Integration processes in contemporary Central Asia are experiencing crises despite the continuing attempts by the leaders of individual states and powers outside the Central Asian region to resume them and give them new format and content. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the region has not been able to develop into a consolidated political and economic community over the past few years.

A number of objective and subjective reasons stand behind that. Among the main reasons, one should indicate the following: the initial phase of national statehood building, the presence of the hidden conflicts in interstate relations, and the economic and technological backwardness compared to other nations of the world. Other reasons include: different visions of models and mechanisms for intraregional integration, poor readiness of the ruling elites to establish supranational economic and political institutions, and the efforts of the states in the region to search powerful allies abroad and using these external players to strengthen their influence. All these have prevented consolidation.

The basis for foreign policy development of Central Asian countries in the 1990s was a multi-vector diplomacy, which met the interests of small nations here. Limited financial, economic, scientific, intellectual and technological resources, the need to build new formats of relations with traditional partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) objectively contributed to their growing relations with the “greater world”. An important role in this process played the interest of leading powers in that previously closed geopolitical and geo-economic space with considerable human and natural resources.

A significant factor in determining the characteristics of foreign policy of the countries in the region was the need for an integral and consolidated response to common threats. Their transnational and trans-border nature necessitated intra-regional cooperation and cooperation with countries outside the Central Asian region, contributing to the emergence of principally new security institutions. An evidence of this is the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which is, at present, one of the models of multilateral cooperation in political and economic issues.

At the same time, the formation of foreign policy of the Central Asian countries, with limited time and resources, has resulted in a strong “pathos” and declaratory character of many initiatives. This has led to the fact that in the 1990s to early 2000s, there was a kind of competition in terms of the number of proposed foreign policy initiatives. This has of course, affected their quality and implementation. It seems that the phenomenon was temporary, resulting from “growing pains”; typical at the initial stage of national statehood.

Besides, in recent years, a number of negative factors in the development of the countries concerned has been identified. These factors demonstrate the growing trend of hidden de-sovereignization. This phenomenon has a complex character, which is due to increasing external pressure on the Central Asian states caused by the growing competition between world powers for dominance in the region. In addition, apparent weakness of the economy and underdevelopment of the region in science and information field also contributes to the hidden de-sovereignization. Weak economy and underdeveloped science and information field allows foreign donors to actively influence the process of decision-making and implementation of the major domestic political and economic programs. A combination of the above-mentioned factors resulted in the fact that newly independent states of Central Asia involuntarily became the objects of world politics, losing their original status of subjects. A positive exception to this is Kazakhstan, which for several reasons, is very much ahead of other countries in Central Asia.

We cannot fail to notice certain differences in the foreign policy of the Central Asian states. The clearest one is the selection of strategic partners in the international arena. Such difference is caused by the presence of local characteristics of development in the preceding period in each country.

Recognizing the objective differences, one should note their different nature in the process of intraregional integration. Being clearly aware of the necessity to create a unified political and economic space, the countries in the region face seemingly insurmountable obstacles. These obstacles are due to the different vision of the most acceptable and achievable means for integration.

Additionally appreciating the motives and interests of the countries in integration, one should note the following:

Integration initiatives proposed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, besides practical benefits, are aimed at strengthening its weight in the region. A strengthened position for Kazakhstan gradually makes it a regional leader; with the help of which the developed countries are trying to lead policies in Central Asia, favorable for them. 

Kyrgyzstan’s participation in integration projects and alliances is still a matter of survival. Kyrgyzstan has become increasingly dependent politically and economically on its neighbors in the region. Demographic and economic pressure from southern neighbors (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) on Kyrgyzstan is forcing the republic to support integration initiatives under the leadership of Kazakhstan.

Tajikistan has always shown its special interest in the Central Asian integration. However, the civil war of 1992-1997 and the special position of Uzbekistan prevented Tajikistan from active participation in the integrative processes. Later, in 1998, Tajikistan joined the Central Asian Economic Community(CAEC) but had the disputes with Kyrgyzstan on many similar problems in economic development and use of hydropower.

Turkmenistan openly refused to participate in integration projects at the regional level. This was due to both political and economic reasons. In particular, certain autonomy of the country’s economy and rich hydrocarbon resources enabled it to survive without the help from neighbors.

Uzbekistan has been highly suspicious about integration projects with political orientation. This was due to the fact that Uzbekistan has sought to avoid dependence on all kinds of supranational structures and, at the same time, it wanted to draw some economic benefits. Given the geopolitical location of Uzbekistan, one must recognize that any integration project in Central Asia is becoming meaningless without its serious participation.

These circumstances have all led to the situation when the leaders of the Central Asian states interpret integration and its specific mechanisms in different ways. This, of course, affected the “speed, depth and quality” of Central Asian integration processes. More often, unfortunately, this has led to negative results.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two largest states of the region, were active initiators of integration. Their first attempts to integrate were back in 1990. On January 10, 1994, in Tashkent, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a treaty on creating an integral economic space between these states, which defined the main directions of cooperation. On January 16, 1994, the Kyrgyz Republic joined in. According to several experts, this was the real start of the Central Asian integration. Involvement of a third country led to the treaty signed on 30 April 1994, in Cholpon-Ata, establishing the Common Economic Space between the Republic of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.

The objective of the integration is defined in the first article of the Treaty. According to it, common economic space would be created for the development and implementation of joint programs to deepen economic integration between the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan. It would involve the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor force and provides a coherent credit, fiscal, customs and currency policy. Initially, this integration was named the Central Asian Union (CAU).

The next step towards the integration of the three states was the establishment of working bodies of the new integration association. In 1994 the Interstate Council of CAU was established. Its structure included basic working bodies, like the Council of Prime Ministers, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Defense Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. The Interstate Council set an Executive Committee as a permanent working body. It was entrusted with coordinating, advising, forecasting, and analyzing and informing, as well as monitoring the implementation of decisions of the Interstate Council and its institutions. A little later, on 5 August 1994, during the Bishkek Summit, the Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development (CABCD) was established with a capital of 9 million U.S. dollars.

On March 17, 1998, a meeting of the prime ministers of three states - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – was held in Bishkek. It considered the issues of creating international consortiums, as well as drafting intergovernmental agreements on: the use of hydropower resources of the Syrdarya River basin, environmental protection and environmental management, the program of cooperation in the field of migration, and health and medical science.

On June 26, 1998, in Bishkek, there was a meeting with the heads of governments of CAU, which was attended by leaders of Tajikistan. Thus, expansion of the regional grouping from “3” to “4” was legally formed. Almost all the agenda issues included the adjustment of documents caused by the inclusion of a new state into the Union. Since then, the new name of Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) officially came into effect.

A significant practical result of a CAEC Summit (Tashkent, April 2000) was the adoption of a wide-scale Treaty on joint actions to combat terrorism, political and religious extremism, transnational organized crime and other threats to stability and security. Because of its importance, the Treaty was ratified by national parliaments and came into force in autumn 2000.

A little later in Dushanbe, in June 2000, a meeting of the Interstate Council was held. At this meeting important documents were adopted – the strategy of integration development until 2005 and the program of prioritized actions on the formation of CES in Central Asia. According to the meeting participants, realization of the program will help overcome the existing differences. At first stage, the four countries planned to make their markets an area of free trade. This will be followed by the establishment of customs, payments and monetary union. The ultimate goal is to create a common market for goods, services and capital.

As a forced step in the development of integration in Central Asia, the outcomes of the CAEC summit (Tashkent, 27-28 December 2001) should be mentioned. At the summit, a decision was made to establish the Central Asian Union Organization (CAUO) on the basis of CAEC. As noted in the comments from the meeting, the decision was taken in order to strengthen multidimensional cooperation in political, economic, scientific, technical, cultural and humanitarian relations. The objectives of that new organization would be to: diversify political dialogue, improve the forms and mechanisms of regional economic integration, deepen mutual understanding on the formation of a common security space and elaborate on joint actions to maintain peace and stability in the region.

The transition from CAEC to the CAUO was to enhance cooperation in the region and ensure mutual security; to form a joint opposition to threats to stability in the region. The positive result of this decision, albeit belated, was in more intense dynamics of integration processes in the region.

The events of 11 September 2001 became an external motivating factor for developing a new concept of cooperation (on the basis of further integration of the countries in the region) in light of the rapidly changing military and political situation. The transition to a new form of cooperation was to promote a higher level of decision implementation, which ultimately was aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the new organization. As a result of a two-day work by the heads of the CAUO, a joint statement was elaborated. It was a coherent response from the region to the challenges of terrorism and political extremism.

The decision to establish CAUO as a new type of integration structure was finally affirmed during the CAUO summit on 28 February 2002 in Almaty. Due to the lack of efficiency of the CAEC, it was decided to abolish its working bodies and replace them by the Committee of National Coordinators. In November 2002 in Tashkent, the first meeting of parliamentarians within the CAUO was held. The heads of the legislative bodies decided to establish an institute of inter-parliamentary cooperation – Conference of Parliamentarians of the CAUO member countries.

Following the summit of the CAUO, which was held in July 2003, a decision was made to eliminate the Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development because of its failure to perform its originally intended functions.

Given the low efficiency of economic institutions created by CAEC, a decision was made to hold regular business-forums on the basis of the CAUO in order to discuss the most pressing development problems and coordinate joint actions. As a result of two business-forums, held on 28-29 November 2002 and on 6 May 2003 in the cities of Tashkent and Osh, the heads of the states highly appreciated the readiness of the countries to implement joint projects, including harmonization of legislation; simplify trade regulations; strengthen direct contacts between enterprises and businessmen; and attract investment into the economy of Central Asian States.

Since the CAUO establishment, the emphasis in shaping domestic policy was made on strengthening political and economic cooperation in the region; formulating a unified position of member states of international organizations on crucial issues of international politics; and attracting international donors to solution of the vital development issues of the region.

Analysis of the major results of the CAUO activity at that time already showed a clear gap between the declarations of politicians and reality. The main points of criticism against the CAEC were almost the same for the new organization.

The common economic space in the region was formed slowly and with great difficulties. Over the past years the countries failed to agree on customs, anti-dumping, fiscal and currency policies. There were no common conceptions and no programs to protect the collective interests when exporting energy and raw resources. The measures to actually improve the competitiveness of industry were not worked out either. Besides, the constantly increasing problems in the mutually beneficial use of water, energy, gas and transportation have not been solved. Lately, cultural and scientific relations that do not require significant expenses have been reduced. There is no coordination in the structural reforming of the economies. Obligations of the earlier signed agreements have not been fulfilled.

Export policy had not been agreed upon either. This has led to strong competition between the member states in the selected groups of export products in the markets of third countries. Other obstacles in the way towards integration were the differing speeds of economic reformation and unilateral decisions undermining the interests of partners. Kazakhstan in the late 1990s, unilaterally carried out tariff and non-tariff regulation of trade within the CAEC. Kyrgyzstan used its water and energy resources as a “restrictive” measure. Uzbekistan demonstrated isolationist tendencies, focusing on the countries outside the CIS and CAEC.

A catalyst of the above-mentioned negative processes remained a combination of interrelated factors, caused by different attitudes of potential “leaders” of the region - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - towards the process of intraregional integration.

The most important characteristics include:

• Constantly continued rivalry between the countries for leadership in the region, supported by relying on extra-regional allies. This hindered the formulation of a common position on major issues of domestic and foreign policy in Central Asia;

• Lack of Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s deep interest in intraregional cooperation and integration as their major trading partners were located outside Central Asia. The intraregional integration mechanisms became important to them only as a means of influence on potential rivals in the region;

• Infringing upon the economic interests of the weaker partners in the CAIO - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – became systematic.

The above-mentioned negative aspects directly affected the dynamics and depth of intraregional integration and discouraged the participants. As a result, the publications under such symptomatic titles as, for example, “Regional cooperation in Central Asia: Mission Impossible?” became inevitable.

In general, the history of integration in Central Asia, according to the author, can be divided into several phases.

The first phase (preparatory) covered 1990-1993. At that time, against the background of newly obtained independence an awareness of their inability to develop on its own, a framework for the integration process was established.

The second phase (the period of “poor realization”) covered the time from 1994 to 2005. It was characterized by a slow process of integration with very small results; a manifestation of which was a constant reformatting and changing vectors of cooperation. Clearly, it was demonstrated by the transition from CAC (1994) to CAEC (1998) and then to the CAUO (2002). Many initiatives had a declarative nature, which did not satisfy the majority of the participants.

 The third phase (disintegration) runs from October 2005 to present. The CAUO ceased to exist; becoming a part of EurAsEC. The formal pretext was a convergence of goals to be addressed by these organizations. The true reason was, however, the inviability of the CAUO. Despite the apparent failure of integration, today Central Asian countries continue to seek new forms of cooperation. An obvious leader of intraregional integration (at least, at the level of proposed initiatives) remains Kazakhstan. For instance, in 2006-2007, Kazakhstan continued to actively negotiate with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to establish bilateral alliances that could form the basis of further effective process of economic and political interaction. Despite the negative attitude of Uzbekistan, the negotiating process continues.

In this regard, comparison of regional integration projects, proposed by the powers outside the region, may be of a certain interest. To date, one can speak about four projects that have a real infrastructure for implementation.

 Russia proposes an integration project within the “post-Soviet” space through the EurAsEC institutions. Despite the higher status of the CIS, it actually is not regarded as preferable.

 China suggests SCO as the most probable mechanism of economic and political interaction, which involves four states in the region and Russia. Lately, Turkmenistan has shown an active interest in this arena.

USA proposed, in April - October 2005, the creation of “Grand Central Asia”, through which the region would actually become an appendage of U.S. satellites in South Asia.

The European Union, since the late 1990s, has been active in the implementation of Central Asian regional projects that would allow our nations to have the common view. The new amended EU Strategy in Central Asia for the period of 2007-2013, realized in seven areas, has the same aim.

The most viable could be a type of “external integration”, which takes into account the interests of not only its initiators, but also of those of the region, as well as the main actors in interstate cooperation in Central Asia. The practical embodiment of this proposal may be creating and implementing a strategy of “anti-crisis” development of Central Asia. This would involve a joint project of the newly independent states of the region, and leading countries in the world who have their own interests here.

Despite the existence of a real basis for realization of “external projects of integration”, the growth of intra-regional cooperation and the transition to the status of a self-sustaining political and economic actor in international relations seems to be the best way for Central Asia.

Taking into account the above-mentioned, there are three most probable scenarios for the realization of integration processes in Central Asia.

First and the least acceptable option is the absorption of the region by external forces. The outlines of such plan may be seen in the project of “Grand Central Asia”, initiated by the United States. Making the region controlled by Washington would turn it into a satellite of American foreign policy, interests, and would lead to inevitable conflict with the traditionally friendly Russia and China.

The second scenario of integration can be expressed in the so-called “network model of intra-regional integration”, which may be seen in the initiatives of Kazakhstan. It is characterized by the creation of a network of bilateral agreements within the region, which, over time, may be transferred to the level of regional integration.

And the third scenario, appealing to the basic experience of integration of the European Union, aims at the establishment of specialized cross-border consortia to mutually exploit the most important resources of the region. It would not be a compromised model of intergovernmental relations, convenient for the major countries in the region, which was designed to control the hydropower resources of less-developed Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On the contrary, there must be a “compensation” model of economic relations, where the growing cost of water use by the “countries upstream” should be fully compensated by energy supply in the form of oil and gas from the “countries downstream”. One should not exclude the option of establishing a transportation and communication association, which might successfully solve the problem of internal and external isolation of Central Asian states.

Comparative analysis of these scenarios, taking into account the experience of integration in Western Europe and Southeast Asia, brings to the conclusion that the most successful would be economic rather than political projects. They will provide mutual benefits to all participants.

Only the scenarios which can promote Central Asian integration will bring a positive format of economic and political relations both within the region and with its main foreign partners.

In view of the negative experiences, regional integration should be based on consolidated aspiration by the elites in the region to create a unified political, economic and cultural space. Currently, internal confrontational potential in Central Asia is significantly higher than integration potential. Still, the situation is not hopeless. The most obvious means of overcoming the problems could be the efforts to minimize communication, information and technological isolation of the region. Of particular importance is the reasonable use of the experience of European integration as a model for the integration in Eurasia.

Crucial to the success of intraregional integration is the qualified management, which combines competence, social orientation of intra-national and intraregional policies, and the creation of conditions for a transparent government.

Equally important is the ability to make effective use of natural and human resources; considering natural resources as irreplaceable and giving only limited in time prosperity. As the world practice shows, there is no automatic dependence between the availability of energy wealth and economic growth.

To achieve this, a coherent and competent policy on several fronts should be implemented. The most promising among them, in terms of the security of interests of Kyrgyzstan at the regional level, are:

1. Creation of a common energy market and a network of transporting corridors in Central Asia;

2. Promotion of economic growth in the countries of the region through special programs of “pulling up” the less developed countries to the average level, as it was in the European Union;

3. Unification of the existing legislation in the monetary sector as a basis for development of mechanisms for domestic investments;

4. Wide-scale implementation of programs to promote scientific, technological and cultural cooperation;

5. Creation of the organs to combat non-traditional security threats, particularly, money laundering, organized crime and terrorism.

Despite the considerable difficulties for the countries in the region, only concerted actions in addressing these and other problems can ensure the success of independent integration initiatives in Central Asia.

Nur Omarov, PhD in History, Professor of Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University

¹The Treaty on establishment of common economic space between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan //Collection of the main documents of the Interstate Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Tajikistan. Bishkek: 1998. p.6.
²Ibid. p.6.
³Statements by the Presidents of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan of July 8, 1994// Collection of the main documents of the Interstate Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Tajikistan. Bishkek: 1998. p.10; Ashirov B.Ch. Formation and prospects for economic cooperation in Central Asia//Central Asia and the World Culture. #1 (4), 1998. pp.5-6; Primbetov S. Central Asia: Realities and Prospects for Economic Integration. Moscow. 2000. p.43.

⁴Saidazimova G. Central Asian Integration: realities, challenges and opportunities//Central Asia and Caucasus, #3 (9). 2000. p.81.
⁵Primbetov S. Central Asia: Realities and Prospects for Economic Integration. Moscow. 2000. p.54; Kumskov G.V., Kumskova N.H., Suvankulov A.R. Regulation of migration processes in Central Asian economic community. Bishkek: KRSU. 1998. pp.63-72.
⁶Protocol “On joining by the Republic of Tajikistan the Treaty on the Establishment of Common Economic Space between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan of April 30, 1994”//Collection of documents and materials of the Interstate Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Bishkek: 1998. pp.14-17.
⁷A defense union of “4” has been established//Slovo Kyrgyzstana. 2000. 21 April.
⁸Presidents of Central Asian states established the Organization of Central Asian Union. http://www.UzA.uz
⁹The Tashkent statement by the heads of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. http://www/UzA.uz.

¹⁰Joint statement by the heads of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the results of the meeting of “Central Asian Cooperation” Organization, held on July 5-6, 2003, in Almaty. - http://www.party.kz/pub0407036.html
¹¹Islam Karimov. There is still a vague strategy in Central Asia - http://www.CentrAsia.Ru/newsA.php4?st=1086590340
¹²Koshanov A. The strategy of regional integration between Central Asian states//Reform, #1(5), 2000. p.9; Koshanov A., Husainov B. The problems of Central Asian integration//Central Asia and Caucasus. #1(13), 2001. p.82.
¹³Ibid. p.82.
¹⁴Eshmambetov N.A. Prospects for development of Kyrgyzstan and Central Asian region in transitional period//Central Asia and the world culture, #1(4).1998. p.71.

¹⁵Bohr Annette. Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Mission impossible?//Helsinki Monitor. Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Special Issue. Central Asia Aspects of security and stability. Ed. by Arie Bloed. Leiden, 2003. pp. 264-268.

¹⁶Andersen V. Integration model of the EU: example for the Central Asian region//Economic aspects of integration processes: the EU experience/Ashimbaev M.S. ed. Almaty: KISI, 2003. PP.9-11; K.I.Baizakova, M.Sh.Gubaidullina. The experience of European integration and its application on the territory of Central Asia//Central Asia in the foreign policy of the European Union/J.U.Ibrashev. ed. Almaty:2004. pp.236-245.