"Concerning the recent Russian and Central-Asian political and economic processes, the dynamics and emphasis from one side and a misunderstanding from the other, will force Kremlin to articulate more precisely its own interests in the region," says the article by Eduard Poletaev, a political scientist from Kazakhstan. This article is being presented to you by IPP.

In the midst of confrontation

The current economic crisis impacts the system of international relations, including the relationship of Russia with Central Asian countries. Soon, beyond the husk of the numerous declarations on friendship and cooperation, an ability (or inability) of the region's countries to coordinate policies will become visible.

Formally, in the near future, Russia's priorities relating to friendly countries will become more important.  This is being expressed through a stronger economic assistance and demonstration of a good political will. In December 2008 in Moscow, there was a joint meeting of the Security Council and the State Council of Russia under the chairmanship of Dmitriy Medvedev.  They met to discuss the topic of cooperation within the CIS framework and strengthening the role of the Russian ruble as an alternative regional currency. Earlier, while summarizing the year's results in a meeting with journalists, Mr. Medvedev stated that special attention will be given to the "development of our relations with  countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Community(EurAsEC) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Main emphasis should be made on these organizations, because it is highly important for us to build adequate and comprehensive relationships with our partners." 

The long-lasting multi-vector policy of Central Asia needs corrections: Moscow, having an investment and diplomatic capacity in the region, unlike Europe or the USA which are preoccupied with their internal problems, can afford to assume leadership which gives an opportunity to position itself as a primary partner in Central Asia. No one can remove the major question of the regional agenda: who has a stronger economy to help out?

The foreign policy decisions of Mr. Medvedev prove that Kremlin gives special importance to the strengthening of Russian relations with CIS countries, and within its frame - with the states of Central Asia. For instance, Dmitriy Medvedev had a state visit to Astana in May last year; having been invited by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev. It was his first visit abroad after assuming the position of the head of state. 

Much can be drawn from the October visit of the Russian president to Kyrgyzstan; which happened earlier than to the regionally important Uzbekistan. Such visits convey a clear message - that these are Russia's  foreign policy priorities, and our countries enjoy special relations. Such visits are not arranged urgently because special dates are chosen and it requires a tedious preparation and coordination work; which usually takes place well ahead of time.

Russia has had increasing complications in 2008 with former Soviet countries (the problems of Russian-Georgian and Russian-Ukrainian relations, an apprehension of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict escalation, an anxiety related to the consequences of Western structural influences in the post-Soviet space, etc). In view of this, special attention was given to the systematization of Russian national interests in 2008. It is not occasional that the special state agency, the Federal Agency for CIS affairs, which has already been named the "Russian USAID," was established. In September this agency was re-named to, the Federal Agency for CIS affairs, compatriots living abroad and international humanitarian cooperation (Rossodrujestvo).

Among the Russian expert community, there is a popular opinion that Russia takes a clear position regarding the protection of its national interests in countries further abroad.  In contrast, Kremlin's interests  with its former "sisters" and "brothers" of the Soviet times are not clearly articulated.  This is particularly visible in the Central Asian region. Russia likes it when good and nice words are said about Russia. These words give reassurance and credit to Russia. the political elite of Central Asia thinks that it is good if one manages to milk Russia, or if not, then one can rely on the multi-vector policy, and try Europe or the USA. If we move away from standard phrases "about friendship and cooperation," it is not yet certain what Russia wants and searches for in this region. What kind of Central Asia does Russia need?

Therefore, Russian politics in the post-Soviet space from time to time is called "the politics of missed opportunities." It is not  an accident that observers of the CIS countries (at least now) have perceived the establishment of the new agency quite indifferently. The point, as usual, is to wait and see how effective this agency will work under the management of Farit Muhametshin, the former Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan. Under the conditions of the crisis, many things will depend on the allocated budget, the cadre's policy, and the relationship between the agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because it is within MFA structure, but financially is independent of it.

However, the sentimental approach of Moscow, known as "not believing in tears" passes away. Let Mr. Medvedev talk about "the major impulse," but the game changes. Considering the emergence of the "Russian USAID," Kremlin intends to "move from the billiards to chess" as phrased by the well-known Soviet political observer, Alexandr Bovin.

On the geopolitical swing

Summarizing the above-statements in a simple way, Central Asian countries, within the realities of the crisis, have no other place to receive political and financial assistance but from Russia; and the latter will thereby gain more points while improving its state. Money today is the most evident confirmation of friendship. But it is reasonable sometimes to give the same money "under the carpet."

Certainly, the scale of impact of the financial world crisis on each country in Central Asia is different, because they differ with their economic scales, economic openness, and the levels of interactions with the "world's pockets." However, the region as a whole, has faced a very serious worsening of socio-economic indicators and deterioration of living standards. As a result, the major question of the agenda: how to maintain political independence and economic growth rates under the new conditions, taking into consideration current negative circumstances?

The region finds an answer to the question in keeping Russia and the West as counterbalancing powers. There must be a complete asymmetry: if the West does not "look through the window," Russia will do it, and vice versa. Russia definitely may direct here, its major impulse, but the region's political elite is not going to give up the multi-vector orientation.

Today, the multi-vector policy continues to be a normal phenomenon for the region, and national interests constitute its bases. Russia should not forget that the local political friendship is guided first of all, by selfish and pragmatic interests. Therefore, it is rational to define foreign policy vectors, knowing clearly why it is beneficial for Russia (since it also exercises the multi-vector principles). At the same time, an approach to Central Asian countries as "bread-eaters" is still popular among the Russian political class.

Besides, taking into account that Central Asia is more integrated into Russia than to any other country (based on cultural and linguistic factors), the future of Russian and Central-Asian relations mostly depends on Moscow. It must not be forgotten that trade-economic relations with the region (despite the relations of politicians on goods turnover growth) do not play a significant role for Russia, but Russia occupies an important position in the foreign trade relations of Central Asia. At last, the region's countries are not strongly connected with the international market (except Kazakhstan). They have been economically damaged because of the USSR collapse and than because of the current crisis.

It must be noted finally that relations with Russia and the regional countries are not affected much by the crisis and improvement of Moscow's position, but by its outcome.

Firstly, if we follow the "principle of broom" many countries are comfortable to act jointly. For instance, the establishment of the joint anti-crisis fund in December by Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with the amount of 10 billion USD to support inter-state programs is not considered a case of certain "expansion" of Russian or Kazakh capital.

Despite the skeptical view on the post-Soviet inter-state organizations' perspective, thinking that their "funeral" have been taking place in the expert minds for several years, in 2009, "the second wind" for these organizations may be expected. In this context, the summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) head of states which will take place in the summer 2009 in Ekaterinburg, Russia, will play a big role (in this meeting much will be said about the ways out of the crisis). It is expected that trade between Russia and EurAsEC states will be intensified as well as within its "mini-format" - in the future Customs union. The most significant issue in the region is not democracy, but the social and political stability. By this, in most cases, the stability of political elite is implied.

It is only Russia which may serve as a guarantor of their safety. Therefore, Russia will actively employ multilateral meetings for its own interests. In addition, the post-Soviet interstate associations include neighboring states with economies that will always territorially interact, and the Soviet heritage will last for a while, since all infrastructure systems must be maintained jointly.

It is convenient for some states that these organizations, in their current shape, do not impose particular obligations, but its membership brings many benefits. Despite the fact that many agreements remain functional on the paper, there are agreements which are operational in practice since it is beneficial for all (for example, the problem of the railroad wagon parks). There are some achievements in the field of customs regulations, standardization, struggle against organized crime, terrorism, etc.

Although, it will be difficult for Russia to progress with the ruble as a means for reciprocal payments. It is becoming worse, and its gradual devaluation is visible to anyone who is attentive to the rate exchange changes. Leaders of Central Asia will definitely show all their respect to the ruble, while stressing the "unreadiness" of their countries. By the way, the idea proposed by Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbaev on having a supra-national currency, altyn, may once again become actual.

Secondly, the real paradigm of state relations within the realities of the region is shaped by external factors. As shown in history, the geopolitical powers are often eager to measure their security threats acutely in the crisis periods and try to show off their "muscles." Under the realities of the current financial crisis, militarization may help to divert public attention from economic problems and governance mistakes, while leading to a social consolidation.  It is not occasional that 2008 passed under the name of the "new Cold War" between Russia and the USA. Many experts believe that the current crisis may lead to global military-political conflicts in 2010-2012.

As for Central Asia, a serious conflict here may be over water issues. It is possible that the internal political situation in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan may worsen after the expected mass return of migrant workers. In this view, Dmitriy Medvedev during the meeting of the Russian State Council stated that the crisis forces a strengthening of regional security.

And finally, the region lives in the new political reality after the Russian-Georgian conflict: it was the first time, when Central Asian states were requested to support/condemn, for example, regarding the recognition of sovereignty of new states - Abhazia and the South Ossetia.  

Thirdly, the events in Afghanistan have a substantial influence on the situation. The significant number of military conflict victims in this country in 2008, and the efforts of several countries to negotiate with the newly empowered "Taliban" movement oblige Central Asian countries to think that the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan as ineffective. As a result, military security remains to be the most important component in the means of ensuring the protection of the regional countries' interests; therefore, the question of military cooperation is particularly key at the moment.

If pre-election promises of Barack Obama come true, the US actions in the region may change. The American military presence in Afghanistan will be intensified. The neighboring countries of Afghanistan may be regarded as allies. Obviously, this point is about Central Asian countries. However, if the latter joins the peace-keeping activities, it will alarm the Russian leadership, which will fear to lose the region as a strategic base. Moreover, the geopolitical swing will be towards the USA, if President Barack Obama visits Central Asia.

"Watchers" of the region

 Experts, while discussing the struggle of world powers over the influence in Central Asia, often forget to account the fact that in the range of unequal "-stans," there are always its own ambitious leaders. The claims of Uzbekistan to be a "key" or "gates" of the region are well known. But in the years prior to the financial crisis, inspired by its financial success, Kazakhstan stated its intention to develop its long-term strategy in Central Asia. For the first time, this idea was voiced by President Nursultan Nazarbaev  the end of 2006, in his speech at the 15^th independence anniversary of Kazakhstan. The ultimate idea is simple, to have an opportunity to position Kazakhstan as the primary partner in the region for other countries.

The strategy must be aimed at improving the competitiveness of the region and at the prevention of political and economic risks related to  venturesome investments into Central Asian republics.  The endeavor to be an unquestioned leader in the region was demonstrated in the context of increasing interests from the European Union to Central Asia, the chairmanship of Kazakhstan in OSCE in 2010, and the US efforts to develop regional economic integration. After the Andijan events in May 2005, when the relationship of Uzbekistan with the EU and US have become more tangled, the West turned towards Kazakhstan as the most acceptable regional partner. However, the financial crisis has seriously changed regional plans of Kazakhstan. Money was needed to save its own economy, and after the visit of the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov to Astana, in April 2008, where Tashkent stated that the idea to create Central Asian States Union is not acceptable for them, it has been forgotten since then.

It must not be forgotten that in its new history, Central Asia has pursued its own policy of rapprochement since the end of Soviet perestroika, when the party leaders of Soviet republics gained independence and for the purpose of coordinating their actions to meet each other without asking a Moscow's permission.   Later, after the Soviet collapse in 1993, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on measures to improve economic integration for 1994-2000. After a year, the same countries, together with Kyrgyzstan, signed an agreement on the establishment of a single economic space. Since 1996, the agreement on free trade between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has been put into effect; and for the agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, it was put into effect since 1997. In 1998, Tajikistan joined the agreement, and the association of four countries has been officially called Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC).

Undoubtedly, the most successful format of relations among the Central Asian countries are bilateral agreements; while the regional integration stimulates processes of integration into scales out of the region, including the formation of a regionally consolidated position towards Russia. For example, during the Kishinev summit of CIS head of states in October 2002 that took place in Moldova, the country which remained at the verge of the integration process, resulted in an agreement on the establishment of EurAsEC. A more definite expression of this regional position was expressed in the summer-autumn of 2008, when none of the Central Asian countries decided to recognize the new Caucasian states after the Russian-Georgian conflict.

Among the expert community, there is a sustainable view that Central Asian integration is not an alternative integration scheme in the post-Soviet space, but one of its stages. From this viewpoint, it is logical to have CAEC as a part of EurAsEC, which happened in 2006. However, from other side, the necessity to get closer to each other was realized by the Central Asian states under the pressure of pragmatic and tendentious views to solve concrete problems (water, energy, transport, etc.) Only a part of these problems have been solved, and there are a lot of mismatches in their positions over important issues.  The integration processes are limited by the different speed of economic reforms, ambitions of certain countries, efforts to impose one's view upon others, etc. In the course of Central Asia's vain attempts during many years, the International Water-energy consortium was not yet been established.

It must be admitted that the development of integration in Central Asia has been limited also because of the increased financial opportunities of Russia. Some people in Moscow are confident that the key for regional integration is located in Kremlin.  Sometimes, the excessive self-confidence may lead to a situation when Russia, wanting to be a mediator in solving difficult regional issues, instead escalates them. "There is an on-going struggle over resources and influence in the region between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and in this struggle, Kremlin has showed its preference to the Uzbek side. It resulted in the corresponding reaction of Tajik president, Emomali Rahmon, who rejected to meet with president Medvedev on February 2," says the founder of the Institute of National Strategy, Stanislav Belkovskiy. Also, when Mr. Medvedev was visiting Tashkent, he stated that Russia, while participating in large hydro-energy projects of the region, would take into consideration third parties' views, and as a result, the relationship between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan deteriorated.

But in general, while contemplating on the post-Soviet integration, one can talk endlessly about: the ineffectiveness of the CIS, the profanation of EurAsEC (especially in the light of the recent Uzbekistan's decision to leave this organization), how CSTO is not as serious as NATO etc. Nevertheless, these schemes give a certain feeling of security. At least, there is a non-visa regime between Kazakhstan and many other countries of the former USSR; it allows the escape of many difficulties. The cooperation in the frames of CSTO is also quite important. The fact that, if necessary, Russia will come to help, is a serious and revealing argument, not only for ordinary people of Kazakhstan, but for the political elite as well.

However, it must be accepted that during several conflicts emerging in Central Asia, such as the event in Andijan, the CSTO military forces were not employed. But, where is a guarantee that in the case of significant interference from outside, these forces will not be employed? No one can guarantee it and in addition, the Central Asian region does not belong to the range of safe regions.

The carrot education  

Today, the Russian political class understands that it is not good to turn to internal problems only. It is necessary to demonstrate power by actively be involved in foreign policy. In other words, the assistance to friendly countries will indirectly encourage Russia out of the crisis. 

Of course, Russia can be perceived as the new world architect or police only in a fairytale, the capacity is not yet sufficient. Yet, by striking to "precise points for assistance" where it is possible (and it is possible where it is delicate), Russia may use the crisis for its benefit (e.g., , a non-occasional financial assistance to Iceland; the military-technical cooperation with the odious regime of Venezuela; or the reception of president of small Nicaragua, Daniel Ortegi at the high level in Kremlin).  In Central Asia, such "assistance banks" are Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan since Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan try to show their self-sufficiency.

Western observers often note that relations between Russia and Central Asia, to the most extent, are based on the energy politics. Here, the sample of Kyrgyzstan (bound by bilateral relations in various fields like culture, science, education, regional security, transport policies and strong normative bases for cooperation) which does not possess oil, obviously represents only one direction of strategic cooperation. Therefore, it is a bit primitive and a short-sighted approach to make conclusions based on the friendship "owing to oil and gas."

The flow of Russian investments into Kyrgyzstan, in a way, is an enforced act. It is not just some kind of help, it will cost Russia 2 billion USD.  This amount was mentioned prior to the crisis. But the crisis has come, and the clear dependence of Kyrgyzstan on this amount shapes the position of Bishkek: visits to Moscow, interviews and articles in the periodical Russian newspapers etc.

Russia, influenced by a number of factors, has a special interest to support Kyrgyzstan. Yes, Russia wants to tighten relations with Kyrgyzstan, since it is easy to manage to make this country more stable. In any case, such a viewpoint is present in the political and business circles. But, without being too expressive and showing false patriotism, we can say that Russian investments are the only option during the crisis.

It is beneficial for Russia to strengthen political and economic stability in Kyrgyzstan. In return, it will reverse the process of disintegration in the post-Soviet space and it will not be a serious financial burden. It is important that in the internal political circles in Russia, there will be a proud feeling of helping the poorer nations. Besides, the revolutions in Tbilisi, Kiev and Bishkek played, for a while, on the wounded Moscow's foreign policy image. By helping Kyrgyzstan, Russia will win back, and prove that not all revolutions are of the losing nature for Russia. Taking into account today's difficulties with Georgia and Ukraine, Bishkek is even becoming more pro-Russian than in the period of Askar Akaev.

A sufficient number of those in Kyrgyzstan doubt the state's capacity to provide independently for the well-being of its own citizens. It relates to the fact that the political elite of Kyrgyzstan has not been able to build an ideological, economical and political motivation base for its citizens.

The perspectives of the decent life have been hazy for many years.  The people of Kyrgyzstan need to be an agricultural nation, serving tourists as well as exporting labor. It is not occasional that the first appeals in Central Asia to have the region define clearly its foreign policy orientations came from Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan is a weak partner for Russia, which is full of its internal struggles.  Kyrgyzstan does not have significant instruments of "soft power," and maybe one can consider mountains and Lake Issyk-Kul as such instruments. Here, we see very unstable rules of the game.  The ruling elite feel, not only as owners of the poor, but of their own state. The energy sector of Kyrgyzstan is in a very difficult condition, bearing stable material losses. There is no finance for developing the state infrastructure, since the state has just started to conduct large scale privatization. Finally, Kyrgyzstan is just now planning to offer some concrete and attractive projects for these two billion USD. For today, based on the speeches of the first figures, everything comes down to general remarks, for example, the "hydro-energy wealth."

Some major measures taken by Russia to attract Kyrgyzstan into its sphere of influence relate to several factors. Russia, under the crisis conditions, acts in accordance with a simple scheme - "oil for food," i.e. not knowing how to deal with jobless migrant workers, they finance their country of origin. Moreover, it is possible that in 2009, there will be an increase of conflicts in Russia in one way or another related to the people of Central Asian origin. In addition, Russia wants to end the term of the American airbase Gansi and does not want to stand a possible emergence of new bases. One should not forget that the Russian funds positively affect the powerful in Kyrgyzstan, thus, allowing Russia to advance its interests further. The investment flow into the strategic sectors of the economy (for example, energy) is in line with the popular idea of turning Russia into the Eurasian energy empire.

The paradox of the resettlement program

Since their independence, the Central Asian countries have actively discussed the "Russian question" which is about the current condition of the Russian population in the region and their emigration to their historical homeland.  One of the stimulating factors for a new stage of discourse is the decree signed by Russian president Vladimir Putin on June 22, 2006 on "Measures to support voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad." This decree has approved the state program on supporting voluntary resettlement of compatriots to Russia and the activities designed to implement it. It also established the inter-ministerial commission on the realization of the decree. It is early to measure its final outcomes - the program will be implemented until 2012. However, several interim conclusions are suggested.

From one side, the Russians living in Kazakhstan are not perceived by Russia as the "fifth column," otherwise there would not be this program. At the same time, particularly under the crisis conditions, Moscow might understand that its efforts to maintain peace and stability in Central Asia may be to keep the Russian population in their settled places because it is cheaper, simpler and more long-term oriented rather than financing the immigration process. 

Secondly, the program adopted upon the officials' initiative was in turn endangered by their own bureaucratic approach.

Third, under the crisis realities, it is unprofitable for employers to invite their Russian compatriots who need proper accommodations and higher payments, comparatively, to illegal migrant workers from the same Central Asian region.

Fourth, the interest of Russia and the interest of potential immigrants do not match: the Russians do not want to move to those regions that are being proposed (a compromise is Kaliningrad oblast of Russia) and the available employment does not fit the immigrants' requirements.

Fifth, the current scale and the ways of the program's implementation do not lead to the solving the economic and demographic problems of Russia. Moreover, the crisis conditions may push the local population to express their anger on the newly immigrated.

And finally the sixth point, the program will not cure all because of unrealistically high expectations, and today's Russia is not able to give much.

Russian language as an instrument

Russia has a very cheap but quite substantial political instrument that may be used to spread state influence. It is the Russian language.

It is a matter of fact that Russia's interests today is to improve the effectiveness of the Russian language and upgrade its importance close to that of English. The way of improving the effectiveness of policies through language does not cost much, and may be implemented owing to the reality that the Russian space is not limited to Russia's territory.

The significant part of the budget money allocated for supporting compatriots is directed to the popularization of the Russian language and culture. For Russia, this amount is little in comparison with the funds directed to the health or realization of the federal space program. But the fact of financing the language and culture proves that it is becoming an important instrument in Russia's foreign policy.

"The Russian language was and continues to be one of the world languages. In accordance with the statistical data, the Russian language (500 million including 300 million abroad) owns the third place after the Chinese (more than 1 billion) and English (750 million) in the world based on a number of people who are able to speak it. It is the official and working language of the most authoritative international organizations (UN, OSCE, IAEA, UNESCO, WHO, etc.) In the end of the last century, in a number of countries and regions, there were alarming tendencies because of a variety of reasons. The most difficult situation with the Russian language is in the post-Soviet space," said in the document of Russian MFA "Russia and humanitarian cooperation."

The language has been used for political purposes for many centuries. A polish scholar, Max Weinreich once said "language is the dialect, which posses its own army and fleet." In fact, political values are formed in the frames of language, which are used by people striving to power or holding the power. In the Russian empire, most of the tsar noblemen did not know Russian, but spoke French or German. In today's Central Asian countries, the knowledge of the local state language is the sacred right which allows one to take a number of state positions.

The popularization of language is the political act, which defines the ways of political perception, because in each language there are unique systems of values and convictions. Language has been always an instrument of externalization of ideology and imposition of values. Finally, the victorious successes in learning English in the CIS space were possible because of the victory of English-speaking USA in the Cold War.

What defines the Russian success?

Russia's strategy in Central Asia in the near future will take into account not only an increased sensitivity of the region, but also potential confrontations of Russia's interests with other players. At that, Russia does not want to engage into the "new Great game," with Washington. The shape of Kremlin's foreign policy will be more precise while transparency and predictability are the requirements for the external forces. It will be an acceptable pragmatism, based on the limited capacity of Russia's resources.  Therefore, it will be concentrated only on several fields- security, economy, humanitarian sphere and protection of compatriots.

"Without an effective political strategy, Russia cannot rely on the inertia of eternal friendships with former Soviet republics. It is good that relations with CIS counties will be founded on the systematic basis and will become a real priority as opposed to the declared one," thinks the Russian political scholar, Yuriy Solozobov.

According to Yuriy Solozobov, there is a set of basic principles, which should serve as a foundation for Russia's approach towards the regional counties. First of all, Moscow is ready to provide for internal political and economical stability in the whole post-Soviet space, while opposing a destructive external influence in any form. Secondly, Russia is ready to cooperate with an entire spectrum of political forces, both with the current authorities, and the constructive opposition. Thirdly, good neighbor relations with Russia are the milestone of stability, and must not alter in case of internal political changes in the regional countries.

Fourthly, it is important to maintain and develop the common cultural space, which plays the key role in the formation of the joint political atmosphere.

Solozobov indicates three major reasons of the mutual interest between Russia and the countries of the region. The first is the development of energy dialogues, which is objectively justified by the existing infrastructure of the previously joint Soviet energy complex. The second aspect is military-political in nature; the common standards of weaponry and training, the united system of anti-missile defense. The third element of interconnection is the linguistic and cultural commonality developed during the Soviet Union. This connection is visible through the existing common education systems and technical standards, as well as similar cultural stereotypes of behavior. Perhaps, it may explain why Moscow's influence in the post-Soviet space still remains powerful compared to the lavish encouragements of external power centers.  

Eduard Poletaev, a political scientist from Kazakhstan, Editor-in-chief of the magazine "Mir Evrazii" (The World of Eurasia)