Kyrgyzstan is not called a transition democracy any more. The word "transition", popular in the past, became a synonym for protracted political construction project and incompleteness. Today no one will take on the task of defining where the country has "transited" to, but according to the theory of a democratic transition we are still going through the second stage of the whole process, the process of democratization".

The first stage of transition - liberalization -lasted for over ten years in Kyrgyzstan and ended with the "tulip revolution". Any pact that was a requirement for this stage turned out to be short-term. The main goal of the second stage of democratization was the introduction of political institutes, new in nature and content. However, the official results of the past Parliamentary Elections are not giving much hope for the prompt completion of the overall process and moving on to the final stage of transition, which is consolidation.

Why does the Kyrgyz political transformation constantly change its direction? What is causing the delay towards a consolidated democracy? Maybe the answer to all these questions lies in the inconsistency of the form and substance of the rule of law. There are a certain number of interpretations of this concept; however from the political point of view we can consider this phenomenon from the following angles.

Rule of law as an endogenous condition for a democratic development

The vocabulary of any transition democracy has a "rule of law" concept that is a fundamental criterion of a consolidated democracy, which is of no small significance. Transition towards a functional democratic society (consolidated democracy, in other words) may be considered to be successful if there are the main indicators of a democratic development including the rule of law.

At the early stages of a democratic transition in Kyrgyzstan, the rule of law has been declared as one of the fundamental principles of state development. Thus, it created an embryonic form of this concept, supported by the introduction of the principle of division of power. Despite the existence of a fairly bulky governmental legislative framework, we failed to create a functional and a mutually effective system of checks and balances or an institute of independent courts. Probably, this goal was not considered by the ruling elite to become an end result, which prevented filling the the structure with corresponding content.

Completion of a two-year constitutional discourse with the adoption of a new edition of the main law in October of the year 2007 also complicated the transition and the effective implementation of the rule of law. Frequently, constitutional innovations have fundamental discrepancies with the current legislature, which of course makes political processes in the country less stable and less predictable.

Lack of coordination between central government and regional authorities also creates a peculiar challenge for the rule of law. The most vivid example is the recent scandal of the persistent desire of Osh city administration to build a cableway to Suleiman Too Mountain, which conflicts with plans of state government on including this sacred place into UNESCO's list of World Heritage Sites. The emergence of such collisions demonstrates the clash of interests between various levels of power and the lack of a political culture of making governmental decisions, including the practice of obeying legislative norms.

Thus, it is obvious that in the cut of endogenous democratic development of the country, the rule of law is a double-edged sword: it is imperative for democratic development and it is also the end result of such development. Bringing these "edges" into one vector requires joint efforts on behalf of all levels of government towards an effective execution of power within an existing legislative framework.

Rule of law as an exogenous factor of international cooperation

Contemporary democratic standards including the rule of law are frequently used by the powerful as a notorious "whip" in the "big game". Supposedly, the requirements of the West in the democratization of post-Soviet regimes are often strictly proportional to the amount of economic and technical assistance provided. However, for countries successful in economic development, and thus having a certain political weight, the effectiveness of such a "whip" slowly loses its former significance. The election of Kazakhstan as chair of the OSCE in 2010 despite obvious gaps in democratizational processes vividly demonstrates this.

Relationships of Kyrgyzstan with donors and international structures such as the EC and NATO are regulated by a block of democratic principles. For example, the Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EC and KR (1995) states that the guarantee of general democratic principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law are vital for the positive development of cooperation. The same principles were included in the underlying foundation of the Partnership for Peace Framework Agreement between NATO and the KR (1994). Thus, the rule of law became a requirement for including new independent states into democratic clubs. The penalty (although moderate) taken on behalf of the EC and NATO against Uzbekistan after the events in Andizhan in 2005 show that these are not simply principles, and are more of a functional mechanism.

At the same time, the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, especially its exogenous aspect, is an agitator. Numerous speculations that the West is funding opposition forces, hiding behind the intent to support the rule of law, do not add stability to political processes. At the same time, it is not where the resources come from that is important for ensuring the principle of the rule of law, but instead that the opposition should fully participate in political processes including the decision making process, first of all on the Parliamentary level. In this context, the model of Ukraine is a good example: forming Parliament without the participation of the opposition resulted in a crisis of legitimacy of power, which undermined democratic development in general and the rule of law in particular.

It is especially interesting to look at the execution of the rule of law in the context of regional challenges. After the aforementioned events of 2005 in Andizhan, the country faced a refugee crisis of Uzbek defections. As it is known, the majority of refugees were redirected to third countries, which caused open confrontation with this neighboring state. That decision was based upon the international liabilities of Kyrgyzstan and has received support as an international success. However, the success would be complete if there was a similar decision towards four remaining refugees alleged to have committed serious crimes. The principles of the rule of law were not fully implemented, leaving room for informal mechanisms adherent to Central-Asian "democracies".

Coming from such precedents, it is easy to forecast what "norms" will be observed during the resolution of other regional disputes related to the water and energy sector

In the context of external factors, the rule of law has two advantages: it is one of the main requirements for receiving assistance and investment, and at the same time the "new democracy" can use the successful observation of this principal for improving our own international image.

Rule of law and informal political relations

Even a quick look at the development of the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan in the context of internal and external factors demonstrates that it has different interpretations. In conditions of a failed political culture, everyone interprets the rule of law in their own way. The authorities use this concept for legitimizing their actions, while the opposition forces keep it as a trump card for criticizing government. Thus, the rule of law has turned into a weapon of a political struggle instead of being a mechanism for regulating the life of society.

Considering that some of the main pecularities of contemporary Kyrgyz politics are kyrgyzchylyk [observance of Kyrgyz traditions], tribalism, the clan system and parochialism - it is quite legitimate to assume their influence on the overall process of democratization, including the rule of law.

In this regard, Kyrgyzstan has brought together two incompatible items: the rule of law foreseeing a legal framework, and informal institutes implying informal activities. Orientation of the political decision-making process including sub-cultural elements, does not in principle contradict the positive development of democratic processes. However, when the majority of governmental decisions are made based on adherence to a clan, while society lives following unwritten rules, then we are forced to talk about a negative democratization, which usually ends with public rebellion and political destabilization.

Informal relations in politics, unfortunately, have a tendency to expand into other spheres of social life, primarily economics. The rule of law, among other things, means transparency. At the same time, transparency mechanisms are the ones that leave much to be desired. Numerous examples of this are the results of conducting non-transparent state tenders for mining natural resources deposits, which in most cases end with conflicts of interests.

In general, the correlation of democratic principles with informal political institutes is always fraught with a level of corruption and favoritism. However considering the regional and national norms of formal and informal political relations, such a combination does not seem out of line. At the same time, the development of democratic principles is not static; in particular, development of a freer media showsmore and more the unacceptability of such relations of the rule of law and informal political institutes.

Rule of law - result of consistent reforms

Ideally, the rule of law is not just a declared principle but a system covering the overall legislative framework, independent courts and the effective executive apparatus on all levels that will provide the mechanisms for public development based on coordinated efforts. This system is not a utopia and may be achieved as a result of consistent reforms.

An imperative factor is the transparency of such processes. The importance of transparency is democratic by nature with the ability to be an effective political tool. The adoption of transparency increases effective implementation of decisions, including political ones; it filters the influence of informal institutes and positively reflects on the reputation of the person or body making such decisions,
At present, it seems unreasonable to eradicate informal institutes in Kyrgyz politics. Such a step could bring even more negative consequences. Given conditions of constant democratic development a different type of civic culture will be established, wherein a considerable role will be given to such factors as transparency and pragmatism. In this case, the informal elements of contemporary Kyrgyz politics may turn out to be the "side effects" of our model of transition and most likely are losing their current significance, although they will never fully disappear from politics

Joomart Ormonbekov, postgraduate student of Moscow State Institute for International Relations