Strategy of the European Union for Central Asia: Pro et Contra
Lilia Ormonbekova and Joomart Ormonbekov, exclusively for IPP
A Strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia, adopted by the EU’s supreme body, the European Council on 22 June 2007, resulted from the relevant initiative in the framework of Germany’s chairmanship in the EU. The strategy was presented in Berlin on 30 June 2007 and was accepted positively enough, in particular, in the countries to which it was addressed. The document’s title sounds serious and promising. What is the strategy about, and what can we expect from this?
What the strategy gives?
After the latest wave of the EU widening in 2004-2007, all neighboring countries were included in the European Neighborhood Policy that provides close cooperation in spheres of common interest. Central Asia having no borders with EU member countries didn’t fit such a format. By accepting a separate strategy regarding Central Asia the EU makes an attempt to establish closer cooperation with the region. The document has important political meaning and symbolizes the beginning of a new stage of cooperation between Central Asian countries and the EU which can already be called full cooperation. The strategy is perfectly timed in the context of the TACIS program’s completion and the implementation of a new instrument of development aid in Central Asia. Intensification of integration processes in Central Asia is also suited to the strategy.
In the spirit of former European strategies (regarding Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean) the current strategy represents a universal framework document that outlines spheres of possible and practical cooperation on the basis of commonly accepted principles and values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights. The document provides the use of several instruments by the EU that are both traditional (the institute of the EU’s special representative, mechanisms of grant aid and cooperation with other international players) and innovational; for example, implementation of “EU initiatives” in various spheres and using the format of “deep dialogue,” in particular in such areas as human rights and energy.
A constructive element of the strategy is the official acknowledgement of a two-level nature of the EU policy in the region: an individual, bilateral approach and a common, regional approach, which correspond to the requests of the countries in the region themselves. Implementation of such a policy has two goals: the acknowledgement of each country’s uniqueness, and at the same time, the development of regional projects with an aim to strengthening the integration relations among countries.
One more peculiarity of the strategy is in the application of a “strengthened approach” in a number of cooperation spheres, starting from democratization and ending with issues of environmental protection. In the framework of the approach the EU takes obligations on development, promotion and the support of concrete proposals, in particular the creation of a unified energy system in the region.
Another distinctive feature of the strategy is its non aggressiveness. Central Asia is considered as an area, where interests of international and regional actors intersect. It is evident that the EU follows a cooperation concept but not competitiveness, which is proved by its intentions to establish contacts with such regional organizations as EurAzEC, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is positive too that the EU considers Central Asia as one of the elements providing its own security. In this regard, the EU is interested to have a unified, integrated and loyal Central Asia at the intersection of the West and the East, which shares European values. The growing energy influence of the region and its important geopolitical location is clearly in the interests of the EU.
Along with that, even taking into account positive innovations, it is evident that the main advantage of the strategy is the fact of its existence. Lively enough discourse, which took place before the adoption of the strategy both in Central Asia and the EU, demonstrates a mutual interest to have amore dynamic and meaningful relations between the two regions. The adoption of the strategy will certainly make sides closer and become a constructive basis for development for medium term cooperation in virtually all spheres.
What to expect in reality?
Because of its one-sided dynamic the strategy is aimed at implementing the objectives primarily of the EU and has a secondary meaning for Central Asia. The essence of the document represents a declaration of principles and intentions with an attempt to bring some specificity and practical application.
Some awkwardness of the strategy is in its clear prioritization of cooperation spheres, which is reflected in the provision of a “strengthened approach” toward Central Asian countries. The first priority in the document is human rights, the rule of law and democratization that fully corresponds to common European values and plans of the EU to widen its “space of freedom, democracy and legality” at the expense of new regions. The EU intends to establish dialogue with each country on human rights, which almost exists in practice. However, the experience of such dialogues shows, firstly as it applies to Uzbekistan, that the rhetoric of the EU often remains unheard.
Implementation of the second priority, which is certainly praiseworthy but not a new initiative – the investment in youth and education- during latest years was limited mostly to the breaking-up of the former system and the introduction of mechanisms for the Bologna process. Any efforts in this direction will become more complicated, taking into account the catastrophic condition of educational systems, the devastating state of educating personnel and the lack of motivation of modern youth. In order to achieve effective and successful results in this sphere it is necessary to conduct cardinal educational reform and substantial financial (most of all donor) support.
The third area of the EU’s strengthened approach includes economic development, trade and investment. Here even a favorable system of conditions for Central Asian countries proposed by the EU will hardly change huge deficit of trade balance between two regions to the benefit of our region. The richness of the European market of goods of its own production, protectionist policies of the EU regarding import of agricultural products (for which the region is famous), will seriously hamper trade development between regions.
The fourth priority of the EU – the strengthening of energy and transportation channels – is certainly the most important direction in a list of real interests of the EU in cooperation with Central Asia. Under the initiative of providing energy security the EU hides an intention to diversify its supply of energy carriers from Central Asia, first of all from Caspian basin, to European markets with an aim to decrease Europe’s energy dependency on Russia. Unfortunately, those issues are too closely related to geopolitical processes, which most likely would not allow hope for constructive energy dialogue between the EU and Central Asian in the near future.
The fifth priority – environmental protection and water resources – in fact contains beneficial proposals for the region, in particular, on the integration policy of water resources usage. In the case of a mutually beneficial implementation of the proposal, jointly with the construction of common energy system, it is possible to overcome several obstacles for the real integration of the region. However, deep contradictions among the region’s countries, and the lack of a unified approach to the issue do not progress in this direction.
The sixth area of priority – the fight against common threats and problems –is probably the most important for Central Asia. Regulations of border disputes, the joint fight against extremism and drug trafficking and the provision of common security in the region is imperative for the economic welfare of Central Asian countries. Alongside that it is evident that for effective involvement of the EU in the region it is necessary to establish contacts with regional organizations for security such as SCO and CSTO with whom the EU, as well as NATO, do not have any formal relations.
One of the shortcomings of the strategy is the lack of a requirement for submitting practical results, except for the reminder that the European Council will consider a progress report in 2008 or in 2009. Probably, an effective element might have been the relation of the strategy’s implementation to an annual distribution of development funds. However, taking into account the unilateral character of the strategy this is not realistic.
How to achieve results?
EU strategies toward third countries are not legally binding documents but they serve as frameworks for the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements (for example, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and several Central Asian countries). Despite this, the strategy is in fact no more than a declaration of intent; the document has significant political meaning, reflecting the increased interest of the EU, which has become one of the most influential power circles in the world for some time.
The strategy in this sense gives one more chance for the countries in the region to strengthen their partnership with the EU and start a process of regional integration. As regards Kyrgyzstan in this context, we should concentrate our efforts on the following points:
1. Working out of a reciprocal national strategy on partnership with the EU or a more practical action plan for the implementation of PCA between the EU and Kyrgyzstan. The agreement serves as a legal basis for cooperation development with the EU and the prolonged delay of its implementation painfully reflects the common state of contacts between Kyrgyzstan and the EU.
2. Common coordination of cooperation with the EU, including financial and donor means. The division of Kyrgyzstan’s cooperation spheres with the EU among various departments without unified coordination often leads to few results and duplication. In this context it is necessary to appoint special representatives or coordinators (with their own office) for European policy (in response to the introduction of positions of an EU Special Representative for Central Asia in 2005).
3. Consultation on a regional level among Central Asian countries on issues of cooperation with the EU. Such a format can serve as a constructive basis for attempts for regional cooperation and the beginning of negotiations on the creation of a unified energy and water network in Central Asia. Such consultations can be inspired by the example of the EU’s birth, when the initial “six” set up the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 with an aim to jointly use coal resources and the steel production industry to reanimate economics in the post-war period.
Special attention of the EU to Central Asia should not be left without the adequate response of countries in the region. Twenty-seven EU member states, for which such strategies are handbooks on the development of individual bilateral relations with third countries, could become more interested in close cooperation. This is one of the main advantages of the EU compared with such players in Central Asia as Russia, China and the U.S.
Conditions of economic and political transition in countries in one region can be found to improve in mutual support. The EU is a bright example of how countries in one region managed to forget about the contradictions and ambitions for absolute leadership, instead constructing a unified territory for the sake of its own citizens’ future, and of future generations.
Liliya Ormonbekov, PhD candidate, Radbout Universiteit Nijmegen, Netherlands
Joomart Ormonbekov, PhD candidate, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia
