Asia are those related to drug production and the dissemination of “jihad” groups’ activities. The last is extremely important. I intentionally used the phrase “territory usage” as statements made in the end of 1990s – early 2000 about military attacks by the Taliban in the North were absolutely groundless. The threat of a direct military attack by the Taliban against Central Asia has never existed, the issue is different: a territory that lacks efficient state management allows the growing of drugs and the allocation of bases for militant training really presents the main danger for our region.

What can one do? Central Asian states (I am talking about five post-soviet countries) with the de-facto hierarchy of states in the system of international relations can barely make a significant impact on the overall situation in Afghanistan. The national interests of the states in the region in regard to threats to security coming from Afghan territory can be achieved with a simultaneous administration of two programs.

The first one does not contain anything significantly new and is based on a simple strengthening of frontier control functions as well as an establishment of a coordination mechanism in adjacent regions in this sphere.

The second objective is to establish a buffer zone in adjacent Afghan provinces, where an environment of mutual cooperation should be created. There exists a precedent of adjacent border economic cooperation of the 1930s that made a serious positive impact on the establishment of stability along the border. In the current situation it seems that a tactic used by the Soviet leadership in the 1930s for the neutralization of anti-Soviet basmachi (Central Asian) activity in the border areas of Afghanistan is the most applicable. Starting from the spring of 1929, the Soviet side started using favorable conditions created as a result of broken ties between separate Afghan regions and between Afghanistan and British India for a developed economic cooperation. The growth of interest of regional Afghan elites in economic cooperation with Soviet frontier regions soon contributed to a decrease in support for the basmachi movement in Afghan border regions.

With its own resources, Central Asian states could currently solve many of their issues following the same direction. Considering the newest positive trends in the development of economic cooperation within the SCO, as well as on bilateral levels, states in the region should also attract those countries interested in establishing stability in Afghanistan through the development of economic revival, rather than through the organization of military operations and the building up of military presence. The main principle of such programs should be a sensible country-based and regional symbiosis.

Bilateral economic activity is an important reserve of stability in the zone of the Afghan border. Being run on local levels, such activity to some extent will worsen traditional Afghan regionalism. However, for national interests of the Post Soviet Central Asian states, any positive changes in the economic situation of the provinces adjacent to the post soviet territory are immeasurably more important. Economic development leading to the creation of jobs and the improvement of living standards provides for the establishment of a specific cooperation zone in the stated provinces and population; traditional leaders especially will be more interested in peaceful cooperation rather than destructive activity, which would safeguard frontier security.


Alexander Knyazev is a Professor of Politics at Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University in Bishkek.