For the First Time, Central Asia is Facing Real Foreign Policy Problems
Muratbek Imanaliev,exclusively for IPP
The Central Asian states became independent in an era of real unipolarity characterized by the complete dominance of the United States in the global political and military space.
In the turbulent and unpredictable 1990s, the inexperienced Central Asian politicians were crafty: While defining national and regional priorities with the leadership of various countries, Washington was, in reality, always in the first place. Russia was responsible for that to some extent. At that time Russia was not only very weak, but also had accepted false foreign policy priorities and was, due to existing patterns of major international systems, following the lead of the West. This put the West in a better position not only in various parts of the world, but also in the group of functional categories of international relations. Such weakness and compliance, in principle, was correctly and prudently perceived by the West - Russia was not recognized as a geopolitical unit equal to the US, administering global political space.
Central Asian countries formed their national priorities, based on the relations between Washington and Moscow, more instinctively than consciously. However, one should bear in mind the following extremely important points – the post-communist situation in the region, the biographies and behavioral patterns of the region’s leaders which determined the formation of the controversial inertial orientation of Central Asian states towards Russia, and negative attitudes towards the values proposed by the West.
Up until now these factors play major roles in the relations of the Central Asian countries not only with Russia and the West, but also with the East. In particular, one may say quite objectively that pro-Russian attitudes in all – without exception – the countries of Central Asia exist not because of the active and laborious diplomatic and other activities of the Russian state, but because of the presence of quite large strata communities in these countries. They have traditionally taken positive attitudes towards Russia, and I mean not the Russian Diaspora but the local indigenous population. I should stress that this attitude creates an opportunity for Russian diplomacy, which is not very actively used by Moscow.
I should also stress a political consequence of the above: it makes Central Asia fundamentally different from the Caucasus, Ukraine and, even more, from the Baltic States. Anti-Russian sentiment is virtually non-existent in Central Asia.
It is obvious that, in general, western and eastern countries and, strangely enough, Russia have tolerated this "ranging" foreign policy of the Central Asian states. Many things have been forgiven.
Since President Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, he began to implement major systemic changes - strengthening vertical power, destroying oligarchic might, orchestrating structural economic recovery, aligning and strengthening public relations, etc. I suppose that it was not about developing the country in a strictly functional way. Rather, it was about restoring the foundations of the Russian state and bringing the country into line with modern views of a strong state that, in principle, meant movement towards development. Without any doubt, the "oil factor" significantly strengthened the position of Russia in the international arena; Moscow's presence in various regions of the world has become more visible and influential. The West, for understandable reasons, did not welcome Russia’s enhanced global competitiveness.
In the same period, the Central Asian countries became more experienced in foreign affairs, but ironically did not become stronger – at first glance. One manifestation of their power could have been strengthened statehood and another could have been enhancement of integration trends and moods. Creating quasi-political, unstable, and unpromising "strong leader" systems does not automatically lead to the development of national statehood. As for the idea of integration, Central Asian states have, for the most part, withdrawn it from their foreign policy agendas. It should be mentioned, however, that Kazakhstan has once again proposed the idea of creating a union of the countries in the region.
To complete the picture, one should add a couple of words about the US and China. The positions of these countries in the region have become more solid, but the most important achievement of both Washington and Beijing is that their policies are now better perceived by the population of Central Asian countries. Although it might sound paradoxical, even the enhancement of anti-American sentiments, which are, actually, more accurately described as anti-Bush sentiments, should be understood as the development of a more objective and more comprehensive understanding of the USA and its role in the region.
But most importantly, by mid-2000, the contours of a multi-polar world order had become more visible. In one of my articles, written in the 1990s, I noted that the uni-polar world is a temporary phenomenon in world politics. If the other pole does not arise by itself, the current pole creates it. And so it happened.
Under the aforementioned conditions, the countries of the Central Asian region came to "Balkan-Caucasus" international range, which became a watershed between the virtual and real foreign policy activities of the Central Asian states. Why?
First and most importantly, the independence of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia directly affects the countries of Central Asia, because the recognition of the independence of those three conflict zones began the second stage of disintegration of already broken states, i.e. the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia did not stop at the level of "divorce" between the former republics constituting the two federations. The most important thing is that now there is a political precedent. This means that the process of disintegration is continuing and has assumed a chronic character.
Secondly, international law, which originally contained an inherent conflict between two principles - territorial integrity and self-determination - completely ceased to function as a legal regulator of international relations. Strangely enough, Central Asian countries have been also participants in that process: while still parts of the USSR, they timidly stated the priority of the principle of self-determination, but after independence they became the most ardent opponents of this principle and even put forward initiatives to revise it, suggesting the removal of the principle from the list of norms and principles of international law.
The above-mentioned principles of international law have always been attended by the political interests of the participants of world politics, but never before have the interests of states or a group of states exerted such a great pressure on the principles of international law, in fact, trampling on them (as it happened in the case of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Obviously, it is impossible to compare those cases with the collapse of the Soviet Union, since the latter was a voluntary act.
Restoration of the previous rules for applying the principles of international law, it seems to me, is only possible if all the countries in the UN agree that those three cases (it is quite clear that "return" of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the former "parent" states is absolutely impossible) will be considered as exceptions under the law, and that nothing comparable should ever happen again. And the appropriate changes should be made to the 1970 Treaty on International Law and to the UN documents. However, such a vision for the future reconstruction of legal principles is hardly probable.
Besides, it appears that the second stage of disintegration may not necessarily happen along previously established administrative borders. It could happen either on the basis of geographically compact communities of ethnic minorities, or on the basis of certain political (including foreign policy) affiliations of certain elite groups. A good example is Trans-Dniester, which, in fact, already has sovereignty over certain territory and has the relevant attributes of an independent state but lacks international recognition.
Thirdly, we must explicitly recognize that the two principles that guided Russia in the South Ossetia crisis alerted Central Asian leaders. The first principle, reading of the historical responsibility that Russia bears for the Caucasus, can still be accepted and supported. Indeed, Russia has a historic responsibility for the fate of the Caucasus, as it owned that territory for a long period of time. But the second principle, concerning the protection of its citizens (the latter can easily transform into "fellow countrymen" or into another category of people), forced the leaders of Central Asian countries, and not only them, to think deeply. Many of them ask which other states can use this principle, referring to the established precedent.
This "deep thinking" laid the foundation for real and responsible foreign policy on the parts of the Central Asian countries. If the emergence of American and other military bases on the territory of these countries was a result of an understanding of the problems common for all and of an agreement between the "great" states, who have born the responsibility for the fate of these bases, if the reform of the UN Security Council was virtually not a problem for the Central Asian countries, the "Balkan-Caucasian bundle" requires an independent, but very responsible decision by the Central Asian states. Too much in the region depends on that decision.
