A short history of the formation and development of international relations in Central Asia can conditionally be divided into the following five chronological stages. This paper does not aim at analyzing or evaluating foreign policy activities of each country of the region but aims at identifying the major tendencies of international life in former Soviet Middle Asia. The country analysis in this paper concerns non-Central Asian states too since their individual or joint efforts provide important and factual material for understanding the place and significance of Central Asia in the contemporary world. The problems of constructing an original worldview by regional states will be covered in the subsequent lecture sessions.

However, it is necessary to say a few words about one of these countries. Turkmenistan, which has a distinct position among the countries of the Central Asian region Research on its "diplomatic history" is a topic for a separate discussion. Here, one has to note that the activization of "pipeline diplomacy," which seems to be the only practical vector of foreign policy in Central Asian states, accompanied with a change of president in this country, slowly breaks "Turkmen isolationism." 

The first stage of international relations development in Central Asia (1991-1994) is characterized by the inertia of regional countries to keep schematic relations with Russia, despite the USSR's collapse and the emergence of new "non-Russian" opportunities. The gravitation to the "mother" state was brought about by many objective and subjective reasons, mostly by circumstances, among which the most impressive is the non-readiness of Central Asian leaders to develop and realize an independent path of development. The residual orientation of these countries' economies towards Russia, of rubles as a joint currency which later broke apart, and the on-going common lingual-cultural space posed security problems. These included the most frightening civil war in Tajikistan with subsequent potential difficulties in the region, because of the conflict escalation and other reasons, and all contained some useful but non-concentrated resources, primarily for Russia, necessary to forming new conditions to integrate the former Soviet republics of Middle Asia and Russia.

However, Russia in those days by following the "attractive" concept of "Russia is a part of the West" generally and quite openly ignored those opportunities, and thereby tried to distance itself from Central Asian states. From another side, one has to admit that Moscow was overloaded by its own problems and new challenges, and did not have a clear understanding of what to do with the former "brother-countries." Therefore, in that period there was a prevailing idea in the political establishment of Russia that "They have no place to go."  It is obvious that such an understanding was mostly relevant to Central Asian states, because in the Ukraine and the South Caucasus there were already emerging some visible signs of independence.  One can see that such a loose, although categorical and pseudo-positioning thesis, did not allow a substantial reaction to the political and economic advancement of the West and East into the region; it is especially true for the USA and Turkey.

During the second stage (1994-1998) Central Asian states while enjoying the political, moral and financial support of the West, particularly of the USA, tried to construct regional structures, including a Central Asian Economic Union in various versions, the Aral Foundation, the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, etc. There were even some efforts to establish a military-political alliance of Central Asian countries.

The integration model that had been constructed by the regional country leaders did not suppose to have it completely independent from the CIS, or more precisely from Russia. All member-countries of the Central Asian Union were at the same time the signatory countries of the Collective Security Treaty, and later members of EurAzEC (Uzbeksitan became a member in 2005).

During the same period, Russia made a formal turn towards Central Asian states, but that did not mean the active deeds of Moscow on the basis of well-developed conception or strategy. It was obvious that Russia was a bit late with such a turn, because the activities of the West, first of all, of the USA by this time, had been seriously affecting the "taste" of regional leaders for the issue of independence.

It has to be noted that within the same period, some fragmented conceptual preferences of Central Asian country leaders regarding the externally proposed models of economic development and public relations, but not of independent nation-state building (a lot has been said in this regard) have been clearly defined. The system of personal rule regimes has been started in the region, and the foreign policy of regional leaders has been almost completely subordinated to this idea. In this context, I may add that if by the end of this stage there would have been a change of the ruling elite as stipulated by the constitutions of almost all Central Asian states, then foreign policy vectors, and perhaps their substance, could be completely different. However, this did not happen.

The third stage (1998-2001) is a stage of a kind of "maturation" of Central Asian states, which was accompanied by disappointment over CIS regional structures and eagerness to construct their relations on a bilateral basis, including the neighbor states in the region. The CAEU, the Aral Foundation and Central Asian Battalion had gradually fallen apart, and the idea of regional integration was no longer a priority in the foreign policy of Central Asian states.

Along with that, regional countries started to understand each other better as independent states and have been forming as such: there was an extensive negotiation process on border regulations, a turn towards international standards of trade and economic relations, certain strategies and concepts of an independent development have been put forward, etc. The "maturation" was encouraged by the monetary-financial crisis in 1998 and the events in Batken 1999-2000, and in this view, the Afghan situation has been perceived with increased concern.

With the end of the Civil War in Tajikistan, the new understanding of this country as a subject of international relations in the region and establishing new relations with this country have been shaped. Here, it seems to me that one has to pay a special attention to Uzbek-Tajik relations.

Another very symbolic event for Central Asian states within the process of "maturation" was the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For the first time, they have become members of an international and regional organization with the participation of non-CIS states (if one does not consider the ECO- an organization which has never been a priority for Central Asian states) and which has an increasing financial-economic and military potential and a willingness to strengthen its positions in the region.

The fourth stage (2001-2005) started after the September 11 events, and the major elements of this stage are the deconstruction of geopolitical lines (the Soviet model) of Central Asia (the first), formation of multilateral foreign policies in Central Asian countries (the second). The most important part of this stage is the direct military presence of the USA and NATO in the region. One has to note that for the first time since gaining independence, Central Asian states have faced some real and very serious foreign policy problems. From one side, there is an urgent need to provide for regional and national security, which cannot be done without balanced relations with leading world powers under conditions of their presence in the region and mutual competition to gain more power. From another side, a foreign policy issue was the problem of choice. As a result, there has formed a multi-layered system of international relations, based on the simultaneously convergent and divergent interests of all participants of the new "Central Asian geopolitical game" played both by regional countries and the leading "players."

The fifth stage (since 2005) starts with the events in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and events in May of the same year in Uzbekistan. It is still hard to evaluate clearly the events in Kyrgyzstan; there are many things (from the criminal to high politics) that are mixed up in that event. However, it is possible to discuss some differences between the "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine from one side (here, we have to take into consideration that there are a number of differences between Georgian and Ukrainian "revolutions" as well) and in Kyrgyzstan on the other. 1) The elite groups' purposes  of those who participated in the "revolutions" of Georgia and Ukraine differ from Kyrgyzstan's with their high degree of programming and the drive for real reforms; 2) Motivating forces, including local political and financial sponsors, have substantially different legitimate characteristics; and 3) the "revolution" in Kyrgyzstan did not have any anti-Russian component. The latter is very important in view of understanding some historical-cultural foundations of foreign policy considerations of the ruling regime in Bishkek and of the public in Kyrgyzstan. To a certain extent, the same is characteristic of other states and nations in Central Asia.

The events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and those conclusions that leaders of the region made, have led to increasing anti-Americanism in Central Asia (or perhaps quasi-anti-amercanism) and strengthening the positions of Russia and China.

The start of the "oil-gas-dollar productive rain" has made, and continues to make, corrections to the foreign policies of Central Asian states, irrespective of their actual possession of such "wealth." The "pipeline diplomacy" has moved to the front positions.

During all five stages of international network development in Central Asia various countries, with different levels of intensity, tried to build certain relationships with regional countries as a group and separately. Here, they tried to form zones of influence within the internal politics of Central Asian states, taking into account and actively using those factors and circumstances mentioned above. I would like to use several examples. 

Turkey. The important pillars of Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia are: 1) Turkey's model of development as a model for emulation; 2) the historical-cultural and ethno-linguistic solidarity; 3) religious identity and 4) Turkic-speaking state - a representative of the West. In the first stage Ankara tried to install the most important construction of its Central Asian strategy, i.e. "the Turkic-speaking train with the Turkish locomotive," by active propaganda and reference to all of the above, while establishing relations with regional countries, and supporting it with investment projects, even though some of the latter failed, and some appeared to be scandalous. Turkey targeted "Turkish groups of influence" in Central Asian countries. In particular, numerous groups of students from countries of the region studying at Turkish universities may be considered in this context.

At the same time, it must be mentioned that the idea of forming the "Turkic-speaking echelon" did not enjoy the support of all Turkish politicians and experts. Many of them think that the priority task for Turkey is to enter the European Union and "eventually become Europeans." From another side, the Russian influence in the region has been prevailing. The scale and level of Russia's influence was encouraged by another important factor - a non-identical Russian-Soviet imperial worldviewof their imperatives, which were cultivated in and still partially represented by the thinking of the elites Central Asian countries.

The ideas of Ankara were not welcomed by all in Central Asia either. The mutual disappointment came very soon; in addition, Turkey, bound by certain commitments to the West, needed to behave favorably to non-friends of Central Asian presidents, and the latter perceived it with bewilderment and more.

The Turkish ideas, not supported by serious financial investments and sufficient trade-economic activities in Central Asia, or strategic and operative calculations, formulated incorrectly by Turkish politicians and diplomats, were not properly implemented. Central Asian countries negatively approached Turkey's drive to play the role of "elder brother."

The failure of "Turkish engagement" disappointed Central Asian countries and the major political ally and sponsor of Turkey - the USA: Ankara lost the nebulous image of being a representative of the West and NATO in Central Asia. 

In the middle of the 90s Ankara re-formatted its Central Asian strategy: it has become more realistic, but it is still amorphous and ineffective.

Islam and Islamic culture are the bases for the Central Asian policy of Iran and Pakistan in the first stages. However, it was quite obvious that Iranian Islam and Iranian business are not attractive models for the leaders and elite groups of Central Asian countries, except perhaps for Tajikistan (here, mostly the point may be the Persian-speaking solidarity under the conditions of a Turkic-speaking environment). Moreover, Central Asian leaders - the former communists  - were afraid of the possible spread of Islamic ideas in their countries. As a result, the expansion of Iranian influence was limited to uncertain activities in some spheres. In recent years, Teheran either changed the substance of its foreign policy in the Central Asian direction, or has successfully camouflaged the formulated policies. Either way recently there is an impression that the economic aspect is a priority area of cooperation for Teheran.

It has to be added that the developmental experience of Iran, Pakistan and India have not become examples for emulation, and hence, were not spread throughout the region. Openly speaking, the experience and possibilities of these states remained unpopular and were left simply without any understanding by Central Asian countries. Hence, the influence of Iran, Pakistan and India on the internal politics of Central Asian countries is not visible, as desired by representatives of these countries. At that, in the first stages there were sporadic ideas to create transport-communication networks, which may provide Central Asian countries an outlet to the seaports of Iran and Pakistan. However, nothing came of it except the "Central Asia-Iran" railroad and some bilateral and multilateral documents.

It has to be said that unlike Turkey, these three countries have never been considered as a priority within the foreign policy framework of Central Asian states in any stages of international network development. It is obvious that at the moment the Central Asian states which have gained some experience and with consideration of the dynamically growing economy of India and a possible positive change of the Afghan situation, are more and more attentive to cooperation projects with these countries, especially in the energy and transport spheres, which are also actively lobbied by the USA.

The quick membership of Central Asian countries in the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) turned out to be unproductive as well in view of the involvement of these countries in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The ECO, if static, is reminiscent of something like the Islamic CIS -similarly unproductive discussions, a great number of plans, the similar absence of financial and other opportunities for productive and mutually beneficial partnership. Moreover, the language of communication is different.

Western European countries, among which the most active ones are Germany, Great Britain, France, and Switzerland, through the European Union, OSCE - and also within the framework of bilateral relations at first two stages - were actively influencing and encouraging the process of democratization of internal political life in Central Asia, often linking financial-economic assistance to this problem. It seems to me that the primary task of Europeans was to form civil society in Central Asian states through humanitarian and legal assistance, which could adopt European values and principles. At that, I can suppose that the Russian component was not excluded from this process, and thereby it was different from the American approach. Definitely, the question of economic cooperation, first of all in the energy sector has always been included in the agenda of Central Asian policy of European states.

However, quite a difficult set of factors, above all being "post-Soviet,"  - which included the factor of personification of ideological choice of political priorities - turned to be the most difficult limitation on the way to the "Europeanization" of Central Asia.

I would like to talk separately about the membership of Central Asian countries in the OSCE. The adherence of Central Asian states to this regional European organization, generally speaking, is a kind of historical-political caprice, brought about by certain preferences of the leading powers in the early 90s. Nevertheless, the membership of Central Asian countries in the OSCE has granted them a great chance, in my view, to become close to the European political and humanitarian spaces with the possible development of economic cooperation. There was a unique situation, and with the complete and correct use of the situation, Central Asian countries could have been involved in European processes. "Asian states that are members of a European organization" is a construct that provides prospects of performing "Eurasian mediating diplomacy" by Central Asian countries. It could have placed some important fundaments of the region's role as a unifying space between Europe and, for example, the Islamic world. I am far from considering this model as absolute; Europeans themselves have their own direct channels to communicate with Muslim countries, but nevertheless "Central Asian mediation" could have played an important role in managing a range of difficult problems.

However, the cooperation was not "in" but "with" the OSCE, and above all, it is a sign of the non-acceptance of European values by Central Asian countries. The upcoming chairmanship of Kazakhstan at the OSCE is a symbolic event in the context of OSCE membership of the region's countries, but it is unlikely to make serious changes to the present situation.

Regarding the "Central Asian Strategy of the EU" of 2007, there is a very important question for the leaders of the region: what are the concrete programs envisioned in this Strategy and is this strategy a project to cover up the energy interests of Europe?

The forth and fifth stages show the increasing threat from Islamic extremists, and the activity of "Al-qaida" and other organizations of international terrorism have forced Europeans and Americans to create an emphasis on cooperation with Central Asian countries in the field of security and to fight against this branch. At the same time, they have been becoming less critical of the issues of human rights and freedoms and the slowing down of democratization. The "oil-gas" factor has made certain corrections as well, especially in an increase of the contradictions between the interests and principles of foreign policy doctrines.

Japan has never aimed at forming "influence groups" in the countries of the region o nor strengthening democracy and so on; it has just tried to improve its positions by means of financial-technical expertise and other forms of assistance as well as spreading Japanese culture and language within a number of Central Asian countries.

The idea of "Japan-Central Asia" has not been widely supported in the region. In my view, Japan has failed to consider a kind of admiring regard of the elite groups and population of Central Asia towards Japan, that was partially formed during the Soviet Union and which could have served as strong political and humanitarian assets to Japan, and which could be used comprehensively and dynamically in foreign policy towards Central Asia.

It seems that China does not try to influence the internal politics of the region but is mostly attentive to the loyalty of Central Asian countries expressed regarding the most difficult and urgent questions of China; the issues of Taiwan, Tibet, Uigur separatists.  Here, it must be noted that the questions of Taiwan, Tibet and human rights are issues of foreign policy loyalty, may be even formal ones, but the "Uigur question" has a concrete dimension, because within Central Asian countries, above all in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there are a great number of Uigurs who are partially very unfriendly towards China, and are suspected of being  part of various Uigur organizations that aim to create an independent Uigur state. Some experts think that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been initiated by the Chinese with the goal of fighting the Uigur separatism.  In fact, this purpose was clearly stated at the SCO "Convention on fighting against three evils." However, I would like to emphasize to the above-mentioned experts that Central Asian countries support the Chinese position not only as an expression of loyalty, etc, but because the problem of separatism is very relevant for the countries of the region as well.

Central Asian countries are puzzled with the question - in what capacity does China consider the region? Do they consider us as a source of raw materials for the Chinese economy and market to realize their products, as a "living space" or like equal partners? The increasing economic and military potential of China, from one side, is an attractive dimension for cooperation, but from another side, it makes Central Asian countries alarmed. In addition to all this, there are some other ways to perceive China: 1) the mistaken historical image of China as of an eternal enemy; 2) the inertia of anti-Chinese propaganda of Soviet times. Despite "image" and "propaganda" fade away with time, they remain stimulators of a negative perception of China. Chinese business that is very active in Central Asia is often considered not as a natural dynamic to widen economic activities of the rapidly developing state, characteristic to economically developed countries, but as the ill-intentioned expansionist policy of Beijing. In this context, I believe, the problem is in the capacity of national business to compete with the Chinese. The same problem is actual not only in the Chinese direction. 

Generally, one has to say that the Chinese concept of cooperation with neighboring states and the actions of the Chinese do not present a threat (at least not one that can be visually observed) to the interests of regional states, and with the correct formulation of interests and purposes, and adequate activities, it may bring good dividends.

It is quite obvious that relations of China with Central Asian states will change dramatically in the future, first of all because of the process that has already been initiated in China to re-evaluate the role of China in the world and in the regions adjacent to China, conditioned by important objective and subjective factors. The latter include the change of the political elite who are based in substantially different ideological and humanitarian ideas as well as the ideas of strengthening "statehood" in Central Asian countries.

Of the activities of the USA in Central Asia, their advantages, accomplishments, mistakes and shortcomings of multilateral and bilateral relations with countries of the region, the most important achievement of Americans is the formal (official) recognition by Russia of the justified interests of Washington in Central Asia. It has formally expanded the frames of foreign policy for Central Asian states, which despite the existing and recently increased anti-Americanism, always try to move towards Americans.

The Central Asian space seems to be the "end point" of American international politics in Eurasian (post-Soviet), Islamic (from Magrib to the Great Chinese wall), and recently the South Asian (the Greater Central Asia) strategies of Washington. The vectors of strategies are different, but the result is similar.

Russia unlike other powers has justified interests in the region, but bears a kind of historical responsibility for the fate of Central Asia.

Since I have mentioned Russia and some aspects of its foreign policy in Central Asia, I will just discuss the following thesis: Russia has the largest resources in the region, which appears to be the great advantage in comparison with other "actors of Central Asian international space," - the all-comprehensive "pro-Russianism" at all social layers of Central Asian countries. It is definite that taking into account all the positive and negative evaluations of Russia's presence in the region for about 200 years, none of the politicians or intellectuals can negate the civilizational role of Russia in the region, and that the Russian language, Russian culture and other things are a great cultural heritage (even though it may look strange for some) for the region's people. It is often ignored by Russian foreign policy makers, even though such an evaluation of Russia is a matter of generations and time.

Each country that has interests in the Central Asian region offers its own value system to incorporate (note: there is no Central Asian country which has formulated its own, national value system, not to mention regional one). It is clear that in the process of the formation of individual systems, certain fragments and value elements that are being offered by these states and international organizations might be incorporated.

These values relate to the worldview, philosophy of being, educational, cultural, moral and language-corporate systems, specifics of state and society building, social-economic conceptions, etc. In this context, there are two questions. Is it true that each leading country will offer or offers to Central Asian states to take its system of values, by means of presenting it as dominating and the only priority of foreign policy and a basis for mutually beneficial bilateral or multilateral cooperation? Or may it be that some of these values are only an instrument to reach one's vested interests? Is it interest or principle at the basis of the foreign countries' policies towards the region? Definitely both. The question is what the priority is. This is the question that has to be answered adequately by Central Asian countries.

It must be recognized that there are contradictions and mismatches in the approaches of leading states to the problems of globalization and the new world order. It is the objective result of serious reasons that have historical-cultural, political, socio-economic and even ethno-physchological character.  In particular, it is enough to mention the problem of a uni- or multipolar world order.

In this view, there is the following question to the Central Asian political elites: the position of leading powers to modern Islam, to politicized Islam, and the "powerful" and military ones. Islam is not formally a counterpart and limiting factor for powers to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation. The enemy is Islamic religious extremism, which has created terrorism. The question: what is the demarcating line between Islam and religious radicalism? There are some politicians in America, Europe, Russia and other countries and regions, who think it is all the same.

Second. In the context of the above conceptual approaches to the globalization problem, are the contradictions and mismatches of value constructions of Islam and the West, Russia and China the potential basis for permanent animosity? These questions for Central Asian states are not easy, with contradictory content and form, since countries in the region are considered as Islamic.

The objective perception of the situation with regard to terrorism and other manifestations of criminal activities tends to lead Central Asian states to have comprehensive support in fighting against international terrorism, but subjectively there is a sense of religious solidarity among wide social layers of the region's population creating other images and ideas.

The serious and responsible foreign policy of Central Asian countries is only just beginning.